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Summer 1983

Bruce Russett
Donald R. DeLuca — Theater Nuclear Forces: Public Opinion in Western Europe

Raymond L. Garthoff — The NATO Decision on Theater Nuclear Forces

Laura M. Lake — The Environmental Mandate

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Book Reviews

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From the Editor:

In this issue. . .

BRUCE RUSSETT and DONALD R. DELUCA look at European public opinion data on nuclear arms deployment and arms control. They argue that the data refute charges that Europeans are becoming neutralist, pacifist, or anti-American, but confirm that Europeans have serious doubts about the prudence of contemporary American leaders.

RAYMOND L. GARTHOFF reviews the NATO decision of 1979 on deploying new intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe. He finds that among the complex considerations underlying that decision, reassurance of the Western Alliance itself was at least as important as deterrence of the Soviet Union.

LAURA M. LAKE analyzes the environmental mandate of the 1970s and argues that the recent stalemate over renewing environmental laws is due to a misperception of the nature of public support. She finds that the environmental mandate is broad and long-lived and that the environmentalist electorate contrasts sharply with the stereotype of the environmental movement.

CHARLES E. ZIEGLER examines the sources of worker dissatisfaction in the USSR and the attempts of the Soviet regime to cope with this discontent through expanded participation. He contends that the regime's strategy has been moderately effective in reducing worker dissatisfaction and that the politicization of Soviet workers has remained inchoate.

CORNELIUS P. COTTER discusses the party leadership record of a president, Dwight Eisenhower, who was assumed to have eschewed a party role. He finds that Eisenhower had a clear conception of how the party related to his administration and consistently sought to influence the organization, leadership, and staffing of the Republican National Committee and to strengthen the party in the states.

WILLIAM WEST and JOSEPH COOPER focus on the congressional veto as a means of controlling administrative rulemaking. They contend that criticisms of the veto are based on faulty assumptions concerning the legislative and administrative processes and that the veto, if structured properly, can have salutary effects as an oversight device in many areas of administrative rulemaking.

DEMETRIOS CARALEY

P.S. It is a pleasure to report to our readers that the *PSQ* is now the most widely circulating journal of political science in the United States.

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Theater Nuclear Forces: Public Opinion in Western Europe

BRUCE RUSSETT
DONALD R. DELUCA

Despite the outcome of the March 1983 West German elections—favorable from the point of view of the Reagan administration—it is clear that many Europeans do not support the deployment of a new generation of American theater nuclear weapons in their countries. Some observers imagine that this reluctance is based on a new "war scare," an upsurge of pacifism, or a new wave of anti-Americanism. None of these explanations, however, can be supported by closer analysis. There was a "war scare" around 1980, but it has now passed; no upsurge of pacifism ever existed; and anti-Americanism is present, but in no significantly greater degree than the postwar norm. The problem is both more specific and more general—a new loss of confidence in the current political leadership of the United States combined with a longstanding popular reluctance to rely as confidently as do their governments on nuclear deterrence. Suspicion and distaste are directed toward the American government, not toward American citizens. These attitudes are more widespread in Britain than in West Germany, and they are concentrated in the young, those voters who will be in the electorate for decades to come. Unless the implications of these attitudes are faced constructively, the recent crisis in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) over West European defense will not be the last of its kind. An undercurrent of fear and mistrust will remain, surfacing periodically with unpredictable and profoundly dangerous implications.

BRUCE RUSSETT is professor of political science at Yale University, editor of the *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, and president of the International Studies Association. His latest book is *The Prisoners of Insecurity: Nuclear Deterrence, the Arms Race, and Arms Control.* DONALD R. DELUCA is director of the Office for Teaching and Research at the Roper Center, Yale University. His major research emphasis involves quantitative analyses of attitudes and behavior, especially on topics related to energy, environment, and technology.

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These assertions can be documented with a wide range of public opinion survey material from the major nations of Western Europe. Many surveys contain similar questions asked in many countries throughout the region, or similar questions repeated periodically over years or even decades. While there are many pitfalls for the unwary in analyzing such survey data, analyses across countries and time can provide some crucial information about the relative depth of popular concern.[1] It is, of course, another matter to move from statements about the nature of public opinion to statements about the probable impact of that opinion on governmental policy. Even democratic governments often can long insulate themselves from the popular mood. But in the long run no government, especially a democratic one, can depend on resisting the deeply felt will of its people.

Fears of War

As Figure 1 shows, there clearly was a sharp upsurge in "the fear of a world war within the subsequent ten years" in all the major countries of the European Community (EC) between 1977 and 1980. We cannot be sure just when that surge became strong, but it is likely to have been after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan at the end of 1979. People in most countries calmed their fears by late 1981, though the West Germans—in a position to be most alarmed by President Reagan's and Secretary of State Alexander Haig's offhand remarks in the spring of 1981 about fighting a "limited" nuclear war in Europe—actually became more worried. Significant relaxation is apparent in all countries by the end of 1982, although the level of fear was, in most instances, still a little higher than it had been in 1977. Longer-term data suggest that recent fears of war in West Germany and Britain have been at a level that is a little above the average for the 1960s and the early 1970s, though lower than during the Berlin crisis of 1961.[2]

Expectations of war are not significantly linked to specific segments of the population. For example, they are about as common among men as among women, and equally prevalent among the various age groups. Nor are they related to political opinion, either on a standard "left-right" political spectrum or on a scale of foreign-policy preference ranging from pro-NATO through neutralism to a pro-Soviet orientation.

Instead, they are closely associated with personal life conditions. Those who "cannot or only just about make ends meet," for whom, at work, "things are going rather badly," or who, in regard to their lives in general, are "not at all satisfied," are much more likely than others to think there is a better than even chance of war.[3] In other words, the "expectation of war" question becomes

[1] For example, see John P. Robinson, *Polls Apart* (Cabin John, Md.: Seven Locks Press, 1982).

[2] *Gallup Political Index*, No. 268 (December 1982):20; and Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, ed., *The Germans: Public Opinion Polls, 1967–1980* (London: Greenwood Press, 1981), 490.

[3] *Eurobarometre* 13 (June 1980): 20.

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FIGURE 1

Assessment of Risk of War in Next Ten Years
Percentage of those expressing an opinion who considered war "certain" or "more than 50/50 chance"



Source: *Eurobarometre:* 16 (December 1981) 9 and 7/8 (1980): 145; and *Gallup Political Index* (Britain) No. 269 (January 1983), 15–18.

something of a projective test indicating the overall state of an individual's psychological mood, rather than the person's considered evaluation of the state of world affairs. In times of international political tension the number of people expecting war may increase, but their susceptibility to fear depends more on their personal experiences than on their political convictions. It also is worth noting that the fear of war is notably less severe in Western Europe than in the United States. Indeed, it is greater among Americans than anywhere else save among white South Africans (who occupy a global pariah status). Table 1 shows the average probability of war (on a 0 to 100 scale) assigned in various countries, in December 1982, with the United States at the top.

Two further aspects of European fear of war emerge in another set of data, given in Table 2. First, several years ago there was a serious expectation of Soviet attack, but that expectation has since dwindled to a very low level. Second, the Europeans are nearly as afraid of American adventurism ("the United

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TABLE 1

Average Estimates in Selected Countries of the Probability of a World War, December 1982

Question: "Here is a sort of scale." [Show card, with percentage gradations from 0 to 100, by tens.] "Would you, with the help of this card, tell me how you assess the chances of a world war breaking out in the next ten years?"

Country:	*Average December 1982 Estimate (percent)*
United States	45
South Africa (white)	44
Canada	38
France	35
Netherlands	34
Ireland	33
Switzerland	32
West Germany	32
Belgium	32
Norway	31
Luxembourg	30
Sweden	29
Great Britain	28
Italy	26
Finland	26
Denmark	26
Greece	18

Source: *Gallup Political Index* (Britain), No. 269 (January 1983), 15–18.

TABLE 2

Perceptions of the Likelihood of an Attack

Question: Russian attack: "How likely do you think it is that Russia will attack Western Europe within the next five years – very likely, fairly likely, not so likely, not at all likely?" (Percentage is of those answering "very likely" or "fairly likely.")

Question: U.S. attack: "How likely do you think it is that the United States will attack Eastern Europe within the next five years – very likely, fairly likely, not so likely, not at all likely?" (Percentage of those answering "very likely" or "fairly likely.")

	Russian Attack (Percent)			*U.S. Attack (Percent)*
	May	*March*	*February*	*February*
Country	*1979*	*1981*	*1982*	*1982*
France	62	42	–	–
West Germany	71	55	15	11
Britain	–	48	21	21

Sources: Kenneth Adler and Douglas Wertman, "West European Security Concerns for the Eighties: Is NATO in Trouble?" (paper prepared for the annual meeting of the American Association of Public Opinion Research, Bucks Hill, Pa., May 1981); Gallup International Survey reported in *Newsweek*, 15 March 1982, 9.

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FIGURE 2

Net Predominance of Favorable Over Unfavorable Opinion of the United States

QUESTION: "What is your overall opinion of the United States? Do you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable, or very unfavorable opinion of the U.S.?"



In the interest of brevity, only the net predominance of favorable over unfavorable opinion is shown. (Two favorable categories combined, minus two unfavorable.) As an example of how to read this graph, in Great Britain in October 1954 there was a 40 percent predominance of favorable opinion (49 percent) over unfavorable opinion (9 percent) toward the United States. This is the latest question wording; earlier wording varied, but still permits comparison of net approval.

Source: Leo P. Crespi, "Trends in U.S. Standing in West European Public Opinion," USICA Report R-4-82, February 1982; February 1982 Gallup International Survey reported in *Newsweek*, 15 March 1982, 9.

States will attack Eastern Europe") as of Soviet adventurism, though neither fear is very great.[4]

Anti-Americanism

West Europeans are less confident than they once were in the basic prudence and reliability of the United States. This downturn in European evaluation

[4] These fears of the United States are greatest in Britain. In January 1983 this question was posed: "Who is more likely to initiate a nuclear attack in Europe, the United States or the Soviet Union?" The results were 28 percent for the United States and 48 percent for the Soviet Union. In West Germany, the division was 20 to 45 percent, and in France 12 to 65 percent. (The remainder in each country had no opinion.) See *Newsweek*, International Edition, 31 January 1983, 11.

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TABLE 3

Confidence in United States Ability to Handle World Problems

Question: "In general how much confidence do you have in the ability of the U.S. to handle world problems—a great deal, a fair amount, not very much, or none at all?" (Percentages are the sum of "a great deal" and "a fair amount.")

Survey Date	*Britain*	*France*	*West Germany*	*Italy*
1972[1]	65	41	57	58
1982	4	33	49	42

[1] Data for 1972 are an average of three surveys (January, March, and June).

Sources: Crespi, "Trends in U.S. Standing"; February 1982 Gallup International Surveys reported in *Newsweek*, 15 March 1982, 9. The survey question varied somewhat in the 1970s but, according to USICA, "not so much as to preclude a broad comparability."

emerges in many surveys in all the major countries. Figure 2, for instance, shows a clear drop in "overall opinion of the United States" since the 1960s, and Table 3 a shorter-term drop even since the early 1970s (during the Vietnam War), in "confidence in the ability of the United States to handle world problems." The perception was worst in Britain, and has become more so. Opinion of the United States was already at an all-time low in February 1982. Only 33 percent of Britons gave positive answers to this question, with 64 percent reporting they had little or no confidence.[5]

These doubts are focused especially on the personage of President Reagan. A British survey in June 1982 found only 31 percent believing that President Reagan "is proving a good president of the United States," with 29 percent saying their opinion had "gone down recently," and only 10 percent saying it had gone up. Lest it be imagined this evaluation is merely a response to lukewarm American support for Britain during the Falkland Islands conflict in April and May of 1982, it may be noted that opinions were even lower in November 1982, with only 23 percent saying he is a good president and 29 percent saying their opinion had gone down recently, and with only 3 percent reporting an improvement.[6] A decline in a leader's popularity after he or she has held office for a while is of course common. All recent American presidents have had the same experience, and the approval rating in the United States of "the way Ronald Reagan is handling his job as president" fell from 49 to 41 percent during the course of 1982.[7] West Europeans particularly may have begun the Reagan term with excessively high hopes out of frustration with aspects of the Carter presidency. If so, some decline is hardly surprising. More informative is the specific content of some West European attitudes, as revealed by the example of West German attitudes. Table 4 reports the decline in German opinion of President Reagan, as given by the use of various adjectives to describe his character.

[5] Opinion Research Limited survey, *New York Times*, 16 February 1983.

[6] *Gallup Opinion Index* (Britain), No. 267 (November 1982), 14.

[7] Gallup Poll news release, 3 February 1983, for the American data.

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TABLE 4

How West Germans View Ronald Reagan

Character Profile (Eigenschaftsprofil)	*Percent*		
	November 1980	*July–August 1981*	*October 1981*
Calculating (*berechnend*)	29	34	37
Imprudent (*rucksichtslos*)	15	24	28
Aggressive	19	16	23
Educated (*gebildet*)	30	21	19
Far Sighted (*weitblickend*)	32	30	24
Trustworthy (*vertrauenswurdig*)	27	23	19
Intelligent (*intelligent*)	45	38	27

Source: EMNID surveys, reported in *EMNID Informationen* 10 (1981), 17.

Doubts about the ability of the United States government to deal responsibly with world problems must not, however, be confused with simple "anti-Americanism." On the contrary, at the same time that indications of confidence in American leadership has waned, indications of positive personal feelings toward Americans have waxed. West German citizens are much more likely than at any time since the mid-1960s to say they "like" the Americans, as shown in Figure 3. Moreover, while doubts about American leadership are greatest among the young, so, by a small margin, are positive attitudes toward individual Americans.[8]

Neutralism

West Europeans may question the prudence and judgment of the United States government, but as yet they show little sympathy for a neutralist foreign policy. West Germans in particular welcome the presence of American troops on their soil. They consider them "a welcome protection," and would "regret" their departure. They prefer a close alliance with the United States to one of political equidistance between America and Russia, and show virtually no interest in a close political relationship with the Soviet Union. Most West Germans see their security as inextricably bound to the NATO alliance in general, and to the United States in particular. As Figure 3 shows, this German reliance on the American connection has become stronger, not weaker, in recent years.[9]

If the question is asked in terms of "security," that is, in the context of military relationships and fears of war or invasion, the overall level of commitment

[8] Noelle-Neumann, ed., *The Germans*, 420.

[9] Four surveys taken between 1977 and 1981 asked respondents' preference for working more closely with each (or both) of the two superpowers. About one-half (49 to 56 percent) chose "prefer to work more closely with the U.S.," while about one-third (32 to 41 percent) indicated that they "prefer to work equally closely with U.S. and U.S.S.R." See Elizabeth Noelle-Neumann, "Breite Mehrheit," *Capital* (August 1981): 90.

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FIGURE 3

German Attitudes Toward Americans and American Troops

Question I: "Generally speaking, do you like the Americans, or don't you like them particularly?" ("Like Americans" is the dotted line.)
Question II: "If you read in the paper tomorrow that the Americans were pulling their troops out of Europe, would you welcome that or would you regret it?" ("Would regret troop withdrawal" is solid line.)



Sources: Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, ed., *The Germans*; Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, "Are the Germans 'Collapsing' or 'Standing Firm'?" *Encounter* (1981): 76–81; and German Information Center, *Focus on the Federal Republic of Germany* 2 (April 1982):6. In this same issue, the German Information Center presented similar trends in survey data on whether "Foreign troops constitute an 'unavoidable necessity,' 'a welcome protection,' or an 'undesirable burden.'" An increasing number of Germans—now a slight plurality, 44 percent—describe the troops as a "welcome protection," and only a small number—12 percent—take the highly negative "undesirable burden" stance.

of West Europeans to NATO is strong. It is not an unequivocal commitment, containing as it does frequent demands for more control and consultation in forming NATO policy. Furthermore, the French prefer their partial association with NATO—allied, but not under the NATO unified military command—to a closer association. But nowhere is there substantial support for military neutrality or accommodation to the Soviet Union ("Finlandization"), or even for

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TABLE 5

Percentage of University-educated People Who Favor NATO or Neutrality, March 1981 (NATO/Neutrality Ratio)

Question: "All things considered, do you think it is better for our country to belong to NATO, the Western defense alliance, or would it be better for us to get out of NATO and become a neutral country?"

	Age		
Country	*18–34*	*35–49*	*50 and older*
West Germany	59/28	63/25	95/5
Britain	62/27	70/21	86/5
France	53/33	61/34	79/18
Italy	56/39	82/18	81/14

Source: Kenneth Adler and Douglas Wertman, "Is NATO in Trouble? A Survey of European Attitudes," *Public Opinion* 4 (1981): 10. Similar data appear in Noelle-Neumann, ed., *The Germans*, 418.

creation of a European military force independent of the United States. Nor is NATO seen simply as a mechanism to avoid bearing what West Europeans see as a reasonable share of the burdens for their defense. Many at least say they would pay more in return for "more say in NATO." Those who prefer the NATO option turn out to be those who are most willing to spend money on defense; certainly there is virtually no sentiment for armed neutrality, with Western Europe balancing between East and West.[10]

However, one should not accept this reassurance too readily. As can be shown in the answers to many other questions, sharp differences emerge among age groups. The majority of older people everywhere in the Atlantic Alliance are firm in their adherence to NATO and in their rejection of neutralism. Among the young, especially those under 35, this adherence is less in evidence. There are signs of a serious "generation gap" among Europeans on this issue, a gap that is most serious in the ranks of the well-educated and therefore in the ranks of those who are likely over time to be most politically influential. Table 5 shows this situation clearly.

Citizens of the other major West European countries are less wedded to NATO and the United States than are the Germans. If asked to express a very general preference regarding "international policy," neutrality attracts substantial support.[11] This support seems to represent a desire for good political and economic relations with both superpowers and probably more than a small wish to distance themselves from recent American hard-line policies toward the Soviet Union and its allies. Most West Europeans, for instance, had little sym-

[10] This analysis is of data from *Eurobarometre* 14 (December 1980), including a cross-tabulation of two items from that survey: military alliance policy preference against preferred levels of spending on defense.

[11] Albert Du Roy, "Montée du Neutralisme," *Samedi*, 21 November 1981.

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pathy for the Americans' policy of imposing sanctions on Russia following the Afghanistan invasion and the crackdown on Solidarity in Poland.

Furthermore, there is an increasing belief that "the Russians are today basically sincere in their desire to negotiate with the West." Whereas most West Germans still do not believe that this is the case, the trend is definitely toward greater belief in the sincerity of the Soviets.[12] Surveys of attitudes toward placement of the new generation of nuclear-armed missiles on West European soil repeatedly show strong preferences for arms control rather than missile deployment. If asked to choose between the missiles and arms control, the typical preference in West Germany, Britain, the Netherlands, and Italy is about two-to-one in favor of arms control. The preferred "solution" is the official NATO "double-track" option: tentative plans to deploy the missiles while pursuing arms control negotiations that would make them unnecessary. In West Germany, Britain, and the Netherlands, a majority can be mustered in favor of the new weapons only under hypothetical circumstances in which arms control talks failed. In Italy a majority for the weapons cannot be found even then.[13] Arms control is widely popular, coupled with a sense that a reasonable agreement with the Soviet Union is possible if the NATO countries really want it.

Pacifism

If most West Europeans cannot correctly be described as neutralist, neither can they readily be labelled pacifist. Table 6 shows that a solid majority of citizens in all the major countries (except Italy, and a clear plurality there) declare it "would be better to fight in defense of your country than to accept Russian domination." West Europeans are not pacifists. They say they are prepared to fight, and surely they would not welcome Soviet occupation.

At the same time, there are cracks in this seemingly solid determination. When the spectre of nuclear war is evoked, the response is quite different. Despite the stated West German willingness to fight, when the questions are asked differently the results are quite different. Another variant, for instance, is: "If we are one day faced with the choice of either letting Europe become Soviet or defending ourselves against such a fate by every means, which is more important—to defend democratic freedom, even if it means a nuclear war, or to avoid war at all costs, even if it means living under a Communist govern-

[12] Thirty-six percent said they did believe in the Russians' sincerity in July 1981, as compared with 48 percent who expressed disbelief. The break was 17 to 57 percent in April 1959. Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, "Are the Germans 'Collapsing' or 'Standing Firm'?" *Encounter* (1981): 76–81.

[13] U.S. International Communication Agency Surveys, 21 April 1981 and 1 June 1981. The USICA, now the USIA, and other organizations have continued to ask questions regarding the emplacement of cruise missiles. They have obtained similar results whenever the question is asked in a form that is at all unbiased. Three British surveys in January and February 1983 showed clear majorities against cruise missile deployment in that country. See *The Guardian*, 24 January 1983, the *Sunday Times*, 23 January 1983, and the *New York Times*, 16 February 1983. The five-year trends in virtually all of this material, moreover, are definitely unfavorable to deployment.

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TABLE 6

Russian Domination Versus War

Question: "Some people say that war is so horrible that it is better to accept Russian domination than to risk war. Others say it would be better to fight in defense of your country than to accept Russian domination. Which opinion is closer to your own?"

	Percent in Favor in Each Country			
Option	*Britain*	*Germany*	*France*	*Italy*
Better to accept domination	12	19	13	17
Better to fight	75	74	57	48
Don't know	13	7	30	35

Source: Gallup surveys as reported in *Newsweek*, 15 March 1982, 9.

ment?" When this question was presented in July 1981, the split was 45 percent to avoid nuclear war at all costs, only 30 percent to defend democracy, and 25 percent unable to decide. Not surprisingly, nuclear war raises the ante. Also, among young people (under 30), the proportion wanting to "avoid nuclear war at all costs" is 10 percentage points higher than among their elders.[14]

The Soviet-American Military Balance

West Europeans live in the shadow of Soviet military might and many of them regard their strategic position as significantly inferior to that of the Soviet Union. West Germans have been asked: "Supposing the Russians were to start a war, do you think that we, together with NATO, have enough troops and would be sufficiently well armed to stave off an attack from Russia and prevent them from entering our country, or don't you think that we could defend ourselves against a serious Russian attack?" In May 1981, 41 percent answered that they could not expect to defend themselves, whereas only 25 percent thought they could do so. Ten years earlier the comparable figures had been 37 percent and 27 percent. The results indicate an overall negative evaluation at both times and a drop in confidence in West German military security, though not a precipitous one.[15] In fact, West Europeans have always felt uneasy about their defensive capabilities, and the current skepticism is only a little greater than usual. Table 7 shows the trends from 1957 to 1981 in the four major countries in perceptions of which side, the United States or the Soviet Union, is ahead in total military strength. The data are not fully comparable over time because of a change in question wording between 1969 and 1977. The earlier wording did not offer "neither" or "equal" as an option (though some people volunteered it). The presence of this option in 1977 seemed to cut especially into

[14] Noelle-Neumann, "Are the Germans 'Collapsing'?" and Noelle-Neumann, "Breite Mehrheit," 88.

[15] Noelle-Neumann, ed., *The Germans*, and Noelle-Neumann "Breite Mehrheit," 88.

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TABLE 7

Perception of United States and Soviet Military Strength, 1957-81

Question (1957-69): "All things considered, which country do you think is ahead in total military strength at the present time – the US or the Soviet Union?"

Question (1977-81): "How do you think the US and the USSR compare at the present time in total military strength – US considerably ahead, US somewhat ahead, US and USSR about equal, USSR somewhat ahead, USSR considerably ahead?"

Country and Date	*U.S. Ahead (percent)*	*USSR Ahead (percent)*	*Neither Ahead (percent)*
Britain			
1981 (October)	10	51	29
1977 (March)	10	50	19
1969 (October-November)	33	34	13
1957 (November)	19	50	6
France			
1981 (October)	15	34	33
1977 (March)	16	34	27
1969 (October-November)	40	26	19
1957 (November)	17	25	20
West Germany			
1981 (October)	15	38	29
1977 (March)	15	34	35
1969 (October-November)	41	26	25
1957 (November)	38	23	20
Italy			
1981 (October)	24	29	41
1977 (March)	22	20	34
1969 (October-November)	44	13	25
1957 (November)	34	22	23

Sources: Kenneth P. Adler and Douglas A. Wertman, "West European Security Concerns for the Eighties: Is NATO in Trouble?" (paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the American Association of Public Opinion Research, Bucks Hill, Pa., May 1981); Crespi, "Trends in U.S. Standing." "Don't Know" answers are omitted from the table.

the proportion (already a minority) who would otherwise characterize the United States as ahead. Nonetheless, the change in question wording does not obscure some basic conclusions that emerge from Table 7.

First, perception of American relative military strength has clearly declined in all countries since the 1960s. This shift corresponds roughly to the changing overall strategic balance as perceived by most military experts, from American superiority to a situation of no more than rough "parity" or "essential equivalence." Second, perceptions differ significantly in different countries. Italians consistently have had the most favorable impression of American military strength; the British have had the worst.

Furthermore, even in the 1950s and early 1960s, the British, the French, and often the West Germans regularly perceived the Soviet Union as militarily superior. This is notable because it happened at a time when the Soviet Union

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TABLE 8

Preferred Power Alignment: United States Versus Soviet Union, 1974

Question: "Whatever you think may actually happen, which would you personally like to see more powerful ten years from now, the United States or the Soviet Union—or would you rather see them about equal in power?"

Sample by Country	*U.S. More Powerful (percent)*	*USSR More Powerful (percent)*	*About Equal (percent)*	*Don't Know (percent)*
Elites:				
British	37	1	61	1
French	25	5	62	8
German	35	2	61	2
Italian	30	5	60	5
Public:				
British	49	1	47	3
French	21	6	62	11
German	39	4	51	6
Italian	28	6	54	12

Source: United States Advisory Commission Information, *28th Report to Congress* (Washington, D.C., 1977), 123.

clearly was not ahead—behind in strategic weapons, and probably not measurably superior even in the European theater.[16] Many NATO military and civilian leaders, however, have regularly proclaimed their fears about Soviet military superiority for the purpose of spurring further defensive efforts by the Western allies. They seem to have been successful in conveying their stated perceptions, if not in bringing about the desired level of military effort.

Finally, in their perceptions of the relative military balance, the Europeans are not discernibly more pessimistic than Americans have been. The American public also lost confidence in American military capability, increasingly so during the late 1970s. Fully 41 percent of Americans said that they felt "the military defense system of the United States is weaker than that of the Russians" in February 1980, as compared with only 27 percent in December 1976.[17] West Europeans thus are not victims of a peculiarly West European wave of "panic."

"Panic," in fact, is hardly the correct term. Quite to the contrary, most Europeans feels more comfortable in a world of approximate military parity between the superpowers. Since the middle of the 1960s, repeated samplings have almost always shown a clear preference for parity, not for American superiority. Table

[16] Alain Enthoven and Wayne Smith, *How Much is Enough* (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), discussed the reality behind contemporary evaluations of the European military balance. In strategic missiles, we now know the United States had a ten-to-one superiority at the time of the Cuban missile crisis.

[17] Harris surveys as reported in Connie DeBoer, "The Polls: Our Commitment to World War III," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 45 (1981): 129.

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TABLE 9

Perceived Effects of American Nuclear Missiles or Troops Stationed in Western Europe, February 1982

Question: "What is the effect of having American nuclear missiles (troops) stationed in Western Europe?"

Perceived Effect	*Britain (percent)*	*France (percent)*	*West Germany (percent)*	*Belgium (percent)*
Increases chances of an attack				
Missiles	42	24	27	24
Troops	25	–	15	22
Provides greater protection				
Missiles	29	31	41	25
Troops	24	–	48	25
No effect/Don't know				
Missiles	29	45	32	51
Troops	51	–	37	54

Source: February 1982 Gallup International Surveys, reported in *Newsweek*, 15 March 1982, 9.

8 demonstrates this beyond doubt for both elite and mass population samples.[18] The reason for this result is simple: parity implies mutual deterrence and caution; superiority implies the possibility of recklessness and adventurism. Europeans prefer that neither side has confidence it can "win" a world war or a European war.

Another aspect of West European fears about provocative military postures can be seen in Table 9. Here, as in Figure 3, there appears evidence of the welcome that West Europeans give to American troops on their territory. Except in Britain, the troops are seen as a deterrent that provides protection. American nuclear missiles, however, are another matter. For the British, the missiles are seen as making an attack more likely, not deterring it. In Belgium the split in perception is about even, and in West Germany the missiles would, on balance, be preferred. But in every case the missiles are far less welcome than the troops.

This perception is especially significant in light of plans to deploy Pershing II missiles in Western Europe. These new missiles will be capable of striking at or near Soviet command and control centers in Moscow, in a time of only about five minutes from launch to impact, with greater accuracy than anything yet deployed. Since they will be only clumsily mobile, by many experts' judgment they both threaten Soviet territory and invite a pre-emptive Soviet strike. West Europeans, whether or not they are familiar with all the technical details, can nevertheless be pardoned for wondering whether such weapons "increase chances of an attack." As the distinguished British military historian Michael

[18] Earlier surveys demonstrating the same point are found in United States Advisory Commission on Information, *28th Report to Congress* (Washington, D.C., 1977), 122.

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Howard has put it, weapons not only must provide deterrence of one's enemies, they must also provide reassurance to one's friends.[19] Not all American weapons systems can easily do so.

Nuclear weapons are relatively cheap. In the words immortalized by Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson during the Eisenhower administration, they provide "more bang for the buck." American officials have seen nuclear weapons as providing "affordable" deterrence, in contrast to the heavy expenditures thought necessary to defend Western Europe from a conventional (non-nuclear) attack purely by conventional means. Nuclear weapons provide an "equalizer" for the technologically superior West against the Eastern "hordes." West European governments typically have shared this judgment; indeed in 1983 both France and Britain were cutting back their conventional forces so they could buy a new generation of nuclear weapons. The preference for nuclear deterrence has been thought, furthermore, to be politically popular—certainly more popular than would be bigger defense budgets for conventional forces.

But there is reason, in public opinion sources, to wonder whether that preference is really so widely shared. The British public has at least given hints to the contrary. One question read as follows: "It is often said that if we gave up nuclear weapons we would have to increase total expenditure on conventional forces because conventional forces would be more expensive. Would you prefer to keep nuclear weapons, or spend more on conventional forces?" The answers split 42 percent for nuclear weapons, and 45 percent for spending more on conventional forces. (The remaining 13 percent had no opinion.) Similarly, another survey asked: "If the money to spend on arms alone could not be changed, would you prefer the Government to spend more on non-nuclear forces and less on nuclear arms, maintain the present balance, or spend more on nuclear arms and less on non-nuclear forces?" A plurality (38 percent) choose "the present balance." But of the others, 31 percent would spend more on non-nuclear forces, and only 17 percent more on nuclear arms.[20] It is of course not clear that the public would be so approving when it actually came time to reallocate expenditures. Nevertheless, one fact is clear: nuclear arms may be accepted in Britain, but they are not loved.

NATO has long maintained a posture of "flexible response" in Europe. That is, any Soviet attack would be met with whatever weapons were necessary to try to contain it. An attack with tactical nuclear weapons presumably would be met with nuclear weapons, either tactical or, very possibly, with strategic weapons launched against the Soviet homeland. A conventional attack might be resisted with only conventional weapons, or, especially considering the widespread image of NATO conventional inferiority in Western Europe, with nuclear weap-

[19] Michael Howard, "Reassurance and Deterrence: Western Defense in the 1980s," *Foreign Affairs* 61 (1983): 309–24.

[20] MARPLAN survey, November 1980, conducted for *Weekend World*, and survey conducted by National Opinion Polls, reported in *Political, Social, Economic Review* 34 (December 1981): 24.

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TABLE 10

Attitudes About Use of Nuclear Weapons in Europe by NATO, July 1981

Question: "There are different opinions about the use of nuclear weapons in Europe by NATO. Which one of the following opinions is closest to your own?"

	Britain (percent)	*France (percent)*	*West Germany (percent)*	*Italy (percent)*
NATO should not use nuclear weapons of any kind under any circumstances	24	44	29	42
NATO should use nuclear weapons only if the Soviet Union uses them first in attacking Western Europe	47	32	37	39
NATO should use nuclear weapons to defend itself if a Soviet attack by conventional forces threatened to overwhelm NATO forces.	19	17	17	12
No opinion	10	8	17	8

Source: Leo P. Crespi, "West European Perceptions of the U.S." (paper presented at the convention of the International Society of Political Psychology, June 1982), Table 4.

ons. The argument has been that the possible or probable resort to nuclear weapons is necessary if deterrence is to be reliable. No one imagines that either conventional or nuclear war in Europe would be anything but immensely destructive; but the nuclear threat is supposed to deter, and thus prevent, either.

The West European populace, however, has long-standing doubts on the wisdom of using or of threatening to use nuclear weapons in Europe. Indeed, these doubts have mounted over the years. Repeated surveys in all major European countries found extreme skepticism toward fighting a nuclear war even two and three decades ago.[21] Except for the first two surveys in Britain, in virtually no case was there a net approval (percentage approving minus percentage disapproving) for a first use of nuclear weapons even if NATO forces were being overrun. The longer NATO has relied on a "first use" posture, the more negative attitudes have become.

West European doubts about the wisdom of nuclear "first use" have hardly been assuaged by more recent developments. Table 10 gives the results to a similar survey question in July 1981. The options presented ranged from the complete rejection of the use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances, through purely retaliatory "nuclear in return for nuclear" use, to the standard NATO posture of "flexible response" (that is, use of nuclear weapons "if a Soviet attack by conventional forces threatened to overwhelm NATO forces). The latter statement ("threatened to overwhelm") actually is a fairly strong proposition, one that would seem to encourage assent. But the striking conclu-

[21] Leo Crespi, "West European Perceptions of the U.S." (paper presented to the convention of the International Society of Political Psychology, June 1982).

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sion is that few people did in fact give that assent; fewer than 20 percent of any country's populace approved NATO first use of nuclear weapons. The same question has been repeated in subsequent surveys with similar results.

Implications for the Future

Many observers over the past thirty years have periodically declared NATO to be "in crisis." So far, the Alliance has weathered such crises. The fact that disaster has always been averted must not, however, obscure the major problems and differences of opinion among NATO members. West Europeans, and particularly the West Germans, are exposed to possible Soviet occupation in a way that Americans have never been. Moreover, West Europeans have already twice in this century experienced disasters of "conventional" wars to a degree unknown in the United States. As a result of these two facts—exposure and experience—West Europeans desperately want to deter the initiation of any war on their soil. "Limited" nuclear war has little meaning in one of the most urbanized and densely populated areas in the world; a full-scale conventional war would be little better. West Europeans therefore want to be reassured that war in general can be deterred, and overwhelmingly have chosen to rely on an alliance with the United States, through NATO, to provide that deterrence. They are not anti-American, neutralist, or pacifist. But neither are they confident in the good judgment of contemporary American leaders, nor are they reassured by talk of fighting a limited nuclear war in Europe, or convinced that a new generation of theater nuclear weapons—the 464 ground-launched cruise missiles and 108 Pershing II ballistic missiles—will truly deter an attack.

The immediate danger to NATO cohesion raised by the new weapons deployment issue may be resolved, either by conclusion of an arms control agreement or by a determination by the governments to go ahead with deployment in the absence of arms control. The underlying problem of retaining Alliance cohesion will not, however, so readily be put aside. The people of Western Europe will remain deeply disturbed by the risks inherent in their security predicament. They fear the risk that, for one reason or another—inadvertent crisis escalation more likely than deliberate assault—they will again suffer devastation. As a result, continued reliance on nuclear deterrence will continue to evoke ambivalence. Proposals for lessened reliance on nuclear weapons will retain great attraction, especially for the younger generation of the West European populace and periodically for their governments. Proposals to avoid a first use of nuclear weapons, or at least to avoid an "early" first use, will have wide appeal. Arguments will continue to rage about the feasibility of alternative defense postures, and this article is hardly the place to try to resolve them.[22] At the minimum,

[22] The most prominent advocacy of a "no-first-use" posture in Europe is by McGeorge Bundy, George Kennan, Robert McNamara, and Gerard Smith, "Nuclear Weapons and the Atlantic Alliance," *Foreign Affairs* 60 (1982): 753–68. This view has been criticized by Karl Kaiser, Georg

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however, steps toward tighter command and control of battlefield and theater nuclear weapons in Europe, and to move vulnerable nuclear forces back from the front lines, make much military sense. They also make excellent sense in the context of West European politics. If the NATO alliance is to survive, it cannot do so with weapons and military postures that ignore legitimate popular fears.*

Leber, Alois Mertes, and Franz-Josef Schulze, "Nuclear Weapons and the Preservation of Peace: A German Response," *Foreign Affairs* 60 (1982): 1157–70. General Bernard Rogers, "The Atlantic Alliance: Prescriptions for a Difficult Decade," *Foreign Affairs* 60 (1982): 1145–56, presents a strong case that at least a "no-early-first-use" policy is feasible for NATO. See also John Mearsheimer, "Why the Soviets Can't Win Quickly in Central Europe," *International Security* 7 (1982): 3–39, for a good argument that a "no-first-use" policy is militarily attainable.

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The NATO Decision on Theater Nuclear Forces

RAYMOND L. GARTHOFF

It is a short span of less than four years since the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) decision to launch a major new progam for deploying American intermediate-range missiles in Europe to reinforce its theater nuclear forces (TNF). But what appeared in December 1979 to be a resounding success reflecting Atlantic Alliance solidarity has become a divisive issue in national and alliance politics. A review of the process of reaching that decision, undertaken in this article, can help illuminate why and how the decision was reached.[1] The process of reaching the decision to deploy new long-range theater nuclear forces (LRTNF), as will be shown, involved complex internal dynamics of domestic and alliance politics at least as much as considerations of military requirements vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact.

Eventually, as apparent European concerns and interest in a positive sign from Washington grew, the American leadership decided to support a new deployment, not because it was believed by most policymakers to be necessary for deterrence or defense against the Soviet Union, but because it would demonstrate to the Allies the responsiveness of the United States to their concerns, as well as American leadership in organizing a positive Alliance decision.

[1] This account owes much to interviews with many of the participants and other officials involved in the decision, especially in the United States. Such material has been used with care by cross-checking and other verification.

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Allied Concerns About Strategic Parity: 1976–77

By the mid-1970s a growing concern appeared within the NATO alliance that détente, whatever its other merits, was not a substitute for continuing NATO military programs, and that the Soviet Union was steadily building its military power in the European theater, including its conventional, tactical nuclear, and long-range theater nuclear forces. By December 1976 a consensus had developed in the NATO committee of defense ministers, the Defence Planning Committee (DPC), that NATO needed to mount a concerted military effort to assure a tolerable military balance in Europe. By the time of the DPC ministerial meeting in May 1977, the new Carter administration had successfully worked out an agreement on a target of at least a three percent annual increase in real terms in defense budgets by all NATO countries. In May 1978, at a summit meeting of the NATO heads of government in Washington, agreement was formally recorded on a Long Term Defense Program (LTDP) that not only incorporated the aim of a three percent annual increase in military expenditures, but that also provided the framework for a substantial program of improvements in a number of concrete areas, including conventional forces, reinforcement capabilities, and theater nuclear weapons.

The initial impetus for the LTDP came, as has been noted, from the United States. The LTDP was also focused mainly on conventional arms and reinforcement of conventional forces. But "theater" nuclear weapons requirements were also to be reviewed.[2] Thus, as part of the LTDP review, a number of task forces were established, including one to examine theater nuclear weapons (Task Force 10). The NATO Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) meeting of defense ministers in Bari, Italy, in October 1977 converted Task Force 10 into a High-Level Group (HLG) to examine the need for NATO long-range TNF modernization and the technical, military, and political implications of alternative NATO TNF postures. It was chaired by an American, Assistant Secretary of Defense David McGiffert.

The American government was initially not convinced that new long-range theater nuclear forces were needed in Europe. While in 1977 some elements of the U.S. military establishment favored new long-range nuclear delivery systems, and research and deployment was proceeding on several systems (including both land- and sea-based cruise missiles of intermediate range, and an extended version of the Pershing tactical land missile), there was no strong constituency favoring a new deployment in Europe. The United States had already quietly increased the capability of strategic submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBMs) at the disposal of the NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe

[2] While not directly referred to in the LTDP in 1977, the principal study underlying a need for TNF modernization was a special report submitted by Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger to Congress in 1975. See Department of Defense, *The Theater Nuclear Force Posture in Europe*, a report to the United States Congress in compliance with Public Law 93-365, Washington, D.C., 1975.

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(SACEUR) by changing the force allotted from five Polaris submarines (with 80 missiles capable of attacking 80 targets) to 400 Poseidon warheads capable of attacking 400 targets. In 1977, the number of American F-111 long-range fighter bombers based in Great Britain capable of all-weather delivery of nuclear weapons deep into the Soviet Union was doubled, from 80 to 164. Another decision, which "leaked" into the public domain in June 1977 and stirred up a major controversy for a year, was the plan to produce and deploy shorter-range enhanced radiation or "neutron" weapons.

In October 1977, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance stated in Congressional testimony on the Strategic Arms Limitations Treaty (SALT) negotiations that the Alliance was reviewing its theater nuclear posture, but that with existing submarine and forward-based systems no additional long-range ground or sea-based systems were required.[3]

Another statement in October 1977, however, was much more significant in reflecting considerations that were to lead to a NATO deployment decision. Chancellor Helmut Schmidt of the Federal Republic of Germany used the occasion of a speech to the International Institute for Strategic Studies to express a rising European concern that the stabilization of the U.S.-Soviet strategic balance through SALT would leave the military and deterrence balance in Europe unsecured. This concern was widely shared in Europe (although by no means universally, or in equal measure), but was intensified in Schmidt's case by his lack of confidence in President Jimmy Carter. He was also influenced by a group of American and European "defense intellectuals," an unofficial but influential group that had been stirring alarm over a perceived gap in the chain of deterrents between NATO's conventional and short-range tactical nuclear capabilities and the American strategic forces. In the eyes of this group, most of whom did not favor SALT I or the emerging SALT II agreement, stabilization of strategic parity damaged the "extended" deterrence umbrella over Europe that traditionally had relied on (or at least had enjoyed) American strategic superiority. In addition, there were rumblings of discontent (not only on the part of this group or of Schmidt) with the American movement in SALT to include limitations on cruise missiles which, it was believed, might prove useful or even necessary for defense and deterrence in Europe. Some opponents of SALT even took the extreme view that the Americans were not only settling for strategic arms constraints limited to intercontinental forces of the two superpowers, but were in effect virtually encouraging the Soviet Union to go forward with deployments of its own intermediate-range systems, while agreeing to constraints on American intermediate-range systems that might be important to European deterrence and defense.[4]

[3] Cited in Congressional Research Services, *The Modernization of NATO's Long-Range Theater Nuclear Force*, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1981), 19.

[4] The best account, if perhaps somewhat overdrawn, of the influence of this group of defense intellectuals, headed by Albert Wohlstetter, is an article by Fred Kaplan, "Warring Over New Missiles for NATO," *New York Times Magazine*, 9 December 1979.

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Schmidt's October 1977 speech did not directly raise any of these points, except to suggest in a few sentences that "changed strategic conditions confront us with new problems. SALT codifies the nuclear strategic balance between the Soviet Union and the United States. To put it another way: SALT neutralizes their strategic nuclear capabilities. In Europe this magnifies the significance of the disparities between East and West in nuclear tactical and conventional weapons."[5] He said "we Europeans" were to blame for not having had a clear enough understanding earlier of the close connection between strategic and European forces, but by implication the United States could not be trusted to make policy with a sufficient understanding of European interests. Hence the need for unspecified additional "means" to support the deterrence strategy of the Alliance, because "strategic arms limitations confined to the United States and the Soviet Union will inevitably impair the security of the West European members of the Alliance vis-à-vis Soviet military superiority in Europe if we do not succeed in removing the disparities of military power in Europe parallel to the SALT negotiations."[6]

Schmidt did not go so far as most of the hard-line defense intellectuals. He did not oppose the SALT II treaty; on the contrary, he supported it. But he was clearly uneasy over the European military balance in an era of strategic parity, and he remained untrusting of President Carter's ability to take account of European interests.

There also were rising European concerns over the American moves in SALT in 1977 (and continuing in 1978–79) toward accepting limitations on cruise missiles. These concerns coincided with an intensified campaign in the United States against SALT II. The American administration believed it had done a good job protecting Alliance cruise missile interests by agreeing only to a ban on deployment (but not on development and testing) of ground- and sea-launched cruise missiles of greater than 600-km range, and only for the three years of the protocol. But many Europeans (and some Americans) were concerned that there would be powerful effects of precedent and inertia that could prolong that constraint after the three years. Moreover, Senator Henry Jackson and others had for some time been urging the Europeans to develop and to express such concerns to the American administration.

Another concern was based on the Soviet modernization (or, as usually described, buildup) of its long-range theater nuclear forces. The Backfire bomber was being deployed facing Western Europe, and U.S. administration arguments in the SALT debate that the Backfire was not a strategic intercontinental bomber implicitly confirmed that it was a potent addition to the Soviet long-range TNF.

But the most significant development in Soviet forces facing Western Europe (or what at least was perceived as such) was the deployment of the SS-20 missile system. The SS-20 is a mobile intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM), with

[5] See Helmut Schmidt, "The 1977 Alastair Buchan Memorial Lecture," *Survival* 20 (1978): 3–4.
[6] Ibid., 4.

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greater range, accuracy, and above all, less vulnerability, than its predecessors. It also has three multiple independent reentry vehicle (MIRV) warheads, increasing target coverage for a comparable number of launchers. It began to be deployed in 1976, and by 1977 units began to become operational. Between 1977 and 1979 the SS-20 became the key justification for new NATO long-range theater nuclear forces. Remarkably, no real analysis of the Soviet purposes in deploying the SS-20 was undertaken by the HLG or any other body in Brussels or Washington (as many key participants have confirmed in interviews).[7]

In the latter part of 1977 and well into 1978, the American government remained cool to the idea that any new NATO LRTNF were needed. In 1977, the United States dispatched experts to NATO to brief European officials on the strengths and weaknesses (and uncertainties) of cruise missile technology. But while these presentations were scrupulously fair, the common assumption of many Europeans was that they must have been intended to cultivate European support of the American SALT position and thus must have been biased against the potential of cruise missiles.[8]

In December 1977, at the semiannual ministerial level NATO meeting, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown sought to reassure the Allies that SALT II would not curtail any NATO options, informing them that the Soviet Union had now agreed that the three-year protocol would not limit testing cruise missiles up to a 1,500 nautical mile range, and that deployment could not be started before the expiration of the protocol in any case. Secretary of State Vance proposed consideration of multilateral arms limitation talks between East and West on European LRTNF, and discussed with the British, West German, and French foreign ministers a new forum for consultation within NATO. Regrettably, nothing further was done to develop those proposals. Secretary Vance had intended his initiative to allow the Europeans to decide whether they would prefer to participate directly in SALT III, in which it was expected that LRTNF would be discussed, or that the United States continue to negotiate alone with close consultation. No immediate decision was needed, so none was taken. As a result, events moved on their own.

[7] For an analysis of the Soviet decision to deploy the SS-20, which finds the prevailing Western assumptions not well founded, see the forthcoming article by Raymond L. Garthoff, "The Soviet SS-20 Decision," *Survival* 25 (1983). To cite the Western perceptions of the growing SS-20 threat, Senator Henry Jackson prematurely claimed as early as 23 February 1977 that 100 were deployed. Official estimates made public showed a gradual but steady increase from about 30 at the end of 1977 to 100 by October 1979, 125 by the time of the December 1979 decision, 150 by the time of the June 1980 NATO ministerial meeting, 200 by September 1980, 250 by the time the U.S. Defense Department booklet on *Soviet Military Power* was issued (with data as of July 1981), 300 by March 1982 when Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev announced a unilateral moratorium on further deployments in the European USSR, and 351 total (including 108 in Siberia) and the Far East beyond the range of Western Europe by mid-1983. See *Soviet Military Power* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 1981), 26–27.

[8] See Robert J. Art and Stephen E. Ockenden, "The Domestic Politics of Cruise Missile Development, 1970–1980," in Richard K. Betts, ed., *Cruise Missiles: Technology, Strategy, Politics* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1981), 400–401. See also Kaplan, "Warring Over New Missiles," 55.

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The American Search for a Deployment Consensus: 1978–79

The High Level Group (HLG) first met in November 1977. While not much occurred at the initial meetings, at the third meeting, in Los Alamos, New Mexico in February 1978, a surprising consensus developed among the Alliance representatives (primarily from their respective defense ministries) that a new NATO weapons deployment was needed. The chairman of the group, David McGiffert, had not been prepared for such a turn of events, but was not inclined to oppose it. A consensus was therefore reached for a NATO "modernization," expressed in international bureaucratic language as an "evolutionary upward adjustment" in long-range TNF, including the capability to strike targets in the Soviet Union. There was some concern by those in the U.S. government not yet ready to reach such a decision, and at the March 1978 HLG meeting the American delegation, now including a representative of the National Security Council (NSC) staff, "waffled." At the next meeting (in April), the HLG consensus nonetheless continued to make plans, with the U.S. representatives providing most of the data on possible weapons systems for NATO deployment. Also in April, the HLG submitted an interim report to the NPG. By this time, some officials from the White House staff and the Department of State felt that the Defense Department representatives in the HLG had been running far ahead of an American decision on what the Alliance needed, and that the U.S. position was being decided by default. Moreover, President Carter's inconsistency over production of the neutron bomb in April had again drawn attention to the need for better coordination and consideration of all relevant aspects of such problems in the Alliance. Accordingly, the NSC staff prepared in May and the president issued in early June a Presidential Review Memorandum (PRM-38), called "Long Range Theater Nuclear Capabilities and Arms Control," calling for a review of pros and cons, options, and alternatives. From June to August an intensive review was undertaken in the U.S. government.

In meetings of the Cabinet-level Special Coordinating Committee (SCC), chaired by Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Zbigniew Brzezinski in August and September, a position was finally established to support in principle a modernization of NATO's long-range nuclear forces (the "evolutionary upward adjustment" of forces, not yet defined). Following these meetings, which had engaged Brzezinski personally with the issue for the first time, he travelled to key capitals in Europe to determine views at the political level. Brzezinski's position essentially was that the U.S. government did not see a military requirement for a new NATO LRTNF deployment, but was quite prepared to proceed with one if it would meet European political-military concerns.[9]

[9] See Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977–1981* (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1983), 294 and 307–308; Zbigniew Brzezinski, "East-West Relations: Strategic Crossroads," *Trialogue* 30 (1982): 21.

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Meanwhile, the neutron weapon debacle in April 1978, viewed in retrospect, was a critical factor in the entire NATO LRTNF decision process. There is no need to review here the neutron weapon controversy and President Carter's equivocation over a decision on production and deployment of neutron weapons in 1977–78. It need only be noted that this equivocation had three important effects on the subsequent TNF decision. First, it stirred long-dormant European public anxiety over nuclear weapons in general that was to remain after the neutron bomb issue subsided. Second, President Carter's vacillation increased doubts in Europe, above all on the part of Chancellor Schmidt, as to the steadiness and reliability of the United States in meeting European interests. Thus, European confidence in American ability to make sound decisions on the range of issues involved had been further reduced, with the result that confidence in American leadership was adversely affected. Finally, the Carter administration itself tried to compensate for its handling of the neutron bomb decision by seeking to respond boldly to a perceived European concern by exercising vigorous leadership in welding an Alliance consensus in support of an initiative to deploy long-range theater nuclear weapons. The administration thus hoped to generate a NATO "success" in the TNF field. Doubts by some as to the military necessity (or even the desirability) of deploying new LRTNF systems were overwhelmed by a perceived political necessity within the Alliance.

The HLG, on the basis of an American technical paper on military modernization options based on the PRM-38 review, outlined in October several alternative LRTNF forces. No specific recommendations were made, but particular attention was focused on ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCM). Consideration was also given to a sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM), but many Europeans favored a land-based system as more politically "visible" and more demonstrative of resolve. American defense officials were also undecided on the desirability of a sea-launched nuclear land-attack cruise missile, and favored the GLCM. Other possibilities included an extended-range Pershing ballistic missile or a new mobile intermediate-range ballistic missile.

A summit meeting involving President Carter, Chancellor Schmidt, French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, and British Minister James Callaghan in Guadeloupe in January 1979 was the key link in the chain of decision. Just as the August–September SCC meetings had first really engaged Brzezinski with the issue, so preparation for this summit first directly engaged President Jimmy Carter.[10] In addition, at Guadeloupe Chancellor Schmidt committed West Germany at the meeting to accepting the stationing of the LRTNF missiles, provided West Germany not be the only European continental country in which

[10] President Carter, in one of the few references to the TNF issue in his memoirs, described the January 1979 discussion in terms stressing his own advocacy of a necessary NATO deployment, and characterized Schmidt as "contentious." He also described the discussion as "inconclusive," but made no reference at all to the extensive Allied consultations since 1977 or to the subsequent meetings prior to December 1979. See Jimmy Carter, *Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President* (New York: Bantam Books, 1982), 234–35 and 535–37.

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they would be deployed.[11] Less crucial, but not insignificant, was the concurrence of Giscard d'Estaing, who could have chosen to assert a differing European view, and of Callaghan, who expressed Great Britain's readiness to participate.

A successful campaign for a NATO consensus on a new LRTNF deployment initiative now became a major goal of American policy. The White House, the Defense Department, and the State Department by the end of 1978 had come into accord that a TNF success would serve several purposes: it would reestablish domestic American political confidence in the administration's handling of Alliance and nuclear weapons affairs; it would reconfirm American readiness to meet European needs and desires; it would demonstrate that SALT was not an impediment to meeting Alliance commitments and defense needs; it would signal to the Soviet leaders American resolve to maintain military programs needed to assure parity; and it would reinforce the chain of deterrence and thus serve strategic stability. Accordingly, throughout 1979 the United States actively led—and sometimes drove hard—the Alliance members to reach agreement on a "positive" LRTNF decision. Reassurance of the Western Alliance became at least as important an objective as deterrence of a Soviet threat.

At the January 1979 meeting, Chancellor Schmidt had also pressed for a parallel effort to negotiate arms limitations, to respond to those in West Germany who would oppose new missile deployment if it could be obviated by agreed arms limitations, and to further East-West détente if possible.

Accordingly, in April 1979 a Special Group on Arms Control and Related Matters was constituted by NATO to work out an arms control proposal to accompany the missile deployment decision. The group was chaired by the Director of the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs in the U.S. Department of State (initially Leslie Gelb and later Reginald Bartholomew). Again, a basically American position was adopted during meetings in the summer and early fall of 1979.

The fact that the Special Group on Arms Control was not established until April 1979, when most of the thinking of the High Level Group on the threat and on deployment had been essentially worked out, meant that such considerations as the "crisis destabilizing" effects of the Pershing II (with only a few minutes flight time from launch to strategic targets in the Soviet Union), were considered only after the decision to deploy had virtually been set in train, to the extent that they were discussed at all. Similarly, the baffling and significant problem of verifying limitations on numbers of small cruise missiles (to say nothing of trying to distinguish nuclear from conventional cruise missiles) were not given weight before enthusiasm for deployment was well developed. Of course, if a serious threat or a political opportunity for Alliance "renewal" was

[11] The West German position has always been of particular importance, and is ultimately crucial. For a detailed account, see David Yost and Thomas Glad, "West German Party Politics and Theater Nuclear Modernization Since 1977," *Armed Forces and Society* 8 (1982): 525–60.

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perceived, such considerations might have overridden arms control considerations. Deciding on arms control negotiations essentially as a political device to mobilize support for a deployment program was almost bound to give arms control considerations a secondary role. Many, of course, hoped that arms control agreements could be reached in order to obviate or limit the need for deployment, as well as for other reasons. But some considered hopes for negotiated arms limitations to be futile, and were therefore disinclined to be much influenced by arms control considerations. At the same time, they overtly supported an arms control approach in order to garner political support for the planned LRTNF deployment.

The High Level Group continued to refine its studies of the most suitable candidates for NATO TNF modernization. By the late spring of 1979, the HLG had decided to support deployment of a mix of Pershing II and GLCM missiles totalling in the range of 200–600 missiles (a range proposed by the United States). More, it was deemed, would seem provocative; less, too weak. The High Level Group (and especially the West Germans) did not want to attempt to equal the Soviet intermediate missile force in numbers—the purpose was to have a comparable kind of European-based capability to ensure a chain of deterrence so as not to permit a "decoupling" of the American strategic forces from NATO's conventional and short-range nuclear forces. To equal the Soviet force numerically, on the other hand, could have a "decoupling" effect, as it could imply no need to escalate to the American strategic forces, and could thus threaten to limit a war to Europe. As a result, the High Level Group decided against attempting to equal Soviet force levels.

The decision to select the number 572, comprising 108 Pershing II missiles and 464 GLCMs, was proposed by Zbigniew Brzezinski's deputy, David Aaron, and accepted by the SCC (Brzezinski, Vance, Brown, and Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman General David C. Jones), and officially adopted by President Carter, in early July 1979.[12]

The Pershing II had originally been decided on, in part to give the U.S. Army a role. Under long-standing guidance any such MRBM or IRBM would normally be a U.S. Air Force system, but since the Pershing II was to use the same basic infrastructure and personnel as the Army's Pershing IA, it was kept as an Army system and retained the "Pershing" name, although its extended range

[12] See Walter Pincus, "Birth of a Euromissile: Arms Decision Stirred a Storm Around NATO," *Washington Post*, 18 November 1981, for a useful general account and for an informed and detailed account of the SCC meeting of 5 July 1979, at which the decision on the 572 missiles LRTNF program was made. See also Brzezinski, *Power and Principle*, 308. The Defense Nuclear Agency and the Joint Chiefs of Staff had earlier proposed a force of 1,500 warheads, on 500 MIRVed mobile MRBMs—in other words an American SS-20. But because congressional review was negative, the development lead-time was considered too long, and the cost would be greater, the mobile MRBM was dropped from consideration. In addition, some American and West German officials had expressed concern that a force of that size deployed (mostly in West Germany) for strike on the Soviet Union could stimulate Soviet alarm in view of its first-strike potential.

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and other characteristics completely changed its role. For the same reason, it was easy to decide on the number and the location of deployment: the U.S. Army had 108 Pershing IA launchers in Germany; they would be replaced by 108 Pershing II MRBMs at the same bases in West Germany.

It has been noted that some American defense officials, as well as some Europeans, had come to favor the GLCM over the SLCM. In order to influence the decision in that direction, the Pentagon in 1979 quietly reversed the research and development schedules for the two systems so that it could be said to the Allies that the GLCM would be available sooner.

The GLCM was a U.S. Air Force system (although not one the Air Force had really shown much interest in). It would need, for Alliance political reasons, to be deployed in several countries. The basic unit was 16 missiles (four each on four launch vehicles), so units of 48 were the minimum logical units per major deployment area. The GLCM total was set at 464 as the next to highest multiple of 16 keeping the LRTNF total (including the 108 Pershing IIs) under the 600 ceiling side of the "recommended" range. Thus the figure of 572 LRTNF missiles was reached. It was assumed in the SCC (incorrectly) that the Allies might wish to reduce the number somewhat, and that level also was designed to allow some negotiating room for talks with the Soviet Union as well.[13]

During 1978 the United States had shifted from uncommitted readiness to consider new LRTNF deployments to ardent advocacy. Throughout 1979 there was an active campaign to mobilize European support and to seek a unanimous and resounding NATO consensus. A team of high-level representatives from the NSC, the State Department, and the Defense Department was sent on repeated missions of persuasion to Europe.[14] By October the basic consensus seemed firm, with some uncertainties about planned deployments in the Netherlands and Belgium and some uneasiness in the Scandinavian countries. The consensus was rooted in a "two-track" approach, envisaging parallel deployment plans and preparations, and arms limitation negotiations.

By October 1979 both the LRTNF deployment plan and the arms control approach were agreed to at the senior working level. Both the High Level Group and the Special Group met in late September and approved, respectively, the deployment plan and a set of guidelines for arms control talks. On September 28 the two groups met together for the only time. In addition to their two separate reports, the chairman of the HLG prepared a draft Integrated Decision Document based on the two reports of October 4. This draft decision was sub-

[13] Brzezinski, *Power and Principle*, 308.

[14] Dispatching the usual team was sometimes referred to informally in Washington as "firing our ABM" again—an acronym drawn from the last initials of David Aaron (Brzezinski's deputy at the NSC Staff, and "godfather" of the Washington TNF group), Reginald Bartholomew (director of the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs of the State Department, and chairman of the NATO Special Group on TNF arms control), and David McGiffert (assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs, and chairman of the NATO High Level Group on TNF).

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mitted to the North Atlantic Council on November 6 and approved by the Permanent Representatives on 28 November 1979.

In October, the United States prepared a "(US Rationale Paper) Modernization and Arms Control for Long-Range Theater Nuclear Forces"[15] to provide a supporting brief for the two-track decision, which was planned for a special joint session of the NATO foreign and defense ministers in December.

When Italy agreed to accept GLCM deployments, Chancellor Schmidt was assured that West Germany would not be the only continental country in which the new weapons would be located, even if both Belgium and the Netherlands finally decided not to participate. (Both were contingently prepared to do so, but with reservations and political uncertainty, especially in the Netherlands.)

Political uneasiness, however, began to appear in some of the NATO countries as the project clearly started to move toward a formal and public decision. Some, particularly in northern European NATO countries, questioned the need for taking a firm deployment decision before trying to reach agreement on limitations. West European unease was also stimulated by a curious and remarkable public speech by Henry Kissinger in Brussels in September on the thirtieth anniversary of the founding of NATO, in which he questioned the credibility of the American nuclear guarantee.[16] The United States had led a concerted campaign to ensure a full deployment decision and commitment in December, coupled with agreement to pursue the arms control approach.[17]

Meanwhile, in a major speech in East Berlin on October 6, Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev proposed to reduce the number of medium-range nuclear delivery systems deployed in the western parts of the Soviet Union if no additional such systems were deployed in the NATO countries. He also denounced the plans for a NATO deployment of new American LRTNF in Western Europe as designed "to upset the balance of forces in Europe and to attempt to secure military superiority for the NATO bloc."[18] Brezhnev thus coupled a strong attack on the NATO LRTNF plan with an offer to reduce Soviet systems in exchange for abandonment of the project. The proposal was, however, vague on important details. (For example, it did not necessarily indicate any curtail-

[15] This document has not been publicly distributed, but it is not secret. The full reference is: "(US Rationale Paper) Modernization and Arms Control for Long-Range Theater Nuclear Forces," Washington, D.C., 16 October 1979.

[16] Henry A. Kissinger, "NATO: The Next Thirty Years," *Survival* 21 (1979): 264–68.

[17] It would be inaccurate to say, as some in effect have charged, that the United States "railroaded" its allies on to the deployment "track," but it may not be far off the mark to say that it "engineered" the consensus.

[18] L. Brezhnev, "Speech at the Ceremonial Meeting in Berlin on the Occasion of the Thirtieth Anniversary of the Founding of the GDR," *Pravda*, 7 October 1979. Brezhnev also used the same occasion to reiterate calls for a political conference on "a broad complex" of measures of "military détente in Europe," and announced (with the MBFR negotiations in mind) a unilateral Soviet withdrawal from East Germany of 20,000 military men and 1,000 tanks over the next year. In fact, the Soviet Union did withdraw the Sixth Tank Division in 1980.

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ment of the SS-20 deployment, since reductions in older SS-4 and SS-5 missile systems were underway and could be extended to effect the promised reduction.)[19] But most important, the proposal came at a time when the NATO deployment plan was moving into its final stage of formal approval, and apart from there being insufficient time to explore the vague offer, it would have required substituting the unclear prospect of an agreement with Moscow for the deployment decision.

Particularly because one of the driving purposes of the LRTNF deployment plan was to rally and demonstrate NATO solidarity, it was unthinkable to abandon the project as it stood on the eve of success, and especially in exchange for an uncertain and suspect Soviet offer. The United States, and most of the principal Allied governments, thus vigorously overrode such modest interest as the proposal raised. Indeed, the Soviet offer was seen not only as an attempt to head off the Alliance deployment (which obviously it was), but also as attempted Soviet interference in an internal political decision on the Alliance. Moreover the offer endangered a needed political boost for the Alliance. Thus, the Soviet offer was seen as a challenge virtually requiring that NATO stick to its policy.

The Soviet Union conducted an extensive propaganda campaign in Western Europe from October to December, marked by an unusual spate of interviews by senior Soviet political officials (including key members of the Central Committee organization) in the Western media. These officials provided data on Soviet forces to buttress the contention that a balance existed and that a new NATO LRTNF deployment was not only unnecessary, but would be provocative. But Soviet assurances were discounted and implied threats of an arms race were not persuasive. Although the campaign did not succeed, it did lay a foundation for later doubts in Western public opinion as to whether NATO had acted precipitately.

The American administration promptly launched a major counter-campaign, with President Carter leading off on October 9 with a rejection of President Brezhnev's proposal and a vigorous reaffirmation of the need to proceed with the NATO LRTNF deployment. (The administration was just recovering from the self-inflicted wound of the incident over the discovery of a Soviet combat brigade in Cuba—a subject still being raised at the same news conference with President Carter on October 9.) Vice President Walter Mondale, Secretary of Defense Brown, and national security advisor Brzezinski all made strong statements within a few days. The chief efforts, of course, were directed through intensive diplomatic lobbying with the Allies.

The Nuclear Planning Group approved the projected deployment at a meet-

[19] On the other hand, Brezhnev did contend—correctly—that the Soviet modernization of its LRTNF was not an increase but a replacement in numbers of missile launchers and medium bombers, and actually represented a decrease in megatonnage. See Raymond L. Garthoff, "Brezhnev's Opening: The TNF Tangle," *Foreign Policy*, no. 41 (Winter 1980–81): 82–94.

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ing in The Hague in mid-November. Then the Special Meeting of the NATO Foreign and Defense Ministers, on 12 December 1979, in Brussels, unanimously approved the "two-track" decision on deployment coupled with an attempt at arms control limitations on the LRTNF. Although the decision was "unanimous," there were reservations by several members. The Dutch and Norwegian prime ministers, and the Danish foreign minister, made special trips to Washington in December before the NATO ministerial meeting to strongly urge a serious effort to negotiate in the hope the deployment would not be necessary. The Netherlands parliament, in fact, in a non-binding vote preceding that visit, narrowly voted against approving the NATO plan. Denmark also urged delay on a deployment decision pending arms limitation negotiations, and only reluctantly went along the general consensus. Finally, all acquiesced, although the Netherlands explicitly withheld for two years its decision on whether to accept the 48 GLCMs projected for deployment in that country, and Belgium insisted on the right to "review" its acceptance of 48 GLCMs in six months (later extended), so the participation of those countries remained less than certain. (Denmark and Norway do not allow deployment of any nuclear weapons on their territories.)

The decision was to deploy 108 Pershing II missiles and 464 GLCMs. These 572 missiles (each with a single warhead) would replace the 108 Pershing IA shorter range missiles already deployed, and the 572 warheads for them would replace 572 older nuclear munitions.[20] Also, as part of the campaign to generate support for the decision, the United States had decided in October (and gained general agreement) to include in the decision "package" a unilateral withdrawal of 1,000 nuclear munitions from the 7,000 stocked in Europe since the 1960s.[21]

In the communiqué of the December meeting, the LRTNF "modernization" and arms control were described as "two parallel and complementary ap-

[20] The decision in fact refers to "108 Pershing II launchers," and "464 GLCM," but by also specifying 572 warheads, the text makes clear that it was not planned to provide reloads for the 572 launchers (on 108 Pershing and 116 GLCM launch vehicles), although they are technically capable of rapid reloading and refire.

[21] One purpose of this move was to demonstrate an interest in avoiding an intensified arms race, and perhaps to "match" the unilateral Soviet withdrawal of a tank division from East Germany. A second purpose was to permit withdrawal of the 1975 MBFR proposal for a contingent removal of 1,000 nuclear munitions. Third, and not least in importance, the U.S. Department of Defense had long wanted to remove these obsolete munitions, many of which were warheads for delivery systems no longer in service. Not only were they militarily useless, but their fissionable material could be salvaged and reworked for new munitions. The level of 7,000 munitions had no military rationale, but because the number had been publicly disclosed in 1967 it had long been accepted, and the burden of proof was on advocates of any change. It was long believed that any reduction might give a wrong signal to the Soviets, or even more to the Allies, of an erosion of the American commitment. Now a palatable, and even exemplary, reason existed for recovering this shelved potential asset. This history did not, however, prevent President Reagan, at the time of his later celebrated initiative on TNF (INF) arms control on 18 November 1981, from making a misleading counterposition of the Soviet deployment of 750 warheads on SS-20s to the U.S. withdrawal of 1,000 warheads.

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proaches."[22] The statement further commented: "Success of arms control in constraining the Soviet build-up can enhance Allied security, modify the scale of NATO's TNF modernization requirements, and promote stability and détente in Europe in consonance with NATO's basic policy of deterrence, defense and détente as enunciated in the [1967 NATO] Harmel Report."[23]

The Decline of the Deployment Consensus: 1980–83

The ministerial meeting also created a new Special Consultative Group (in practice, a renewal of the Special Group under the North Atlantic Council), which began its work in January 1980. The High Level Group of the Nuclear Planning Group also continued to exist to consult on the deployment program as it proceeded. It was assumed that the agreement would, in the words of the communiqué, be "negotiated bilaterally in the SALT III framework in a step-by-step approach." While not explicitly urging ratification of the SALT II Treaty, then stalled in the U.S. Senate, the ministers of the communiqué did "welcome the contribution which the SALT II Treaty makes," thus assuming and obviously favoring its ratification.[24] In fact, a number of Allied leaders had conditioned their support for the LRTNF deployment plan on SALT II even before the treaty had been signed in June. The Carter administration had also sought to use this Allied favor for SALT II as an additional argument in its favor in the Senate deliberations.

In December 1979, the NATO LRTNF deployment decision appeared to be the success its authors had worked so hard to bring about. In effect, the United States had gotten its way on the deployment decision, and the Europeans had gotten their preference on a commitment to talks on arms control. Among the professional NATO diplomats and the military, few expected (and some did not want) the arms control talks to lead to any constraining agreement. But the second track provided the essential element that held the consensus together. Above all, the Alliance position seemed to represent a successful political-military response to a perceived Soviet political-military challenge, exemplified in the steady SS-20 deployment. The SS-20 increased the vulnerability of NATO military forces and provided greater survivability to Soviet LRTNF, and while these facts would not be changed by the NATO deployment, the military effects would not significantly affect the overall balance of the two sides. The real threat was perceived to be a Soviet ability to capitalize for political pressures on what was seen as a weak link in the NATO chain of deterrence. This ability would be countered by the NATO decision. Perhaps even more important,

[22] *Communique of the Special Meeting of NATO Foreign and Defense Ministers, December 12, 1979*, Department of State Press Release No. 326, 19 December 1979, 4.

[23] Ibid., 4.

[24] Ibid., 3.

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NATO was showing itself that it could do something to meet a situation in which the Soviet side was clearly acting.

In the United States, some (especially Zbigniew Brzezinski) also saw the LRTNF decision as serving a more subtle purpose in supporting the war-waging options to be unveiled some months later in Presidental Directive 59. The counterforce strike capabilities of the Pershing II and GLCM, while not intended for a first strike, were seen as bolstering American capabilities in a way that would enhance the political-military leverage of the United States. These were not, however, among the considerations involved in the NATO deliberations and decision.

There is no need to review here the subsequent course of efforts in 1980 and 1981 to proceed on the arms limitation negotiation "track." Initial Soviet intransigence gave way eventually to an initial exchange of views in October and November 1980, during which time the Carter administration lost its mandate. The new American administration was noticeably reluctant for some months to enter into arms limitation negotiations. SALT II was clearly dead, and European disquiet grew. Finally, in November 1981 President Ronald Reagan moved boldly to the seemingly forthcoming, but actually very cautious, stance of proposing a "zero option," offering to cancel the entire planned NATO LRTNF deployment if the Soviet Union would reduce to zero not only the SS-20 deployment, but the entire 600 MRBM/IRBM launcher force (SS-4, SS-5 and SS-20 systems) it had maintained for twenty years. While his initiative was widely welcomed in Europe (by those who focused most on the possibility of zero NATO deployment, as well as by those who thought it might yield a zero Soviet deployment), questions soon began to arise as to whether this proposal was in fact a realistic basis for negotiation. But Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) talks at least were underway.[25]

It is far too early to tell whether the NATO LRTNF deployment decision will succeed. It has already lost the wide consensus of support it enjoyed in 1979. It is, however, doubtful that the deployment decision will ultimately be judged the Alliance success it then seemed to be. Clearly public attitudes remain uneasy over the decision, and politically significant public opinion will be influenced by judgments as to the credibility of the United States negotiating record if an impasse remains in the INF talks as the date for initial operational deployment draws near in 1983–84. In addition, broader (and narrower) political judgments will be made in key European countries, as well as in the Alliance as a whole, in which the specific arms limitation record and the East-West military balance will be but one element, and not necessarily the single most significant. Both

[25] In 1981, in part to meet a growing aversion by a number of Europeans, including Chancellor Schmidt, to the term "theater" nuclear forces, and in part owing to a preference by the new Reagan administration to coin its own terms of its "own" initiatives, "LRTNF" became "INF" (Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces). During the entire period covered by this discussion, however, the term LRTNF was in official use and is therefore used in this article.

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general American and Soviet policies and behavior will also be judged. Internal political issues and contests are deeply involved—most notably in the domestic political arena in West Germany. The Netherlands and Belgium continue to reserve their positions on participation in the deployment. Popular pressures for a nuclear weapons "freeze" have now unexpectedly mounted in the United States itself.

Even a "successful" deployment of 572 missiles, if it stirred new countervailing Soviet deployments and alienated wide circles of the public in NATO countries, would hardly be the success sought and celebrated in 1979. In short, the saga of the NATO TNF decision of 1979 is far from over.

Conclusion

The experience of the process of reaching a decision in NATO on an LRTNF deployment provides an interesting and instructive case study in the intersecting processes of bureaucratic, institutional, alliance, and adversarial politics. In the late 1970s, frictions arose in the NATO alliance from different perspectives on adjustment to a new state of strategic parity between the United States and the Soviet Union. Some in Western Europe saw a new danger of possible Soviet attempts to gain leverage against the European wing of the Alliance under conditions of lessened American strength. Suspicions of American assignment of priority to stabilizing the intercontinental strategic balance in SALT were heightened by the fact that intermediate-range or theater nuclear forces were not covered in SALT. Moreover, the exclusion of some weapons in the "grey area" between SALT and clearly non-SALT forces, such as the Soviet medium bomber Backfire and the SS-20 IRBM, only emphasized the lack of constraint on such systems facing Europe. At the same time, the Americans did appear to be prepared to accept in SALT some constraints on new "grey area" technologies, above all cruise missiles, which the Alliance might decide it would need to meet those Soviet threats. The Americans scrupulously reported on the progress of the SALT negotiations, and believed they had met valid Allied concerns. But such concerns persisted, fed also by a growing lack of confidence in American handling of such matters as the neutron weapon.

Soviet actions in proceeding to deploy new intermediate-range systems to replace obsolescent ones (above all the SS-20 missile systems) were an important element in the equation, but not, as appeared on the surface, the main one, especially to the American leaders. Moreover, this key aspect of the situation was not even seriously studied in the Alliance. In fact, many West Europeans—publics and policymakers—were really more concerned with reassurances of American commitment than with real fear of a Soviet threat. The Soviet leaders, for their part, believed that a modernization of their theater forces, entirely compatible with arms control commitments, was overdue and necessary. Later, they were unable to believe that their actions were in fact responsible for the Allied decision. Rather than seeing the Western action as a reaction to their own

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actions, even a misguided reaction, Soviet leaders saw it as one element in a broader American and American-led NATO effort to build up offensive forces, using the Soviet SS-20 and other deployment programs as a pretext.

In the aftermath of the decision, important currents of public opinion in the West European countries have reacted negatively to the new NATO deployment plans. Ironically, what had been taken as a step to keep European arms programs—and arms control efforts—abreast of a new stabilized intercontinental U.S.-Soviet strategic balance, was launched just as the U.S.-Soviet arms limitation efforts collapsed. As a result, the collapse of Soviet-American relations after the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan left the TNF dual-track decision on its own. Moreover, partly owing to Soviet delays, it was nearly a year before the Carter administration held a lame-duck meeting on TNF arms control late in 1980, and another year before the Reagan administration reopened negotiations in November 1981—half of the span of time from the NATO "two-track" decision to the planned initial deployment.

This change in the international situation, however one apportions responsibility, reduced prospects and possibilities for arms control, and thus generated European opposition to proceeding on the deployment "track" before arms control could be given a chance. At this writing, the likelihood of negotiated limitations before deployment is poor, and the deployment is likely to proceed.

What was ostensibly designed as reinforcement of Alliance unity and deterrence of the Soviet Union, and in fact was largely an exercise in American assurance of its European allies, has now however become an issue within the Alliance and may even become a test of European reassurance to a hard-line American administration. It is also likely to precipitate new (if only demonstrative) Soviet counter-deployments that almost certainly will not be met by any additional agreed Alliance deployment. Moreover, what was once seen by some as a real opportunity for East-West arms control to stabilize intermediate-range nuclear forces in Europe, and by others as an attempt to blame Soviets for intransigence in preventing such agreements, now has become to many a question as to whether the United States has given arms control a real chance. There is a widespread suspicion in Europe that the United States has been merely using the INF talks, reluctantly and belatedly launched, as a pacifier to European opinion, while it maintains a "negotiating" position known and indeed expected to be non-negotiable.

What conclusions can be drawn from this experience? First, the relationship between intra-alliance and inter-adversary considerations and calculations are much more mixed than is often realized, and actions ostensibly directed toward an adversary may in fact represent actions intended primarily to reassure or otherwise influence allies. Actions directed toward allies can lead to unanticipated and undesired reactions from the adversary. Second, changes in the international context (including changes within the leadership and the policy "line" of any significant participant) may drastically alter the actual effects from those earlier anticipated. Third, the recipients of intended assurances may in fact see

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the situation differently later (particularly, but not only, if it is in fact changed), and actions intended to produce greater unity may create divisions. Fourth, no one consideration, even if it is correctly identified as primary in reaching a decision, should be permitted to block out consideration of other effects insofar as these can be anticipated. It was not sufficient for the Allies to wish American assurance, or for the Americans to wish to reassure the Allies. Fifth, a governmental decision (such as the American one on TNF deployment) should not be deferred until an international (alliance, or other) consensus develops. However, one must keep in mind that a conscious decision to accept any consensus within given parameters is another matter (but that was not the case in the United States government before August 1978). Sixth, national decision-making by national governments, and especially by international alliances, is a highly cumbersome process, and is difficult to reorient to a changing or changed situation.

These conclusions are essentially common sense considerations, but of a kind often overlooked both in decision-making and in studies of decision-making. Perhaps most important, the kind of study presented here shows that commonly held assumptions about international political events are often incomplete to the extent of being misleading, and that for episodic analysis (including clarification of what actually occurs) it is necessary to review closely the course of the decision process, and not merely to accept the stated purpose and the observed result. In addition, in dealing with recent events general recollection may be in error. Also, while official documentary sources may not yet be available, live participants are. Interviews can be highly useful, especially to establish the perceptions and motivations of participants, and more cautiously as sources of facts not otherwise available, or, even better, as leads to verify facts through other sources. For this article, an understanding of many aspects of the events reviewed was developed only after impressions from one participant were matched and modified by interviews with others, and where possible by other data.

Finally, a case study (even one more exhaustively researched than was possible for this review) provides but one experience, and does not by itself permit generalizations. It can, however, by providing a better understanding of a given case, contribute to a general base of experiences from which generalizations can be drawn.

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The Environmental Mandate: Activists and the Electorate

LAURA M. LAKE

Public policies often experience momentary national popularity, only to be relegated to a political backburner, where they may be subjected to symbolic substitutions or simply ignored. Thus it is not surprising that in 1972 Anthony Downs equated public attention with public support for environmental protection, and assumed that as the costs of environmental protection became apparent, support for implementation would decline.[1] Whether or not his "issue-attention cycle" (equating popularity with support) is accurate is important because political support for a policy legitimizes it and facilitates its implementation. As federal environmental laws passed during the euphoric days of the early 1970s come up for renewal, the question of public support for these laws becomes critical.

The environmental movement is a loose coalition of old conservation groups concerned with preserving natural amenities, and pollution-control groups established during the late 1960s and early 1970s that are devoted to improving and protecting public health and urban environmental quality. Although the environmental movement is an elite phenomenon (most of its members are drawn from the middle and upper classes),[2] environmental interest group

[1] Anthony Downs, "Up and Down With Ecology—the 'Issue-Attention Cycle,'" *The Public Interest* 28 (1972): 38–50.

[2] See Richard N. L. Andrews, "Class Politics or Democratic Reform: Environmentalism and

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leaders cite opinion polls that indicate that a majority of Americans want environmental laws passed during the 1970s to be implemented. They do not believe that economic well-being is mutually exclusive with environmental protection.[3] By contrast, opponents of environmental regulation argue that the policy is an improper intrusion of government into the economy and assert that public support for environmentalism, never widespread, has been displaced by newer problems, such as inflation, energy, and unemployment. Since many grassroots protests in the United States are led by small groups of affluent citizens and experience severe difficulty in institutionalizing their protest and maintaining public support, these claims are not necessarily far-fetched.[4]

Which side ought elected officials to believe? Perceptions of support for environmental protection differ markedly and are colored by the viewer's objectives. Nonetheless, these perceptions, whether accurate or inaccurate, influence the responsiveness of elected officials to the demands of environmental interest groups to implement environmental statutes. To exert political pressure, a grassroots protest movement like the environmental movement of the 1970s must do more than overcome organizational entropy by developing a professional staff and by expanding its membership base. Politicians must *perceive* it as a broad-based political movement that accurately predicts the next election and restrains public officials from pursuing courses of action opposed to the values of the nation.[5] If politicians perceive the environmentalists as a single-issue group that is orchestrated by the affluent and no longer in tune with the general voting public, the ability of environmentalists to influence implementation is severely impeded.

Little attention needs to be devoted to whether the characteristics of environmental activists are representative of the general public, for James Rosenau and E. E. Schattschneider have ably demonstrated that the attentive public is rarely demographically representative of the general public.[6] Rather, the important question is whether environmental activists are supported by an environmental electorate that constitutes a majority of the voting public. Political scientists such as Sidney Verba and Norman Nie believe that such political activists do not accurately represent the general public and that voters do not

American Political Institutions," *Natural Resources Journal* 20 (1980): 221–41; Frederick H. Buttel and William Flinn, "The Structure of Support for the Environmental Movement," *Rural Sociology* 39 (1974): 56–69.

[3] For example, see Robert C. Mitchell, *Public Opinion on Environmental Issues: Results of a National Public Opinion Survey* (Washington, D.C.: Resources for the Future, 1980).

[4] For detailed examinations of grassroots protests, see Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward, *Poor People's Movements: Why They Succeed, How They Fail* (New York: Vintage Books, 1977); James Q. Wilson, *Political Organizations* (New York: Basic Books, 1973).

[5] James Rosenau developed this argument in *Citizenship Between Elections* (New York: Free Press, 1974), 8.

[6] Ibid., 14; E. E. Schattschneider, *Semi-Sovereign People* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960).

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accurately reflect the public's policy preferences.[7] Others, such as Raymond Wolfinger and Steven J. Rosenstone, as well as Sheldon Kamieniecki, have observed that voters accurately represent the general public's policy concerns.[8]

This debate draws attention to the comparability of opinion polls and electoral data. Economists, for example, express skepticism about the predictive accuracy of opinion polls regarding political action and, particularly, "willingness-to-pay" for policy implementation.[9] Which is more accurate or valid an index of public preferences? There are important differences between polls and elections. Under our constitutional system of representative democracy, elections authorize the government to act.[10] Polls as mere auxiliaries to the electoral process have no such legal or political authority. On the other hand, polls sample a random cross-section of society, while elections attract a self-selected group of individuals whose socioeconomic status is often higher than that of a random sample. Also, elections increasingly fail to draw a large percentage of the eligible voters. Thus, it is alleged by some that if turnout were higher, the outcome would be different. But Wolfinger and Rosenstone's study of voter turnout showed no such discrepancy between the voting and non-voting public. They found that "issue voters are virtually a carbon copy of the citizen population,"[11] although they are demographically unrepresentative of this population. Furthermore, turnout and issue salience are non-directional measures. They denote controversy but do not predict the outcome of an election.

Polls, Referenda and the Environmental Mandate

Two sources of information on political support for environmental protection policies are examined here to investigate the congruence between opinion polls and elections: national surveys and California environmental and control referenda between 1970 and 1980.[12] It could be argued that referenda in Califor-

[7] Sidney Verba and Norman Nie, *Participation in America* (New York: Harper and Row, 1972).

[8] Raymond Wolfinger and Steven J. Rosenstone, *Who Votes?* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1980); Sheldon Kamieniecki, *Public Representation in Environmental Policy-Making: The Case of Water Quality Management* (Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 1980).

[9] Burton Weisbrod, "What Might Public Interest Law Accomplish: Distributional Effects," in Burton Weisbrod, et al., *Public Interest Law: An Economic and Institutional Analysis* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 107.

[10] See Hanna Pitkin, *The Concept of Representation* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967).

[11] Wolfinger and Rosenstone, *Who Votes?* 109, 111.

[12] The Pearson correlation between turnout (percent eligible voters) and percent voting "yes" for the twenty-eight environmental measures is weak and negative ($R = -.35$). In other words, support varied inversely with turnout. Data on eligible voters are from "Voter Registration Turnout and Participation in Statewide Elections—1958–1980," *Statement of the Vote* (Sacramento, Calif.: Office of the Secretary of State, 4 November 1980).

Similarly, the correlation between issue salience (measured as the percent difference from the average number of "yes" and "no" votes cast for ballot measures in each election) and the percent

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nia do not measure support for federal environmental regulation. But federal environmental policy implementation requires active state involvement. For example, the Clean Waters Act Amendments of 1972 provided a generous grant-in-aid program to the states if state and local governments provided matching funds. Large sums of money were involved: for the period from 1970 to 1980, California's share of the matching funds necessitated voter approval of $1.1 billion in state bond issues.[13]

Elected officials find it difficult to ascertain the degree of support for environmental protection at the local level. Accordingly, both friends and foes of environmental policies have sponsored public opinion polls to determine the relative priority a policy enjoys and the amount of support or opposition to it. A policy may no longer be at the top of the nation's agenda but may retain a wide margin of support for its implementation. Environmental policy clearly illustrates this phenomenon.

Environmental quality lingered only briefly at the top of opinion polls priority lists and was quickly displaced by the 1973–74 energy crisis.[14] But slippage in the priority lists is not concomitant with a decline in public support, as Robert C. Mitchell's 1978 and 1980 national surveys for Resources for the Future (RFF) made clear. Mitchell wrote:

> [When] asked . . . whether they consider themselves active environmentalists, sympathetic to the environmental movement, neutral, or unsympathetic to the movement . . . 62 percent said that they are active or sympathetic, a level of support that is almost identical to that found in 1978 when this question was first asked by RFF. The 7 percent in the 1980 survey who regarded themselves as "active participants in the movement" is lower than the 1978 figure of 13 percent. However, there is no increase in those who say they are unsympathetic to the movement. In 1978, 6 percent took this position, and in 1980, it was 4 percent. . . . The environmental movement continues to enjoy a very high level of support and an extraordinarily small amount of opposition from the public.[15]

Indeed, public support for the environmental movement has remained so strong that pollster Louis Harris referred to a " 'Commandment on the Environment.' . . . Freely translated, it reads, 'Thou shalt not ease up.' "[16]

The long-lived support for environmental policies observed by pollsters may exist because of the publicity environmental problems have received from the

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voting "yes" is weak and insignificant (R = .12). In fact, the category of ballot measures that is only moderately salient, bond issues, is far more successful (R = .58) than the category of highly salient measures, initiatives (R = −.62). Thus environmental referenda are moderately salient, but salience does not predict voter approval in California.

[13] These bond issues were: Proposition 1 (November 1970); Proposition 2 (June 1974); Proposition 3 (June 1976); Proposition 2 (June 1978); and Proposition 9 (November 1980).

[14] Dick Kirschten, "Thou Shalt Not Ease Up," *National Journal,* 20 May 1978, 812; Mitchell, *Opinion on Environmental Issues.*

[15] Mitchell, *Opinion on Environmental Issues,* 41.

[16] Kirschten, "Thou Shalt Not Ease Up."

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media, worsening environmental conditions, and public education efforts, including modifications of elementary and high school curricula. These efforts have apparently instilled a general environmental consciousness and made environmental protection a value held by a majority of Americans.

While it may be a defect of American politics that participation requires significant participatory skills and leisure time, referenda held at the state and local levels of government offer uniquely low-cost forms of political participation on specific policy issues. By studying California referenda and initiatives (voter-initiated legislation) between 1970 and 1980, it is possible to determine: whether voters are indeed willing to "vote their pocketbooks" for environmental protection (as they assure pollsters they are); whether the environmental movement can mobilize the public to qualify initiatives for the ballot (by collecting hundreds of thousands of signatures); and lastly, whether the characteristics of the environmental electorate differ from the stereotype of environmental activists.

Referenda and initiatives mark the impact of the Nonpartisan Movement, which swept the nation and particularly the West during the 1910s. Such measures indicate weak party states. In addition to being more authoritative than statutes because they often amend state constitutions and cannot be overturned without voter approval unless declared unconstitutional, initiatives provide an opportunity for grassroots protestors to legitimize their demands by qualifying for the ballot.[17]

Between 1970 and 1980 Californians decided 160 ballot measures. This large number of propositions suggests the frequency with which referenda are used to resolve complex political controversies. For example, referenda and initiatives have been used to settle conflicts over the fluoridation of water, urban growth limitation, the location of industrial and power plants, and perhaps best known, tax limitation.[18] However, only 28 of the 160 ballot propositions addressed environmental protection issues. These propositions and 5 control (non-environmental) measures are the focus of this article.

Between 1970 and 1980, twenty-five initiatives qualified for the ballot in California, although only five of these measures passed. Despite their small number, analysis of initiative results is hampered by several problems. The wording of measures often confuses voters. For example, the 1976 nuclear moratorium initiative (Proposition 15) confused voters who were interviewed in Sacramento County. Eugene Lee has written that "twenty percent of the respondents who had voted for the measure . . . had clearly voted for the wrong reasons, for example, 'saying that they voted yes because there was a need for

[17] See Thomas Dye, *Politics in States and Communities* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1977); and Eugene Lee, "California," in David Butler and Austin Ranney, eds., *Referendums: A Comparative Study of Practice and Theory* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1978), 87–122.

[18] Maureen Fitzgerald, "Computer Democracy: An Analysis of California's New Love Affair with the Initiative Process," *California Journal Annual Report* (1981): 2, 5, 11.

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TABLE 1

Environmental Bond Issues in California, 1970–1980

Proposition		*Percentage Voting Yes*
Prop. 1	Water Pollution Control Bonds (November 1970)	76
Prop. 20	Wildlife Bonds (November 1970)	57
Prop. 3	Pollution Control Revenue Bonds (November 1972)	51
Prop. 1	Park Bonds (June 1974)	60
Prop. 2	Water Pollution Control Bonds (June 1974)	71
Prop. 3	Water Pollution Control Bonds (June 1976)	63
Prop. 2	Park Bonds (November 1976)	51
Prop. 3	Bonds for Energy Conservation Loans (November 1976)	41
Prop. 2	Water Pollution Control Bonds (June 1978)	54
Prop. 1	Parklands and Renewable Resources Bond Act (June 1980)	47
Prop. 1	Parklands Bond Issue (November 1980)	52
Prop. 2	Lake Tahoe Acquisition Bond Issue (November 1980)	49
Prop. 9	Water Pollution Control Bond Issue (November 1980)	64

Source: California Secretary of State, *Statement of the Vote* (Sacramento, Calif.: Office of the Secretary of State, 1970–1980).

more nuclear energy no matter what.' "[19] Environmental initiatives, like other initiatives, fall victim to such problems. In addition, the level of knowledge of environmental problems, as with other policy issues, is quite low among the general public.[20] On the other hand, most of the measures studied here are less prone to misinterpretation since they are bond issues and spending measures, relatively straightforward questions of willingness to spend public funds. They are less likely to confuse voters.

California Voters and the Costs of Environmentalism

The analysis of the approval by California voters of bond issues and related measures to pay for environmental protection sheds some light on the role of self-interest as a factor in policy-specific voting. Several political economists argue that voters act in their self-interest after conducting a rational benefit-cost analysis. They see voting as an instrumental benefit rather than as a symbolic or expressive benefit.[21] Some political sociologists and psychologists, on the other hand, stress the symbolic and expressive benefits of voting.[22] The ap-

[19] Lee, "California," 113.

[20] Mitchell, *Opinion on Environmental Issues,* 33.

[21] For example, see Anthony Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (New York: Harper and Row, 1957).

[22] David Sears, et al., "Self-Interest vs. Symbolic Politics in Policy Attitudes and Presidential Voting," *American Political Science Review* 74 (1980): 670–84; Wolfinger and Rosenstone, *Who Votes?* 7.

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TABLE 2

Environmental Spending Measures Revised, Resubmitted, and Eventually Passed in California, 1970–1980

Unsuccessful Proposition		*Successful Proposition*	
Prop. 18	Smog Fund from State Gas Tax (November 1970) 46% Yes	Prop. 5	Subsidize Mass Transit Guideways from State Gas Tax (June 1974) 60% Yes
Prop. 12	Authorize Energy Conservation Loans (June 1978) 49% Yes	Prop. 8	Alternative Energy Facilities Financing (June 1980) 50.2% Yes
Prop. 3	Tax Exemption for Home Alternative Energy Systems (June 1978) 45% Yes	Prop. 7	Solar Energy Tax Exemption (November 1980) 66% Yes
Prop. 8	Tax Exemption for Pollution Control Facilities (November 1972) 27% Yes		

Source: California Secretary of State, *Statement of the Vote* (Sacramento, Calif.: Office of the Secretary of State, 1970–1980).

proval of bond issues and tax measures would argue to a degree against the notion of instrumental voting. While bond issues may provide public works jobs, tax measures, for example, are clearly more difficult to accept as directly beneficial to the individual.

Evidence of willingness-to-pay is apparent in Table 1, which shows that even after the taxpayers' revolt in 1978, bond issues for environmental protection continued to pass. Between 1970 and 1980, thirteen bond issues were placed on the ballot by the legislature. Most passed (77 percent), including a water pollution control bond issue appearing on the June 1978 ballot, which included Proposition 13. If there was ever a time to expect voter rejection, this was it. Similarly, two bond issues passed in November 1980, when Ronald Reagan carried California in the presidential election.[23]

The general success of bond issues is not surprising since, as noted, they may be perceived as providing instrumental benefits to voters. In addition, they are well-situated at the top of the ballot, a position that avoids "ballot fatigue." California environmental bond issues actually had a slightly higher rate of approval (71 percent) than non-environmental bond issues. These results are unambiguous signs of public willingness to spend public funds for environmental protection throughout the past decade.

While one might expect bond issues to pass for reasons already noted, tax authorizations and similar measures are normally greeted with far less enthusiasm, according to James Best and Robert Warren, who found that these were

[23] Proposition 2 on the November 1980 ballot narrowly failed (49 percent yes), ostensibley because it involved $85 million for land acqusition and preservation exclusively within the Lake Tahoe Basin. (Subsequently, this measure was resubmitted and passed in 1982.)

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among the least successful type of propositions.[24] It is therefore significant that seven of the eight environmental protection and energy conservation spending measures met with eventual success. As shown in Table 2, these measures frequently failed the first time and were retitled, revised, and resubmitted. After such changes, most of the measures passed, sometimes by wide margins.

For example, Proposition 18 (November 1970) was a broad measure calling for use of the state gasoline tax for air pollution control and mass transit. This measure, as Table 2 shows, failed. But the effort to utilize this fund for mass transit ultimately succeeded, in the form of Proposition 5 (June 1974), which permitted use of the state gasoline tax for the construction of mass transit guideways on freeways. Such revision and resubmission is common in California. (For example, measures establishing the regulation of chiropractors and changes in the state usury laws frequently reappear on the ballot.) The important point is that over a period of ten years, most environmental spending measures passed.

Unlike bond issues and tax measures, which indicate a willingness-to-pay for environmental protection programs, initiatives are difficult to interpret because of confusing wording, low voter knowledge, and because initial support often evaporates as opponents outspend supporters.[25] Most initiatives are not approved in California, and environmental initiatives submitted during this period are no exception. Only one of the four environmental initiatives during the 1970s passed.

If initiatives are highly controversial and hard to interpret, what role do they play in understanding the nature of support for environmental policies? The ability to qualify for the ballot requires an enormous grassroots political effort and the mobilization of voters. Continued appearance of initiatives denotes the ability to mobilize, indicating that the environmental movement exists at the grassroots level. For example, the citizen-initiated measure to repeal the Peripheral Canal's authorization (Proposition 9, June 1982) qualified for the ballot and passed. This indicates that the movement is still able to mobilize the public.

California environmental tax measures, bond issues, and initiatives met with the same or slightly better rates of approval than their non-environmental counterparts. Significantly, these referenda show a willingness-to-pay indicated by opinion polls commissioned both before and after the 1973–74 oil embargo. These and other surveys have observed a continuing concern about environmental protection in the face of energy and economic crises, as well as an unwillingness to sacrifice environmental amenities and safety for economic pros-

[24] James Best and Robert Warren, "The 1968 Election in Washington," *Western Political Quarterly* 22 (1969): 536–45.

[25] Lee, "California," 110–111; Carl Lutrin and Allen Settle, "The Public and Ecology: The Role of Initiatives in California's Environmental Politics," *Western Political Quarterly* 28 (1975): 352–71; and John Mueller, "Ballot Patterns and Historical Trends in California," *American Political Science Review* 63 (1969): 1197–1212.

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perity.[26] Although the recent history of environmental protection in California generally agrees with Downs's issue-attention cycle for environmental policy, the observed continued willingness-to-pay for environmental protection conflicts with his thesis. This willingness also counters the notion that self-interest is the principal force behind political action (in this case, referenda approval). A deep non-transitory value preference appears to lead a majority of voters to approve these measures.[27]

A Contextual Model of the Environmental Mandate

Political support for environmental protection policies is based on a majority of the electorate approving environmental referenda and survey respondents replying that they support environmental protection. What types of individuals and groups are responsible for the observed environmental mandate? Analysis of referenda on a county-by-county basis permits the development of a contextual model of the environmental electorate in California during the 1970s. This section of the article will determine whether the image of environmental activists corresponds to the characteristics of the environmental electorate. In view of the often high socioeconomic status of most reform movement members in the United States, it would be a safe guess that environmental activists are likewise affluent.[28] However, this stereotype does not necessarily apply to the environmental electorate. For example, the greatest beneficiaries of environmental pollution control groups are those most exposed to pollution, usually residents of the central city.[29] Similarly, many conservation group members may never visit wilderness areas, but nevertheless seek to protect them from development.[30] Thus the standard test for direct benefit from environmental activism is not necessarily useful in explaining the relationship between environmental activism and political support for environmental protection. Non-economic benefits of supporting environmental protection measures would seem to motivate both activists and their supporters.[31]

[26] Mitchell, *Opinion on Environmental Issues;* Joseph Viladas, *Impact of the Fuel Shortage on Public Attitudes Toward Environmental Protection* (Washington, D.C.: Environmental Protection Agency, 1974).

[27] The simple correlation between percent voting "yes" and time for the twenty-eight environmental propositions was a miniscule 0.04, indicating no significant change in political support with time.

[28] Andrews, "Class Politics or Democratic Reform," and William Burch, "Who Participates: A Sociological Interpretation of Natural Resources Decisions," *Natural Resources Journal* 16 (1976): 48.

[29] Mitchell, *Opinion on Environmental Issues,"* 29; Marjorie Hershey and David B. Hill, "Is Pollution 'A White Thing'? Racial Differences in Preadults' Attitudes," *Public Opinion Quarerly* 41 (1977–78): 439.

[30] See Frederick H. Buttel and Oscar Larson III, "Whither Environmentalism? The Future Political Path of the Environmental Movement," *Natural Resources Journal* 20 (1980): 323–44.

[31] This phenomenon is explored further in Mancur Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971); Wilson, *Political Organizations;* Peter B. Clark and James

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There remain exceptions to this generalization, to be sure. At times environmental regulations have been used to benefit a select group of citizens, such as exclusionary zoning in the name of environmental protection.[32] The twenty-eight environmental propositions considered here benefit the general public and are not limited to a segment of society. Nevertheless, environmental activists are stereotyped as belonging to the affluent class even though an objective analysis of the socioeconomic characteristics of the environmental electorate in California shows little elitism.

This study of California propositions employs six independent variables (population density, income, age, education, race, and party) in a multiple regression analysis of percent voting "yes" for the twenty-eight environmental and five non-environmental propositions that serve as controls.[33] It is expected that the environmental electorate will differ from those voting on other types of measures. The multiple regression analysis will show how each of the independent variables contribute to the support for environmental protection. Since the number of dependent variables involved in this analysis is large (thirty-three propositions), the results of the multiple regression analysis are summarized in this discussion to illustrate the direction, strength, and significance of the effect of each variable, and whether it is statistically significant at the .05 level.[34]

Before examining these referenda and initiatives, it is important to note the limitations of using aggregate data, since the fifty-eight counties of California

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Q. Wilson, "Incentive Systems: A Theory of Organizations," *Administrative Science Quarterly* 6 (1961): 129–66. Burton Weisbrod empirically examined the question of membership benefits and found that collective benefits rather than individual benefits (such as wilderness hikes or bulletins published by conservation organizations) are the primary motivation to join environmental groups. Weisbrod, "Distributional Effects," 130–39.

[32] See Bernard Frieden, *The Environmental Protection Hustle* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1979); Michelle White, "Self Interest in the Suburbs," *Policy Analysis* 4 (1978): 185–203; and Michael Danielson, *The Politics of Exclusion* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976).

[33] Independent variables were defined as follows: "population density" was obtained by dividing the total square miles per county by the population of the county. To accommodate the enormous range in populations, the natural logarithm of this value was utilized in the multiple regression analysis. These data were obtained from the County Supervisors' Association of California, *California County Fact Book 1977–1978* (Sacramento, Calif.: County Supervisors' Association of California, 1977), 19, 41. The base year for the square miles was 1965; the base year for population was 1970. "Median income" for 1970 was obtained from the *County Fact Book,* 69. "Median age" for 1970 was obtained from the *County Fact Book*, 50. "Percent white residents" for 1970 was obtained from the *County Fact Book,* 51. "Median years school completed" was averaged for men and women for each county and obtained for 1970 from the Bureau of the Census, *General Social and Economic Characteristics, California* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1972), 1038–42. "Percent registered Democrats" for 1970 was obtained from the 4 November 1980 *Statement of the Vote* (Sacramento, Calif.: Secretary of State, 4 November 1980), 4.

Dependent variables (percent voting "yes") for each of the thirty-three propositions was obtained from the *Statement of the Vote* for primaries and general elections, starting in June 1970 and ending in November 1980.

[34] The control propositions are: Proposition 19, "The Usury Law Amendment" (November 1970); Proposition 19, "The Legalization of Marijuana Initiative" (November 1972); Proposition 1,

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are the units of analysis. Such data create certain biases because each average, "whether the county be Alpine (pop. 450) or Los Angeles (pop. 7,036,463)," is weighted equally.[35] This means that less populated counties are favored. An even more important factor is the difficulty of inferring individual beliefs and actions from aggregate data. This problem, known as the "ecological fallacy," is guarded against by comparing referenda analysis with survey data and by using controls (non-environmental referenda). With these cautions in mind, it is possible to use aggregate data to develop hypotheses regarding group and individual behavior that can be tested subsequently through analysis of smaller homogeneous units, such as voting precincts and individual interviews.

Population Density

Environmental activists, according to surveys, are often suburban and rural residents.[36] But population density, measured as the natural logarithm of persons per square mile (to accommodate the wide range already noted in county population), is the best predictor of support for environmental propositions when the other variables are controlled. The more densely populated a county, the more support exists for environmental protection. The relationship was often strong, almost always positive, and frequently statistically significant. As expected, control propositions show a different pattern, and indicate that population density is not a predictor of support for those measures. In contrast to environmental activists, the environmental electorate tends to be urban, or at least densely populated.

Other studies have found similar correlations between population density and support for environmental protection.[37] For example, Jerry Medler and Alvin Mushkatel probed this point to determine not only the relationship between population density and environmental support, but also length of residence and support for land-use control.[38] In particular, they were concerned with understanding why rural residents were less environmentally supportive than urban

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"Community College Bond Issue," (November 1972); Proposition 9, "Legalization of Bingo Initiative," (June 1976); and Propositions 1, "The Veterans Bond Act of 1978," (November 1978).

Each of the independent variables is correlated with the dependent variable, controlling for the other independent variables. The measure used to describe the strength of each relationship (when the other variables are controlled) is the standardized regression coefficient (beta weight), which ranges from 1.0 to −1.0; beta weights of 0.00 indicate no relationship between the independent and dependent variables tested. These coefficients are available from the author on request.

[35] Robert C. Fried, "The November 1976 Election in California: How the Counties Voted," Department of Political Science, University of California at Los Angeles, 1976 (mimeographed), 12.

[36] Mitchell, *Opinion on Environmental Issues,* 45.

[37] See Buttel and Flinn, "Structure of Support," 64–65; Don A. Dillman and James A. Christenson, "The Public Value for Pollution Control," in William Burch, et al., *Social Behavior, Natural Resources and the Environment* (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), 237–56; and James McEvoy III, "The American Concern with Environment," in Burch, et al., *Social Behavior,* 227.

[38] Jerry Medler and Alvin Mushkatel, "Urban-Rural Class Conflict in Oregon Land-Use Planning," *Western Political Quarterly* 32 (1969): 344–48.

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residents in Oregon. They reasoned that those who had most recently been exposed to unplanned growth would support land-use planning. They found that urban communities did indeed support land-use planning more than rural communities, and that those communities that had most recently undergone rapid growth were the most intense supporters of growth and land-use controls. Finally, they found that the more recent the resident, the more support existed for growth and land-use controls. By contrast, rural areas with abundant land-related natural resources are also the least developed economically and therefore rural residents are opposed to environmental regulations. The authors concluded that rural voters felt they should economically catch-up by cashing in on their most abundant resources—scenic, forested Oregon land.[39] Robert C. Mitchell similarly found that specific environmental problems concerned urban respondents more than rural survey respondents. He wrote: "People who live in cities of 250,000 or more and in their suburbs are much more concerned about air pollution, toxic chemicals, and drinking water purity than those who live in rural areas."[40] The correspondence between environmental referenda and these surveys leads to the conclusion that the environmental electorate is an urbanized constituency, in contradiction to its image as a suburban-rural movement.

Voter Income

The image of environmental activists as members of the leisure class appears to hold true regarding the relationship between median income of county residents and percent voting "yes" for environmental propositions when the other independent variables are controlled. The relationships are often positive, strong, and significant, with the notable exception of a control proposition, the Veterans Bond Act of 1978.

These results are not surprising, since studies of environmental attitudes have found that support increases with income.[41] Regarding the income stereotype of environmentalists, the image corresponds with the characteristics of the environmental electorate in California and survey respondents in national and state surveys.

Racial Minorities

While densely populated counties are supportive of environmental propositions, as noted above, such counties also have the largest racial minority populations. The "white" image of the environmental movement would lead one to expect

[39] Ibid.

[40] Mitchell, *Opinion on Environmental Issues,* 29.

[41] For example, see Frederick Buttel and William Flinn, "The Politics of Environmental Concern: The Impacts of Party Identification and Political Ideology on Environmental Attitudes," *Environment and Behavior* 10 (1978): 17–36.

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that racial minorities would not support these propositions. Yet when "percent white" residents in each county is correlated with "percent voting yes" for the propositions and the other variables are controlled, the results are startling. Contrary to the stereotype, a consistent negative relationship between percent white and percent voting yes is observed. These values are moderately strong and often statistically significant. They suggest that when other socioeconomic variables are controlled, the policy preferences of counties with large non-white populations are especially supportive of environmental protection propositions. Race was not a significant factor in the control propositions, with the exception of Proposition 19, the "Legalization of Marijuana Initiative" (November 1972). In this instance, non-white populations strongly supported the measure.

Until recently, few studies even addressed the question of race and environmental attitudes, either because of the movement's image or because many of the environmental attitude studies were conducted in states with small minority populations such as Oregon, Montana, and Wisconsin. In addition, early studies of environmental attitudes did not find a strong preference for environmental protection among minority members and thus perhaps discouraged further study. For example, Marjorie Hershey and David B. Hill concluded in 1977 that black schoolchildren did not perceive pollution to be an important problem, despite the fact that they were more exposed to and affected by this problem than white children.[42] Matthew Crenson found in a 1971 survey of St. Louis residents that non-white respondents were less bothered by air pollution than white persons living in similar conditions.[43]

But by 1980 this picture had changed, as more studies addressed the issue. Bryan Jones, et al., for example, found that black Detroit residents were more likely to file environmental complaints with city officials than white residents of comparable socioeconomic status.[44] In 1978, Raymond Wolfinger and Steven J. Rosenstone published findings that blacks had a slightly higher voting turnout when socioeconomic variables were controlled.[45] Finally, in 1980 Robert C. Mitchell argued that while blacks were somewhat less supportive of the environmental movement, they were more concerned about specific pollution problems by a significant margin. He stated that two out of every three blacks were "concerned 'a great deal' about (water and noise pollution) . . . compared with one in three whites."[46]

It is clear from these recent studies and the consistent pattern of the relationships that the racial stereotype of the environmental movement differs from the racial characteristics of its supporters. Environmental protection, and particu-

[42] Hershey and Hill, "Racial Differences."

[43] Matthew Crenson, *The Un-Politics of Air Pollution* (Baltimore, Md.: John Hopkins University Press, 1971), 15.

[44] Bryan Jones, et al., "Bureaucratic Response to Citizen-Initiated Contacts: Environmental Enforcement in Detroit," *American Political Science Review* 71 (1977): 158.

[45] Wolfinger and Rosenstone, *Who Votes?* 90.

[46] Mitchell, *Opinion on Environmental Attitudes,* 29.

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larly pollution control, is not a "white" cause with voters. The role of race in environmental attitudes and voting is an important question that warrants further research.

Age and Environmental Support

Just as one assumes (incorrectly) from the stereotype of the environmental movement that it only appeals to whites, the same stereotype would lead one to expect that it only attracts young supporters. In fact, studies of environmental activists indicate that they are often young because many of the new pollution control groups formed during the late 1960s and early 1970s were led by and aimed at young people.[47] But voters, and not just activists, are the focus of this article.

Once again, the stereotype does not accurately describe the environmental electorate. Age, measured by median age, when the other independent variables are controlled, is not a significant predictor of support for environmental propositions. The relationsips are both positive and negative, and consistently very weak and insignificant. The only exception to this pattern is a control proposition, Proposition 9 (June 1976), the "Legalization of Bingo Initiative." In this case, the older the median age of a county's population, the more support existed for bingo.

While most surveys of environmental attitudes show that support for the movement is greatest among the young, the few studies that have controlled for other independent variables, particularly income and education, have found that age is not a significant factor in predicting support for environmental issues.[48] Though age may not presently be a major factor in support for environmental protection, it may become so in the future, as more people are exposed to environmental education courses or as environmental quality declines. Support for environmental protection may show an increasingly youthful orientation. Expressed somewhat differently, what might have been acceptable to one generation may no longer be tolerated by younger people, who perceive that they will have longer exposures to these problems.[49]

Party Affiliation

The image of environmental activists as liberal-to-radical in their political ideology leads one to expect that they will appeal to similarly inclined voters. This is not the case, however, as Table 3 illustrates. The prevailing ideology for both environmental activists (defined here as members of environmental or-

[47] Jeffrey Berry, *Lobbying for the People* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1977).

[48] Dillman and Christenson, "Public Value," 253.

[49] Denton E. Morrison, et al., "The Environmental Movement: Some Preliminary Observations and Predictions," in William Burch, et al., *Social Behavior, Natural Resources and the Environment* (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), 275; Crenson, *Un-Politics of Air Pollution*, 14.

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TABLE 3

*Political Ideology and Membership of Five Environmental Organizations**

Political Orientation	*Environmental Group Respondents (percent)*	*General Public (percent)*
Strongly Conservative	8.6	8.0
Moderately Conservative	36.4	41.0
Middle-of-the-Road	29.7	31.0
Moderately Liberal	19.5	14.0
Strongly Liberal	3.7	5.0
Radical	2.1	2.0

* Environmental Action, Environmental Defense Fund, National Wildlife Federation, Sierra Club, and The Wilderness Society.

Sources: Robert C. Mitchell, "How 'Soft,' 'Deep,' or 'Left'? Present Constituencies in the Environmental Movement for Certain World Views," *Natural Resources Journal* 20 (1980): 354; Bill Keller, "Environmental Movement Checks Its Pulse and Finds Obituaries are Premature," *Congressional Quarterly*, 31 January 1981, 211-56.

ganizations) and the general public is moderately conservative to middle-of-the-road. In fact, the same percentage of activists and the general public describe themselves as radicals (two percent) when the size of organizations is controlled.

It should come as no surprise to learn that environmental activists are not confined to the liberal-radical end of the ideological spectrum. As noted earlier, the environmental movement is a loose confederation of large conservative sporting organizations and smaller (but highly vocal) liberal-to-radical pollution control groups.[50] At the left end of the spectrum are groups like Environmental Action (with 20,000 members), in the center, the Sierra Club (with 180,000 members), and at the right end, groups like the National Wildlife Federation (with over 4.6 million subscribers and contributors), who are often blue collar workers interested in protecting hunting and fishing areas.

The partisan affiliations of environmentalists differ somewhat from those of the general public. In 1972, 35 percent of respondents to a survey by the University of Michigan's Center for Political Studies responded that they were independents; 40 percent responded that they were Democrats; and 23 percent answered that they were Republicans.[51] Sierra Club members replied somewhat differently to the same question when asked by Resources for the Future in 1978: 57 percent described themselves as Independents; 28 percent as Democrats; and 11 percent as Republicans.[52] While environmental activists tend to be

[50] James Rosenau has noted that there exists a debate regarding the growth of the attentive public, though other observers such as John Mueller claim that the attentive public is not larger but merely more vocal than in the past. See Rosenau, *Citizenship Between Elections,* 41; and Mueller, "Ballot Patterns."

[51] Richard A. Watson, *Promise and Performance of American Democracy,* 3rd ed. (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1978), 343.

[52] Judy Anderson, "Sierra Club Survey," *Southern Sierran,* April 1979, 5-6.

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more independent than the general public, more Democrats than Republicans are involved in these organizations.

Therefore one would expect there to be more support for environmental propositions in California counties with more registered Democrats. But this is not the case. When the other independent variables are controlled, there is only an extremely weak and frequently negative relationship between the "percent registered Democrats" and "percent voting yes." The more registered Republicans, contrary to expectations, the more support for environmental propositions. The only exception to this relationship is a control proposition, the Veterans Bond Act of 1978, which shows a positive and significant relationship (the more Democrats, the more support for the bond measure).

Since referenda are nonpartisan elections, indicative of weak political parties, this barely measurable relationship between party identification and percent voting "yes" is in one sense, not unexpected. But in another sense, the negative relationships are unanticipated because one would expect that Democratic populations would support environmental protection propositions more than would Republican populations. While environmental activists' ideological beliefs and partisan affiliations correspond with those of the general public, it would appear that the environmental electorate is more conservative than the general public and environmental activists.

In part, this difference is due to the political profile of California, which is different from that of the nation as a whole. Although registered Democrats have outnumbered Republicans in the state for over two decades, they have not dominated state offices. More importantly, in the words of Charles Bell and Charles Price: "California voters tend to be considerably more conservative than liberal. Half are conservatives while only a third are liberal.[53] California Republicans, it should be noted, are "conservative-to-very-conservative" in their ideology, and some forty percent of California's Democrats are also conservative. The political characteristics of the California electorate make it improbable that environmental referenda could pass that did not appeal to conservatives from both parties. One may therefore conclude that the image of the environmental movement matches neither the environmental electorate nor the actual nature of the movement itself. In addition, the environmental electorate is more conservative than the environmental movement.

While party identification does not explain voter approval of environmental propositions, it does explain legislative voting and is consistent with the expected pattern of Democratic support for environmental bills, as demonstrated by roll-call analyses by Riley Dunlap and others.[54] These findings suggest a gap

[53] Charles Bell and Charles Price, *California Government Today: Politics of Reform* (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press, 1980), 87–90.

[54] See Riley Dunlap and Richard Gale, "Party Membership and Environmental Politics: A Legislative Roll-Call Analysis," *Social Science Quarterly* 55 (1979): 670–90; Richard Cooley and Geoffrey Wandesforde-Smith, eds., *Congress and the Environment* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1970), 205–26.

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between the policy preferences of the electorate and the actions of elected representatives. This gap is exactly what Jerry W. Calvert observed in the Montana Legislature—support for environmental protection spanned party lines, but Republican legislators ignored this trend and opposed environmental measures.[55] Apparently, Republican legislators do not perceive environmental protection as an issue to be supported by Republican voters. This type of perception is one key to understanding the misperception of the environmental movement by some elected officials.

Education and Environmental Support

The last independent variable examined here is an important factor in explaining support for environmental propositions. Median years of school completed for each country and percent voting "yes" for the propositions (when the other independent variables are controlled) yields, with few exceptions, positive, moderately strong, and significant relationships. As expected, education is not a significant factor with the control propositions.

The importance of education in environmental support is not surprising since earlier studies have consistently observed strong correlations between education and support for environmental issues. In addition, education has been found to be the most significant factor in explaining voter turnout. According to Wolfinger and Rosenstone, "people who are likely to make it through college are also likely to make it to the polls. In part this is because years of schooling reflect family background more than any other demographic characteristic."[56] Education, they continue, instills a feeling of social obligation to vote and provides the skills to obtain and interpret information necessary to evaluate electoral choices. Thus, from surveys and this analysis of California referenda one may conclude that support for environmental protection increases with education.

Conclusion

This article has attempted to explore the nature of public support for environmental protection during the 1970s in order to learn whether support has continued over time and whether this support is broader than expected considering the stereotype of environmental activists. It is apparent from this study that a great deal of congruence exists between polls and electoral behavior.

Voters and the general public support environmental protection on an issue-by-issue basis. In California, the environmental electorate spans income, racial,

[55] Jerry W. Calvert, "The Social and Ideological Bases of Support for Environment Legislation: An Examination of Public Attitudes and Legislative Action," *Western Political Quarterly* 32 (1979): 327–37; see also Helen Ingram, et al., "Water Scarcity and the Politics of Plenty in the Four Corners States," *Western Political Quarterly* 32 (1979): 298–306.

[56] Wolfinger and Rosenstone, *Who Votes?* See also Buttel and Flinn, "Structure of Support."

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age, and party lines. The environmental constituency therefore includes many more people than the stereotype of environmental activists would indicate. Furthermore, a significant willingness-to-pay has been observed in the form of bond issue and public spending measure approval throughout the 1970s. While environmental protection is no longer at the top of the nation's policy agenda, consistent and strong support for the policy exists. It has defied the issue-attention cycle.

The depth and longevity of the environmental mandate stand in stark contrast to efforts to repeal or alter the environmental laws passed during the early 1970s. The general public, for example, when surveyed by the Harris Poll in October 1981, responded that 80 percent opposed any relaxation of air pollution regulations. Louis Harris commented that the public is saying, " 'Watch out. We will have your hide if you do it.' That is the only message that comes out of this as clear-cut as anything I have ever seen in my professional career. . . ."[57] Yet the Reagan administration has sought to gut these laws. Congress has considered weakening environmental controls and has, for example, been unable to reach a consensus on renewing the Clean Air Act of 1970.[58] During the 1982 Congressional election these items were tabled. This situation creates enormous uncertainty for the Environmental Protection Agency and for regulated industries alike.

One explanation for the stalemate over renewing environmental laws is that elected officials confuse issue saliance with issue support. Their election campaigns fix on salient issues. They assume that by the time the next election rolls around, environmental regulation will be displaced by other policy issues and that public dissatisfaction with a particular environmenal vote will be neutralized. This might be an intelligent gamble if one is concerned only with issue salience. Preoccupation with issue salience, however, leads to a misperception of the nature of public support for environmental protection.

The gap between citizen preferences and the actions of elected officials is not confined to environmental affairs. It is symptomatic of a general decline in the role of political parties, of a rise in incumbency levels (little turnover in office), and the meteoric rise of political action committees, which now dominate elections.[59] Intense political activity by well-financed and well-organized economic

[57] Quoted in Kathy Koch, "Senate Committee Begins Clean Air Revision," *Congressional Quarterly,* 7 November 1981, 2191-92.

[58] See "House Unit Backs Added Extensions for Cleanup of Air," *Los Angeles Times,* 10 March 1982.

[59] Political action committee spending has continued to climb since 1978. By 1980 it was estimated that contributions had doubled from an average of forty percent of 155 House members in 1978. See Luther J. Carter, "Environmentalists Seek New Strategies," *Science* 208 (1980): 447-78; and Larry Light, et al., "Democrats May Lose Edge in Contribution from PACs," *Congressional Quarterly,* 22 November 1980, 3405-3409.

For a discussion of the decline of political parties and increased incumbency levels, see: Gerald Pomper, "The Decline of the Party in American Elections," *Political Science Quarterly* 90 (1975): 411-35; and Walter Dean Burnham, "American Politics in the 1970s: Beyond Party?" in Louis

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interests is not matched by poorly funded public interest groups representing a diffuse set of interests. Furthermore, nonprofit tax-exempt public interest groups are prohibited by federal tax laws from endorsing candidates and are restricted in their lobbying activities.[60] These factors result in underrepresentation of the general public's policy preferences.*

Maisel and Paul Sacks, eds., *The Future of Political Parties* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1975), 238–77.

[60] Analysis of the effects of tax laws on public interest environmental groups is presented in Laura M. Lake, *Environmental Regulation: The Political Effects of Implementation* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982), 85–86.

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Worker Participation and Worker Discontent in the Soviet Union

CHARLES E. ZIEGLER

The formation in August 1980 of the independent Polish labor organization Solidarity illustrates the potential for mass, spontaneous worker participation in Leninist systems. The question that immediately comes to mind is, could a similar movement emerge in the prototype socialist system, the Soviet Union? Is worker dissatisfaction in the Soviet Union similar in nature or magnitude to that in Poland? Might worker discontent find expression in comparable forms as mass, unregulated participation?

In attempting to answer these questions, two factors will be analyzed. The first involves the success of the Soviet regime in mobilizing and channeling workers' energies through institutionalized means of participation. Trade unions, factory committees, youth organizations, and the Communist Party itself all strive to incorporate workers into the governmental process, almost exclusively on the output side of government. Evidence is provided that suggests the inclusionary policies of the Soviet regime have been moderately effective in reducing worker dissatisfaction by increasing workers' political efficacy. A definite stratification appears to be occurring, however, between the more highly skilled and educated workers, and those having lower skill and educational levels.

Second, the politicization of Soviet workers will be analyzed. In Poland, the events of August 1980 were the culmination of nearly a quarter century of

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worker unrest beginning with the Poznań riots of 1956. This period can be viewed as a significant political learning process for the Poles.[1] In contrast to the situation in Poland, worker politicization in the Soviet Union has been fragmented at best. Furthermore, Soviet workers have demonstrated great reluctance to form an alliance with the intelligentsia, as occurred in Poland after the formation of the Workers' Defense Committee (KOR) in 1976. These factors would indicate a much lower degree of politicization of workers in the USSR.

The Soviet Inclusionary Strategy

Soviet leaders, under self-proclaimed conditions of developed socialism, have pursued a policy of encouraging increasing numbers of industrial workers to become involved in the formal governing institutions of the Soviet state. This process can best be described as "inclusionary," where the regime seeks to manipulate rather than dominate the working class, utilizing the potential of the most skilled and educated segments of the working class in administration and production.[2] This strategy demonstrates Soviet commitment to the Marxist-Leninist ideal of workers' rule, and has been consistent in Soviet policy toward industrial workers. The reversal of the inclusionary process detected by Kenneth Jowitt in many Leninist regimes does not appear to be occurring in the Soviet Union.[3]

A primary component of developed socialism is the expanded role of the public in the governance of the Soviet state.[4] Articles 8 and 9 of the 1977 Soviet Constitution, for example, emphasize the role of labor collectives and of all working citizens in the conduct of public affairs. State administration is expected to be strengthened through democratization, by bringing the average citizen into day-to-day decision-making and into the implementation of policy.[5] Article 7 of the Constitution specifies that mass organizations such as the trade unions, local soviets, People's Control Committees, conservation societies, and factory and other *kollektiv* organizations are to serve as structures through which this participation takes place. Mass involvement is supposed to ensure efficiency through public oversight (*kontrol'*) of the administrative process. Mass participation also serves to educate the citizenry according to socialist principles and is thus an important means of political socialization.

[1] David W. Paul and Maurice D. Simon, "Poland Today and Czechoslakia in 1968," *Problems of Communism* 30, No. 5 (1981): 25–39.

[2] Kenneth Jowitt has elaborated the concept of inclusion as a stage of development of Leninist regimes in his article "Inclusion and Mobilization in European Leninist Regimes," *World Politics* 28 (1975): 69–96.

[3] Ibid.

[4] "Demokratiia razvitogo sotsializma," *Kommunist*, No. 10 (1977): 5–16; L. Brezhnev, "Politicheskaia sistema razvitogo sotsializma," *Kommunist*, No. 8 (1978): 12–23.

[5] V. I. Mukhachev and V. S. Borovik, *Rabochii klass i upravlenia proizvodstvom* (Moscow: Politizdat, 1975).

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Since the existence of autonomous structures in Soviet society constitutes a threat to the Party's monopoly of political power, the Party has adopted certain strategies directed toward functional utilization of "interest groups."[6] Political demands that accompany development of social complexity cannot be allowed to exist independently; neither can they simply be eliminated through Party decree. The alternative is to absorb inchoate interest groups in party-controlled social and political institutions. This process would include worker representation in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) itself, worker representation in the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and in the local soviets, and worker participation in factory committees and trade unions.[7]

Since the decision taken under Nikita Khrushchev to "proletarianize" the Communist Party, workers have constituted a growing proportion of that body. In the period from 1957 to 1977, worker representation in the CPSU increased from 32.0 to 42.0 percent of total membership. Workers as a proportion of new entrants into the Party increased substantially; 57.6 percent of those entering the Party in 1971–75 were workers.[8] It should be noted, however, that the proletarianization process does not extend to the upper levels of the Party. In 1976, only three percent of the full members of the Central Committee were workers.[9]

Similar increases in worker representation can be documented for the system of soviets at both the local and the national levels. Industrial worker representation in the Supreme Soviet, formally the highest organ of state power in the USSR, has consistently increased since the Khrushchev era. Workers accounted for 23.5 percent of the deputies in 1963 and 34.8 percent in 1979. White collar representation declined over the same period, from 55.4 to 48.9 percent, while the proportion of collective farmers decreased by about five percentage points.[10]

This pattern is repeated at the sub-national level, where workers have made substantial gains in becoming deputies of local soviets. Their proportion of the total membership increased from 35.0 to 42.3 percent during the period 1969 to 1977. White collar personnel and collective farmers experienced declines proportional to those noted for the Supreme Soviet, although white collar representation had been consistently lower in local institutions.[11]

[6] For an example of this process in the area of environmental policy, see Charles E. Ziegler, "Soviet Environmental Policy and Soviet Central Planning: A Reply to McIntyre and Thornton," *Soviet Studies* 32 (1980): 124–34.

[7] The significance of participation in the workplace is discussed in Carol Pateman, *Participation and Democratic Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970).

[8] Ronald J. Hill and Peter Frank, *The Soviet Communist Party* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1981), 36–37.

[9] Jerry F. Hough and Merle Fainsod, *How the Soviet Union is Governed* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979), 339, 456.

[10] *Pravda*, 7 March 1979; N.N. Demochkin, "The Soviets in Conditions of Developed Socialism," *Voprosy istorii*, No. 12 (December 1974), translated in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press (CDSP)* 27 (16 July 1975): 14–15.

[11] In 1977, white collar personnel accounted for 31.6 percent of total membership. *Itogi vyborov*

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A number of Soviet writers contend that the soviets are assuming new powers in the formation and implementation of policy.[12] However, Western research suggests that progress toward a real policymaking role for the soviets has been modest at best, especially at the national level.[13] Local soviets are generally allowed greater autonomy in dealing with local affairs than the Supreme Soviet is allowed in national issues, since Party control is more pervasive at the national level. In the local soviets, "average" workers are represented along with specialists on the standing commissions, which assist in the supervision of ministerial departments, enterprises, and other organizations.[14] Specialists, however, tend to exercise disproportionate influence on substantive matters before the commissions.[15] In addition, workers are substantially underrepresented on the important executive committees of the soviets. While the percentage of total membership of white collar employees declined from 35.7 to 32.7 from 1969 to 1973, their percentage of membership in the executive committees increased from 53.4 to 54.5 percent. Worker representation on local soviet executive committees stood at 21.9 percent in 1973.[16]

Worker Participation

As might be expected in a "workers' state," Soviet workers are legally guaranteed a significant voice in the workplace. Of course, such "legal guarantees" are seldom fully realized in Soviet practice; however, the *symbolism* of regime commitment to participation may be important to workers. This participation may take place through trade unions or through any of a multitude of factory committees. Trade unions and other mass organizations are expected to serve as "political schools" for workers, educating them in the everyday governance of the Soviet state.[17] There is no question that participation is strictly constrained in the workplace. The principle of *edinonachalie*, or one-person management, still holds in Soviet industry. A 1981 sociological study of labor discipline found that industrial managers frequently take on too much authority, causing young

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i sostav deputatov mestnykh sovetov deputatov trudiashchikhsia SSSR, 1969 (statisticheskii sbornik) (Moscow: "Izvestiia sovetov deputatov trudiashchikhsia SSSR," 1969), 18, 197; *Itogi vyborov . . . 1971,* 14, 198–99; *Itogi vyborov . . . 1973,* 18, 218–19; *Izvestiia,* 25 June 1977.

[12] See, for example, O. E. Kutafin, *Mestnye sovety i narodnokhoziaistvennoe planirovanie* (Moscow: Moscow University, 1976).

[13] Peter Vanneman, *The Supreme Soviet: Politics and the Legislative Process in the Soviet Union* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1977).

[14] V.I. Ivanova, *Postoiannye komissii blagoustroistva i dorozhnogo stroitel'stva vestnykh sovetov* (Moscow: Iuridicheskaia Literatura, 1970), 10–11, 20. It should be noted that deputies to the soviets are considerably more highly educated as a group than the adult Soviet population as a whole.

[15] For a good description of the soviet commissions, see Theodore H. Friedgut, *Political Participation in the USSR* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979), 188–200.

[16] *Itogi vyborov . . . 1969,* 18, 197; *Itogi vyborov . . . 1971,* 14, 198–99; *Itogi vyborov . . . 1973,* 18, 218–19; *Izvestiia,* 25 June 1977.

[17] L. M. Rodionova, *Partiia i rabochii klass v usloviiakh stroitel'stva kommunizma* (Moscow: Mysl', 1973), 76–83.

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TABLE 1

Coefficients of Representation in Administrative Organs at 21 Machine-Building Plants in the USSR, by Occupation and Party Affiliation, 1968–70

Organization	*CPSU*	*Komsomol*	*No Affiliation*	*Workers*	*Engineering-Technical Personnel*	*Salaried Officials or Professionals*
Party Committees[1]	NA	NA	NA	.62	2.4	1.22
Factory Committees	1.73	.64	.94	.86	1.22	2.09
Komsomol Committees	1.60	4.02	0.00	.86	1.24	2.13
Standing Production Conferences	2.90	.37	.76	.70	2.07	1.28
People's Control Committee	2.95	.57	.69	.77	1.79	1.28
Komsomol'skii Prozhektor	.72	4.69	.02	.94	1.12	1.35
Social Bureau Economic Analysis	2.35	.92	.73	.17	3.74	2.59
Social Bureau of Norms	2.08	.51	.90	.72	2.23	.43
Social Dept. of Cadres	1.99	.37	.96	.77	1.19	3.56
Council of Young Workers	0.00	4.58	.19	.83	1.70	.78
Council of Young Specialists	.82	3.58	.30	.04	4.77	.72
Comrades' Courts	2.69	.42	.79	.84	1.41	1.69

[1] Party Committees are by definition composed entirely of party members

Source: Calculated from V.I. Mukhachev and V.S. Borovik, *Rabochii klass i upravlenie proizvodstvom* (Moscow: Politizdat, 1975), 33–34.

specialists to lose interest in workplace participation.[18] Yet even lower level participation, or "pseudo-participation," may have a demonstrable impact on feelings of worker efficacy among some elements.[19]

Membership figures for Soviet trade unions are meaningless, since virtually all workers (blue and white collar) claim membership. More important here is evidence of worker participation in the various committees of the trade unions and factories, and possibilities for influence through legal means, such as the people's and comrade's courts.

Table 1 indicates the extent of worker participation in twelve different factory administration organizations. The data were compiled by Soviet researchers, who surveyed a total of 10,000 workers at twenty-one machine-tool plants during 1968–70. Coefficients of representation for workers, engineering-technical personnel, and salaried officials or professionals have been calculated. The coefficient of representation indicates the degree to which a subgroup is under-

[18] B. Kutyrev, "Distsiplina truda v dinamike," *Ekonomika i organizatsiia promyshlennogo proizvodstva (EKO),* No. 9 (1981): 28–29.

[19] See Pateman, *Participation and Democratic Theory,* 67–84. For further evidence in a socialist context, see Alex Pravda, "Political Attitudes and Activity," in Jan F. Triska and Charles Gati, eds., *Blue Collar Workers in Eastern Europe* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1981).

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represented or overrepresented in a given organization. A coefficient of 1.0 would demonstrate representation exactly proportional to a subgroup's strength. The data indicate a substantial underrepresentation of workers on all twelve of the factory committees. Engineering-technical personnel are overrepresented on every committee, while the coefficients or representation for employees exceed 1.0 for nine of the twelve committees.[20]

The preponderance of engineering-technical personnel on the important Party committees, on People's Control Committees (KNK), and on Standing Production Conferences is especially noteworthy. The Party committees, of course, are the primary organizations of Party control in the factories, and are charged with guaranteeing workers a role in factory administration.[21] People's Control committees work closely with local government and Party officials in supervising factory activities. They conduct investigations, set forth resolutions (with the approval of top KNK officials), order ministries to correct deficiencies, and may force the dismissal of enterprise or production association managers.[22] Production conferences are formally empowered to evaluate virtually all social and economic functions within the factory, although one Western observer has noted that few production conferences exercise their powers fully.[23]

The Party and Workers

The Communist Party and its junior partner, the Communist Youth League (or Komsomol), are important institutions for controlling factory activities. Calculating coefficients of representation for affiliated and nonaffiliated respondents, a coefficient greater than 1.0 is found for Communist Party members in nine of the twelve organizations. The coefficient was less than 1.0 for every organization for the unaffiliated. Mixed results were obtained for the Komsomol. This may be explained by the fact that certain organizations are "designed" for members of the Komsomol (the Komsomol'skii Prozhektor and Komsomol committees). At the same time, other organizations (such as the Council of Young Workers and the Council of Young Specialists) attract aspiring young workers who might have joined the Komsomol in order to advance more quickly.

[20] The formula for calculating the coefficient of representation (CR) is:

$$CR = \frac{M}{P}$$

where M is the proportion of organization membership that the subgroup constitutes and P is the proportion of factory personnel that the subgroup constitutes.

[21] V.A. Ezhov, *Rabochii klass SSSR* (Leningrad: Leninizdat, 1974), 180.

[22] See *Izvestiia,* 14 June 1973; *Pravda,* 10 June 1977; *Izvestiia,* 25 August 1977. For an extended treatment of the People's Control Committee, see Jan S. Adams, *Citizen Inspectors in the Soviet Union: The People's Control Committee* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1977).

[23] Blair A. Ruble, "Workers' Participation and the Soviet State" (paper presented to the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, New York, N.Y., 4 September 1981).

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TABLE 2

Participation of Leningrad Machine-Building Personnel

Groups of Employed Personnel	*Party Membership (percent)*		*Participation in Rationalization (percent)*		*Participation in Community Work (percent)*	
Unskilled Manual Labor	CPSU	3.7	Regular	0.9	Yes	35.1
	Komsomol	10.1	Irregular	9.1		
	Non-Party	86.2				
Personnel in nonmanual labor, medium skills	CPSU	7.8	Regular	3.1	Yes	54.5
	Komsomol	19.3	Irregular	12.0		
	Non-Party	72.9				
Skilled, primarily labor on machines	CPSU	12.9	Regular	4.6	Yes	54.3
	Komsomol	27.3	Irregular	20.8		
	Non-Party	60.5				
Skilled, primarily manual labor	CPSU	16.2	Regular	10.8	Yes	60.7
	Komsomol	21.2	Irregular	34.7		
	Non-Party	62.6				
Highly skilled mental and manual labor	CPSU	23.4	Regular	15.6	Yes	79.2
	Komsomol	14.2	Irregular	54.8		
	Non-Party	62.4				
Skilled mental work	CPSU	19.6	Regular	13.1	Yes	82.4
	Komsomol	23.2	Irregular	23.3		
	Non-Party	57.2				
Highly skilled scientific and technical	CPSU	19.8	Regular	10.3	Yes	70.4
	Komsomol	20.4	Irregular	35.4		
	Non-Party	59.8				
Organizers of production collectives	CPSU	54.4	Regular	27.1	Yes	84.2
	Komsomol	6.4	Irregular	43.1		
	Non-Party	39.2				

Source: O.I. Shkaratan, "Social Groups in the Working Class of a Developed Socialist Society," *International Journal of Sociology* 2 (1973): 83.

In keeping with the social responsibilities placed on Party and Komsomol members, these individuals tend to participate at much higher levels than do non-members. Table 2 demonstrates the relationship between CPSU and Komsomol affiliation, participation in improving the efficiency of work, and participation in community work. Data were collected in a survey of 2,888 respondents from the Leningrad machine-building industry.[24] As indicated in the table, the proportion of Communist Party membership in each employment group is positively correlated to the complexity of the tasks performed by the employment groups. Of the organizers of production collectives, 55.4 percent were Party

[24] O. E. Shkaratan, "Social Groups in the Working Class of a Developed Socialist Society," *International Journal of Sociology* 2 (1973): 63–105.

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members; of the personnel in highly skilled scientific and technical work 19.8 percent; and of skilled mental personnel 19.6 percent. At the other end of the scale, only 3.7 percent of unskilled laborers were members of the Communist Party.

The extent to which Soviet workers participate in the rationalization of production and in community work is related to the level of occupational complexity, as also indicated in Table 2. Workers trained and educated to perform more difficult tasks are more likely to suggest improvements in the production process or to engage in voluntary social work than are workers performing simpler tasks involving minimal mental effort. A 1980 study of working youth in the USSR and four East European countries emphasized the importance of the creative character of work for specialists with higher education.[25] The more highly educated the workers, the more they tended to value the ability to be innovative in their work. Manual workers having lower levels of education tended to place more importance on compensation gained from their labor.

The finding that both party affiliation and level of occupational difficulty have some direct impact on worker participation in the Soviet enterprise and in society is supported by other studies. Rensselaer W. Lee III, in a 1979 study of Soviet workers and technological innovation, found that the content of work (that is, the degree to which labor involves the use of mental capacities rather than purely physical labor) was positively related to workers' propensities to suggest technological innovations.[26] A study conducted by Soviet sociologists in the mid-1960s gave a basis for comparing the impact of party affiliation and education on participation in community work.[27] Although the data do not apply specifically to the Soviet working class, they do provide some basis for evaluating the relative impact of education (which has been shown to be positively correlated to occupational complexity in the USSR)[28] and party affiliation. Table 3 indicates a relatively greater impact on participation by party affiliation than by education, although neither variable is especially powerful in accounting for participation.

While Soviet researchers use a variety of categories in describing the working class, there appears to be a significant distinction between the most creative and highly educated working categories and less qualified manual workers. The worker intelligentsia (highly skilled persons having specialized secondary or higher education and occupying positions involving mostly mental work) and

[25] Ferents Gazho and Vladimir Shubkin, *Trudiashchaiasia molodezh': orientatsii i zhiznennye puti* (Budapest: Institute for the Social Sciences 1980), 454–65.

[26] Rensselaer W. Lee III, "The Factory Trade Union Committee and Technological Innovation," in Arcadius Kahan and Blair Ruble, eds., *Industrial Labor in the U.S.S.R.* (Elmsford, N.Y.: Pergamon Press, 1979).

[27] S. N. Ikonnikova and V. T. Lisovskii, *Molodezh': o sebe, o svoikh sverstnikakh* (Leningrad: Leninizdat, 1969).

[28] David Lane and Felicity O'Dell, *The Soviet Industrial Worker: Social Class, Education and Control* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1978), 53, 133–35.

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TABLE 3

Percent of Total Respondents Answering the Question "Do you take part in social work?" by Education and Party Affiliation

	Education				
Response	*1st to 6th Class*	*Classes 7–9*	*Complete Secondary*	*Higher Education (not law)*	*Higher Education (including law)*
Yes	20.8	38.6	46.5	40.1	59.1
No	41.5	40.4	36.8	42.7	31.0
Significant at .001; N = 1,841					

	Party Affiliation		
Response	*CPSU*	*Komsomol*	*Not Party Members*
Yes	82.3	46.5	23.8
No	7.5	37.1	41.0
Significant at .001; N = 1,725			

Source: S.N. Ikonnikova and V.T. Lisovskii, *Molodezh': o sebe, o svoikh sverstnikakh* (Leningrad: Leninizdat, 1969), 61, 64.

engineering-technical workers are in the process of "drawing together," according to a 1980 study by A.A. Kostin.[29] These types of workers are more likely to be concerned about the creativity of their labor than are manual workers. They make more extensive use of the cultural amenities available, and they participate in socio-political organizations at substantally higher levels. The researchers found that 73.7 percent of the worker intelligentsia and 71.6 percent of engineering-technical workers had permanent assignments in Party, Komsomol, and trade union organizations, compared with 45.7 percent for workers as a whole.[30]

The Potential for Worker Discontent

A major reason for the official Soviet emphasis on participation in the workplace is an eagerness to generate feelings of efficacy among workers. Data scattered among sociological studies suggest that this may be the case. As Table 4 indicates, those individuals who participate more in discussing production methods and techniques, disciplinary actions, and the distribution of bonuses tend to be more satisfied with their jobs. Yet it is unclear whether participation leads to higher levels of job satisfaction—that is, whether or not the relationship is causal. Apparently, political efficacy is related to a complex of factors including education, occupational attainment, membership in the Party or Kom-

[29] A. A. Kostin, "Sotsial'no-kul'turnye kharakteristiki rabochikh-intelligentov," *Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniia* 2 (1980): 112–14.

[30] Ibid., 112–13.

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TABLE 4

Relationship Between Job Satisfaction and Worker Participation

	Participation in Discussion on Methods and Techniques (percent answering)			*Participation in Discussion of Behavior Rewards and Punishments (percent answering)*			*Participation in Distribution of Premiums (percent answering)*		
Evaluation of Job	*Yes*	*Seldom*	*No*	*Yes*	*Seldom*	*No*	*Yes*	*Seldom*	*No*
Job is Interesting; I Like It	66.7	15.7	17.6	52.3	15.5	32.3	31.2	10.5	58.3
Job is No Worse and No Better than any Other	47.3	20.3	32.4	33.0	21.0	41.0	30.0	11.1	58.9
Job is Not Interesting; I do not Like It	37.3	20.9	41.8	30.0	22.0	48.0	25.4	3.6	71.0

Source: N.I. Alekseev, "The Interrelationship of Social Factors Determining Work Attitudes," in Murray Yanowitch, ed., *Soviet Work Attitudes: The Issue of Participation in Management* (White Plains, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1979), 92-93.

somol, and age. Both participation and efficacy may be causally related to this set of variables.

Of the variables related to worker participation in the USSR, the level of education or training of individuals is undoubtedly one of the most important. The more highly educated and skilled workers tend to be more active participants in Party and Komsomol organizations, local soviets, and in factory organizations. In addition, education has become a prime requisite for accession to the executive committees of local soviets as well as to the Party posts.[31] The average education level of worker members of the CPSU in 1976-77 was 9.3 years compared with an average of 8.5 years for unaffiliated workers.[32] As noted, those workers who participate at higher rates tend to be more satisfied with their jobs. But satisfaction is also related to the character of work performed; workers are more satisfied with interesting, creative, higher paying tasks. Poor working conditions, low pay, lack of facilities are among the more significant problems contributing to worker dissatisfaction.

Worker dissatisfaction may also be reflected in labor turnover rates. There is some question whether turnover rates in the USSR are comparable to those in other industrialized countries. At first glance, the Soviet figure of approximately 20 percent appears normal considering the rates in other countries. The rate in Japan, for example, is somewhat lower, while that for the United States is around 25 percent. Yet the methodologies used in arriving at these figures are so diverse that it is impossible to regard the figures as genuinely comparable to

[31] L. M. Rodionova, ed., *Partiia i rabochii klass v usloviiakh stroitel'stva kommunizma* (Moscow: Mysl', 1973), 54.

[32] N. P. Konstantinova, et. al., "Changes in the Social Characteristics of Workers under Developed Socialism," *Voprosy istorii,* No. 5, translated in *The Soviet Review* 20 (1979): 75.

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those of other countries. U.S. figures, for example, are relatively complete, distinguishing between hirings and separations. Separations, the most commonly used definition of turnover, is further subdivided into "quits," "layoffs," and "firings." Data from the United Kingdom, on the other hand, are less complete; no distinction is made between voluntary and involuntary separations. Soviet labor turnover data ignore accessions, defining turnover as total dismissals (for infractions of work discipline) and resignations. Retirements, deaths, reassignments, and other "acceptable" reasons for leaving are not included in official statistics.[33]

The important fact about turnover rates in the USSR is the perception of Soviet officials that rates are too high, and the implied recognition that social and structural factors lead to such behavior. Rates of turnover among younger workers are considered to be excessively high and to indicate a number of problems requiring attention. These problems would include dissatisfaction with work assignments following graduation from vocational-technical school, resentment at the lack of opportunity for meaningful participation in the workplace, or the frustrations encountered by relatively highly educated youth placed in unchallenging positions.[34]

A 1979 study of the Sibselmash farm machinery production association in Novosibirsk found that workers under thirty years of age constituted 70 percent of the turnover in that plant. In, addition, educated and experienced workers accounted for much of the turnover.[35] This observation is reinforced by a cross-national study of working youth that found Soviet skilled manual and mental workers to have higher incidences of job turnover than unskilled or partially skilled workers in the USSR. In addition, young manual workers in the USSR demonstrated slightly higher levels of work satisfaction than their mental worker counterparts.[36]

These data suggest the existence of two strata of especially disaffected workers: highly educated, skilled young workers whose avenues for advancement into desired positions are restricted by the paucity of available jobs; and a stratum

[33] On labor turnover and worker satisfaction in the USSR, see David E. Powell, "Labor Turnover in the Soviet Union," *Slavic Review* 36 (1977): 268–85; Wolfgang Techenberg, "Labour Turnover and Job Satisfaction: Indicators of Industrial Conflict in the U.S.S.R.?" *Soviet Studies* (1978): 193–211; Murray Yanowitch, ed., *Soviet Work Attitudes: The Issue of Participation in Management* (White Plains, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1979). On the problem of methodology in determining turnover, consult James L. Price, *The Study of Turnover* (Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1977).

[34] See Kutyrev, "Distsiplina truda" and Iu. N. Udovichenko, "Executive's Sociological Radar," *EKO,* No. 10 (October 1980), in *CDSP* 33 (29 April 1981): 15.

[35] O. V. Kuznetsov, "Turnover or Mobility?" *EKO,* No. 4 (April 1979), trans. in *CDSP* 31 (15 August 1979), 5, 16.

[36] Gazho and Shubkin, *Trudiashchaiasia*, 450, 470–80. Interestingly, of the four countries analyzed (the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland), the Soviet Union had the highest overall levels of turnover. Results for other three countries also demonstrated a positive correlation between the level of training and job satisfaction.

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of unskilled or semi-skilled manual laborers having low levels of education. This latter category would appear to be the less significant politically since they would likely be young workers, or migrants from the countryside with limited aspirations. The frustrations of this segment of the working class find an outlet in drunkenness, violations of labor discipline, and high levels of turnover.[37] Those who enter the work force at an early age and then turn to alcohol constitute over half of all "parasites," according to the All-Union Institute for the Study of Crime.[38] Both males and females are represented in this category, although males demonstrate higher turnover rates and a greater tendency toward abuse of alcohol.[39]

The more educated category of disaffected workers is significantly different from the group just described. Although they are also young, these workers have at least an eighth grade education, and often specialized secondary or incomplete higher education. Their aspirations for advancement are relatively high; many are enrolled in night school while working. Demands made by this group on the content or "character" of work are also high. They prefer tasks that are complex, challenging, and interesting. The potential for political disaffection is quite high within this stratum of Soviet workers.

In a 1978 study, David Lane and Felicity O'Dell suggested that the manifold "alternate routes" available through the Soviet educational system promote a "cooling off" of worker aspirations.[40] The highly competitive nature of the Soviet educational system, combined with this broad range of alternatives, would seem to be a successful formula for internalizing blame for failure rather than directing it toward the system.[41] However, the apparent slowing of social mobility in the USSR may prove a future source of tension. In part, this slowing may be ascribed to structural factors, such as declining rates of urbanization and industrialization. More significantly, however, educational attainment is increasingly tied to socioeconomic status. The different strata in Soviet society are reproducing themselves through the educational system.[42] Murray Yanowitch has argued that regime efforts to reduce young people's aspirations by upgrading vocational guidance in secondary schools have had relatively greater impact on working class students than on children of the intelligentsia.[43] But Soviet and

[37] See Walter D. Connor, *Deviance in Soviet Society: Crime, Delinquency and Alcoholism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972).

[38] *Pravda,* 16 April 1980. Also see Connor, *Deviance in Soviet Society,* 42–58.

[39] N. A. Aitov, "The Influence of Job Content on Work Attitudes," in Murray Yanowitch, ed., *Soviet Work Attitudes;* Connor, *Deviance in Soviet Society,* 39–45; Gazho and Shubkin, *Trudiashchaiasia,* 445.

[40] Lane and O'Dell, *Soviet Industrial Worker,* 92–107.

[41] Ibid., 134–35.

[42] See Richard B. Dobson, "Education and Opportunity," in Jerry G. Pankhurst and Michael Paul Sacks, eds., *Contemporary Soviet Society: Sociological Perspectives* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1980); and David Brand, "Educating Ivan," *Wall Street Journal,* 17 March 1981.

[43] Murray Yanowitch, "Schooling and Inequalities," in Leonard Schapiro and Joseph Gordon, eds., *The Soviet Worker: Illusions and Realities* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981).

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East European researchers have compiled data suggesting that worker aspirations toward education and occupations greatly exceed their achievements.[44] If these observations are accurate, one might expect to find an increasingly restive Soviet proletariat.

The Politicization of Soviet Workers

The first decade of Soviet labor history witnessed the gradual incorporation of radicalized Russian workers into the Party-state structure. The Bolsheviks exercised little semblance of control over the working class until the end of the War Communism period. By 1921, at the Tenth Party Congress, the confrontation between the syndicalists (the Workers' Opposition, led by Aleksandra Kollontai and Alexandr Shliapnikov) and those favoring complete state dominance of the trade unions (Leon Trotsky and Nikolai Bukharin) reached its peak. Lenin's compromise formula, granting limited union autonomy within the contours of Party and state policies, was adopted at the Congress. This compromise has delineated the role of Soviet trade unions through the present. One consequence of the Tenth Party Congress resolution was the cooptation of union leaders and the increasing bureaucratization of union organizations. A growing lack of responsiveness to workers' interests in the 1920s led to the estrangement of management and labor, manifested in arbitrary behavior by the former and apathy, strikes, and outbreaks of violence by the latter. Worker unrest peaked about 1925; strikes and disturbances then declined during the following years. By the end of the First Five-Year Plan (1932), Soviet trade unions had lost whatever vestiges of autonomy they had retained after 1921, and labor unrest had been effectively quashed.[45]

Worker discontent in the USSR resurfaced in the late 1950s. A construction camp at the Temir-Tau metallurgical combine in Kazakhstan was the scene of worker riots in late 1959 that reportedly resulted in the deaths of over one hundred workers. Major sources of dissatisfaction at the combine included food shortages, low wages, and abysmal short-term housing conditions.[46] A few months later the government unintentionally provoked demonstrations in

[44] The Gazho and Shubkin research found that a large percentage of Soviet working youth receive an education insufficient to attain their occupational aspirations. Fully 77.1 percent of those interviewed initially planned on securing an occupation requiring complete or incomplete higher education, but actually attained a lower level of education. In addition, 64.7 percent of those with aspirations to jobs requiring specialized secondary education did not achieve that level of education. The figures were 56.4 percent and 46.6 percent respectively, for those desiring jobs that required professional-technical training and complete secondary education. Gazho and Shubkin, *Tradiashchaiasia,* 147.

[45] On worker opposition and trade union activity during the early years of the Soviet regime, see E.H. Carr, *Socialism in One Country, 1924–1926* (New York: Macmillan, 1958); E.H. Carr and R.W. Davies, *Foundations of a Planned Economy, 1926–1929* (New York: Macmillan, 1969): Jay B. Sorenson, *The Life and Death of Soviet Trade Unionism, 1917–1928* (New York: Atherton, 1969); Blair A. Ruble, *Soviet Trade Unions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 9–26.

[46] John Kolasky, *Two Years in Soviet Ukraine* (Toronto: Peter Martin Associates, 1972), 190–93.

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Kemerovo through a series of ill-advised austerity measures that, in effect, reduced workers' real wages.[47] In both cases the official response to the disturbances was to shift the blame to local Party and government officials by removing or demoting a number of them.[48]

The best-known case of worker unrest in the USSR occured in 1962 in Novocherkassk, a city in southeast Russia. On June 1, the leadership raised the prices of meat and butter, and simultaneously lowered piece rates at the Novocherkassk Locomotive Works.[49] Initial grumbling within the factories developed into spontaneous meetings and street demonstrations, where the workers were joined by students, children, and housewives. There were several reports that non-Russian soldiers, apparently Caucasians, were brought in to quell the disturbances. These soldiers opened fire on the ethnic Russian crowd, killing and wounding hundreds. After the massacre, Russian troops were brought in to replace the Caucasian troops. Members of the CPSU Central Committee were dispatched to the town to hear workers' grievances and attempt to restore order. A number of "ringleaders" were arrested, food supplies were increased substantially, and the local Party committee was reprimanded. The riots at Novocherkassk were not the only popular disturbances arising from the price increases and revision of work norms. Albert Boiter reported strikes and demonstrations in at least eight other cities, including Moscow, during 1962.[50]

Occurrences of worker discontent in the Brezhnev era included reported walkouts at the Kharkov Tractor Factory (1967), demonstrations at the Kiev Hydroelectric Station by workers dissatisfied with housing conditions (1969), strikes at Kopeiske (1971) and Vytebsk (1973) over revised work norms, and strikes and riots in Dnepropetrovsk over wages, living conditions, and food supplies.[51] All these examples are textbook cases of collective, anomic behavior. Although the immediate causes of worker discontent varied, the underlying conditions for discontent were remarkably consistent: insufficient wages; poor working and housing conditions; inadequate provisions of staples; arbitrary revision of work norms; and perceived inequalities between the large stratum of average workers and the privileged local elites.[52]

The Party and government are by no means totally oblivious to workers' needs and to the sources of their discontent. Lower level responsiveness to workers' demands is encouraged by the Soviet leadership, in part to preclude

[47] Michel Tatu, *Power in the Kremlin* (New York: Viking Press, 1969), 115.

[48] Ibid.

[49] This account is drawn largely from Albert Boiter, "When the Kettle Boils Over. . .," *Problems of Communism* 13, No. 1 (1964): 33–43; and Aleksandr I. Solzhenitsyn, *The Gulag Archipelago,* 3 vols., (New York: Harper and Row, 1978), 3: 506–14.

[50] Boiter, "When the Kettle Boils Over," 38.

[51] See M. Holubenko, "The Soviet Working Class: Discontent and Opposition," *Critique* 4 (1975): 5–25; Peer Reddaway, ed., *Uncensored Russia* (New York: American Heritage Press, 1972), 290–91.

[52] For a bitter commentary on the stratification between workers and bosses, see Anatoly Marchenko, "Some are More Equal than Others," *Society* 17 (1980): 9–11.

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spontaneous worker activity, and in the expectation that increased satisfaction will generate higher levels of productivity. Public opinion researchers in socialist systems have been granted more latitude in order to ascertain the sources of workers' discontent that might affect performance.[53] A 1979 article on factory sociologists, for example, argued that "knowledge of the specific problems bothering various categories of workers is very important" for enterprise managers in planning social amenities.[54] Managers are expected not only to be aware of workers' problems, but to resolve such problems in cooperation with local government institutions.[55]

It is important to note that in many instances workers do go through the prescribed channels to voice their complaints. They may seek relief through procurators, soviets, people's courts, and trade union branches at the local level, and they may frequently appeal to the regional soviets or procurators, higher Party and ministry officials, the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions (AUCCTU), or the Supreme Soviet. Frequently, however, local organizations have neither the will nor the authority to take decisive action. Appeals to higher authority, including the mass media, may or may not be successful, as the following discussion indicates.[56]

An instructive case of worker discontent surfaced in late 1977. A group of workers, led by a mining engineer named Vladimir Khlebanov, formed an illegal union after meeting at the Central Committee offices and discovering their common interest. The workers had traveled to Moscow individually in a final effort to protest to the Party Central Committee against corruption, inefficiency, unsafe working conditions, and unemployment. They apparently took this action after local organizations failed to respond to their complaints. When the Central Committee declined to give the workers a hearing, they formed an independent trade union and appealed to the International Labour Organization (ILO) for recognition. Leaders of the group were arrested shortly after talking

[53] Walter D. Connor and Zvi Y. Gitelman, *Public Opinion in European Socialist Systems* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1977), especially pp. 122–24. See also A. G. Zdravomyslov, et al., eds., *Chelovek i ego rabota* (Moscow: Mysl', 1967) for an example of this type of opinion research in industry.

[54] "Factory Sociologist is an Important Profession," *CDSP* 31 (26 September 1979), 6–8; originally published in *EKO,* No. 3 (March 1979).

[55] See, for example, the article on illegal dismissal of employees in *Pravda,* 1 October 1980. Local prosecutors and Soviet executive committees were urged to take a more assertive role in protecting workers from arbitrary enterprise managers.

[56] On the role of trade unions in defending workers' rights, see Blair A. Ruble, "Factory Unions and Workers' Rights," in Kahan and Ruble, eds., *Industrial Labor in the U.S.S.R.*. Soviet citizens have increasingly turned to the official mass media in an effort to expose wrongdoing by local officials. Soviet leaders encourage this process, since it provides feedback on policy implementation. In a 24 March 1979 article, for example, *Pravda* castigated local bodies and ministries for failing to handle workers' complaints. The article explained that "dozens" of citizens visited the offices of *Pravda* during the first part of 1979 to complain about housing and labor problems. See also Alex Pravda, "Spontaneous Workers' Activities in the Soviet Union," in Kahan and Ruble, eds., *Industrial Labor in the U.S.S.R.,* 342–48.

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to Western reporters, and Khlebanov was incarcerated in a psychiatric hospital in March 1979 for injuries sustained in a "mining accident."[57]

The attempt to form an independent labor union is noteworthy of its own accord. Beyond this, however, a number of points merit attention. First, the members of this union had exhausted all other means of redress before petitioning the Central Committee. Those who signed the "open letter" to the world describing the situation faced by workers and employees in the USSR had substantial work experience, were between thirty-five and forty-five years of age, and represented various social strata, nationalities, and geographical areas.[58] Their demands included the right freely to criticize failings in the workplace, the opportunity to achieve the lifestyle guaranteed to all citizens by the regime, and the right to strike should their complaints remain unanswered. Finally, the workers disavowed any connection with Soviet dissidents, who they disparagingly referred to as "renegades." They unequivocally rejected the idea that their actions were anti-systemic.[59]

In requesting the rights to strike and to criticize deficiences in the workplace, the workers recognized the ineffectiveness of trade unions and factory and Party organizations as institutions supposely responsive to their needs. An insightful paragraph in their address to the ILO stated that:

> Soviet trade unions don't defend our rights and don't have the proper authority, because the key positions in the trade unions are occupied by Communists, i.e. people who are not able to prove themselves in their Party organizations. They're all engineering-technical workers, and if they would fail to be elected to a new term they would be given some other leadership position in the enterprise. Because of this consideration they always dutifully serve the interests of the leadership.[60]

Candidates for union leadership positions, the address went on to observe, are selected by factory managers, Party committees and *raion* committees. Union elections had become an empty formality.

Conclusion

This article has not attempted to relate all instances of unusual worker activity in the Soviet Union. There have been many reports of strikes, demonstrations, and slowdowns of which Western observers have only meager information.[61] The examples presented, however, do permit cautious generalization.

[57] See V. Chalidze, ed., *SSSR-rabochie dvizhenie?* (New York: Khronika, 1978); *New York Times,* 11 and 27 January 1978, 23 February 1978, 11 March 1979. See also Elizabeth C. Scheetz, "Disaffected Workers Publicly Defend Their Rights," *Radio Liberty Research* (RL 47/78), 28 February 1978.

[58] V. Chalidze, *SSSR-rabochie dvizhenie?* 34–51.

[59] Ibid., 34–35, 50.

[60] Ibid., 57.

[61] Additional strikes have been reported in Riga, Latvia in 1976. Major strikes over economic issues were reported in the summer of 1980 at the giant Togliatti automobile plant on the Volga River and at a large factory in Gorky. See the *Christian Science Monitor,* 16 June 1980; and the

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The most important finding is the extent to which the workers' situation is interwoven with the imperatives of Soviet economics. In an era when virtually all economic growth is expected to come from increased labor productivity, democratization of the workplace and the locale is viewed as one method for raising worker efficacy, satisfaction, and hence productivity. At the same time, ministries pressure management to show continued improvements despite the constraint of diminishing marginal returns. The Soviet structure of incentives and penalties leads management to violate workers' rights by raising norms, reducing piece rates, forcing workers to work overtime without adequate compensation, and firing less desirable employees.[62] Furthermore, declining growth rates limit the availability of housing and consumer goods, given existing investment priorities. A shift in these priorities is unlikely considering the current international climate and the conservative nature of the Soviet regime.

A second point relates to the form of "social contract" that exists between the regime and the workers. Formally, this contract is expressed in the constitution of the USSR. Citizens have the duty to work for society; in return the state guarantees the right to work and promises to improve working and living conditions, to provide adequate health care and consumer services, and to raise the level of education. Informally, the contract includes various amenities, such as low-cost travel and vacations, subsidized food, and free medical care provided to workers by the regime. A less explicit part of the informal contract was best epitomized in a statement made to Hedrick Smith by a Russian worker: "As long as the bosses pretend they are paying us a decent wage, we will pretend we are working."[63] Both workers and management mouth the rhetoric of plan fulfillment and overfulfillment; in practice, the two sides moderate their mutual expectations. Should the regime unexpectedly raise the ante by revising norms, raising prices, or effectively reducing wages, workers may view such action as a violation of the "rules of the game." J. M. Montias has convincingly argued that "perceived violations of promises made by the authorites regarding the conditions of workers" are a common element behind worker disturbances in communist countries.[64]

Worker dissatisfaction in the Soviet Union is not qualitatively different from that in Poland. The underlying conditions that generate discontent are common to both countries, though the problem is less acute in the USSR, with its greater natural wealth and its larger capacity to tolerate economic inefficiency. Inadequate food supplies constitute the major locus of worker unrest. Both Soviet

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New York Times, 14 June 1980. Alex Pravda reported a total of sixty-one cases of workers' protest actions from 1956 to 1973; see "Spontaneous Workers' Activities in the Soviet Union," 348–49.

[62] In a 3 May 1980 article, *Pravda* castigated managers who arbitrarily fired troublesome individuals, thus adding to already high turnover rates.

[63] Hedrick Smith, *The Russians* (New York: Quadrangle, 1976), 215.

[64] J. M. Montias, "Economic Conditions and Political Instability in Communist Countries: Observations on Strikes, Riots, and Other Disturbances," *Studies in Comparative Communism* 13 (1980): 296.

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and Polish elites sought to "buy off" workers through steadily improving levels of consumption. In Poland this took the form of a major program of importing capital and consumer goods from the West. In the Soviet Union, substantial grain imports have been augmented by renewed attention to agriculture in the early 1980s.

Contravention of workers' expectations by the regime has provoked worker protests in the USSR, although it is doubtful that the Soviet government and Party leaders have suffered the loss of confidence experienced by the Polish elite vis-à-vis Polish workers. In both countries the political leadership has sought to improve worker confidence by increasing worker participation in the governance of the developed socialist state. In a move more symbolic than substantive, Soviet industrial workers were elected to the bureaus of five union republic central committees in early 1981. This high-level cooptation was apparently designed to give the impression that workers are gaining access to real seats of power in the Soviet Union, and may have been a response to labor unrest in Poland.[65] The relatively democratic Polish United Workers' Party elections in the summer of 1981 resulted in a sizeable contingent of workers being elected to serve on the Party's Central Committee.

Several factors, however, differentiate the Soviet and Polish situations. Soviet political culture exhibits a high degree of heterogeneity, making widespread mobilization unlikely. The diverse national identities, religions, languages, and cultural-historical experiences of Soviet workers result in conflicting loyalties.[66] Also, there is no genuine tradition of autonomous group activity, including trade union activity, in Russian-Soviet history.[67] The capacity of the Soviet regime to regulate its citizens' political behavior has always been greater than that of the Polish government. Finally, as suggested by the open letter of Khlebanov's "Trade Union for the Defense of Workers," there remains a wide gulf between the dissident intellectuals and the disenchanted workers. The alliance between workers and intelligentsia in Poland, formed with the creation of the Workers' Defense Committee in 1976, was central in facilitating the rapid mobilization of Solidarity in 1980.[68] No comparable process appears to be occurring in the Soviet Union.

Soviet worker politicization appears inchoate at best. Labor unrest stems from the unsatisfactory nature of immediate living and working conditions. The

[65] The five Central Committees were those of Latvia, Lithuania, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaidzhan. See Ann Sheehy, "Blue Collar Workers Elected to Central Committee in Five Union Republics," *Radio Liberty Research* (RL 57/81), 5 February 1981.

[66] The significance of Poland's homogeneous political culture is discussed in Paul and Simon, "Poland Today and Czechoslovakia 1968."

[67] See Stephen White, "The USSR: Patterns of Autocracy and Industrialism," in Archie Brown and Jack Gray, eds., *Political Culture and Political Change in Communist States,* 2nd ed. (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1979).

[68] For an insightful analysis, see George Schöpflin, *Poland: A Society in Crisis,* Conflict Studies No. 112 (London: Institute for the Study of Conflict, 1979).

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absence of any effective communications links among disaffected workers, such as those forged by the Committee for Workers' Defense in Poland, ensures that industrial dissent will remain sporadic and uncoordinated in the near future. It is doubtful that the momentous events in Poland will soon be replicated in the Soviet Union. The tense international situation combined with the relative inflexibility of the current Soviet leadership suggest a continuation of the policy of "muddling through." Bleak prospects for economic growth in the 1980s will mean continued frustration of popular aspirations for their living standards. There is a possibility that real structural changes in the economy may be enacted now that Iurii Andropov has replaced Leonid Brezhnev as general secretary, and that the much-heralded generational transition has begun.[69] Should genuine economic reforms be enacted by a new generation of Soviet leaders, the present instrumental aspirations of Soviet workers could be satisfied. If half-hearted reforms acceptable to the Party and government bureaucracies (rather than real structural reforms) are introduced, there is the possibility that temporary economic gains will raise expectations that cannot be met in the long run.[70]

[69] See Seweryn Bialer, *Stalin's Successors: Leadership Stability and Change in the Soviet Union* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1980); Jerry F. Hough, *Soviet Leadership in Transition* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1980).

[70] This, of course, is the pattern of events that unfolded in Edward Gierek's Poland. For an in-depth examination of the Gierek era, see Maurice D. Simon and Roger E. Kanet, eds., *Background to Crisis: Policy and Politics in Gierek's Poland* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1981).

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Eisenhower as Party Leader

CORNELIUS P. COTTER

Eisenhower, while Army Chief of Staff (1945–48) and Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces in Europe (1950–52), was courted by notables of both political parties as candidate for the 1948 and 1952 presidential nominations. The general's party identification was obscure to the point that Governor Sherman Adams of New Hampshire (also chairman of the state's Eisenhower-for-President committee) wrote the clerk of Dickinson County, Kansas, in futile quest of evidence of the general's party affiliation.[1] The clerk responded, "I don't think he has any politics." Henry Cabot Lodge then went to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) headquarters and returned with a declaration of party affiliation which satisfied the New Hampshire statutory requirement for evidence of affiliation with the party in whose primary he was being entered.

Eisenhower spent a professional lifetime immersed in military politics and a decade rising from tutelage to mastery in the politics of nations before seeking the American presidency. But he lacked a record of party involvement when he deprived "Mr. Republican" Robert A. Taft of the nomination.[2] And he proceeded to win the election in a campaign which relied heavily on anti-organization "amateurs" and the "new politics" of media and advertising.[3]

[1] Sherman Adams, *First-Hand Report: The Story of the Eisenhower Administration* (New York: Harper, 1961), 12–13.

[2] See George H. Mayer, *The Republican Party, 1854–1964* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964). Mayer finds Eisenhower "allergic to the responsibilities of party leadership" and attributes to him "apathy toward all aspects of political management. He simply had no interest in patronage problems or the organizational rivalries dear to the heart of the average Congressman. Politics was another area that Eisenhower turned over to others whenever possible" (pp. 496–98).

[3] James M. Perry, *The New Politics: The Expanding Technology of Political Manipulation* (New

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His White House staff observed that the president played the party leadership role with some reluctance. Sherman Adams comments on Eisenhower's "distaste for partisan politics," as reflected in "the lack of any firm or militant command over the Republican party. He preferred to leave the operation of the political machinery to the professionals."[4] Having helped convince the president of the need to speak out as party leader against Senator Joseph McCarthy, C. D. Jackson noted that the "problem now is, having zippered the toga of Republican political leadership on the President's shoulders, how to keep that zipper shut."[5] Yet these words were penned by members of "a powerful political team" who had been moved by the president from the campaign organization to the White House.[6]

The record reveals that as president, Eisenhower exerted considerable influence over the Republican party and pursued a well-informed and sustained program to strengthen it. Arguably, he was the most constructive and consistent intervener in party organizational matters of any president after Franklin D. Roosevelt. These findings concerning Eisenhower's party leadership are consistent with Fred Greenstein's revisionist study of "Eisenhower as an Activist President: A Look at New Evidence."[7] And, as was Greenstein's experience, the study of the archival records compelled this author to alter long-held assumptions concerning Eisenhower's level of party activism.

Scholars will disagree on conceptualizations of party and of presidential party leadership. For the purposes of this study, party is identified as the national party committees—principally the Republican National Committee, but to a lesser extent the campaign committees in the House and Senate—and state party organizations. Eisenhower was one of the first presidential candidates to make extensive use of extra-party "citizens" committees, and the relation of these to the party organization becomes relevant. A president who in any degree accepts a party leadership role necessarily has some thoughts on the nature of party and the appropriate relationship between party and president. Eisenhower did accept such a role and had a fairly coherent theory of how the party should relate to the presidency. In order that the president lead the party, he must relate to the party. These relations (if they can be documented) should be suggestive both of leadership style and of the objectives of presidential use of the party organization. Leadership is a reciprocal relationship, allowing scope for party use of and

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York: Clarkson N. Potter, 1968), and Leon E. Epstein, *Political Parties in Western Democracies*, 2nd ed. (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction, 1980).

[4] Adams, *First-Hand Report*, 25.

[5] C. D. Jackson's diary for December 1953, quoted in William Bragg Ewald, Jr., *Eisenhower the President: Crucial Days, 1951-1960* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1981), 125. Jackson, a friend of Eisenhower's, had served on his staff during the war and served in the White House on leave from Time, Inc., in 1953 and 1954.

[6] Ibid., 145-46.

[7] *Political Science Quarterly* 94 (1979-80): 575-99. Also see Greenstein's *The Hidden-Hand Presidency* (New York: Basic Books, 1982).

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even resistance to the president. Finally, such leadership can be highly personalized—in pursuit of the political career objectives of a single person—or it can be more generalized—in pursuit of administration goals and long-term party interests. In the latter instance, party will be germane to the president's relations with the cabinet and the Congress, and to the generation of diffuse support for the administration. The analysis which follows proceeds in general conformity with this scheme.

Eisenhower and the Role of Party

As he began his second year in office, President Eisenhower remarked in a news conference that he was "not very much of a partisan."[8] A year later, asserting the role of "titular head of the party," he admonished the Republican National Finance Committee against undue and misplaced partisanship:

> . . . Our greatest enemy is not the Democrats. We certainly know that we can't have better allies when we are fighting anybody from abroad. So let's remember that, and as I talk, let's not build up a picture that the worst enemy anyone can have is a Democrat. Far from it. We just don't think they can do as good a job as we do.[9]

At his most partisan, the president was the exponent of "Modern Republicanism." Pressed in news conferences for elaboration on this theme, Eisenhower acknowledged the national government's responsibility for ameliorating privation, performing "a wide field of education and health" functions, and for maintaining prosperity within the framework of private enterprise.[10]

The moderate partisanship of Eisenhower's public stance was consistent with his own background, with his need for Democratic votes for his legislative program, and with the composition of his electoral majority. He had benefited from partisan ambiguity in the electoral choice of 1952. In the spring of the preelection year, Gallup showed a lopsided Democratic preference for Eisenhower over Truman as the party nominee, while Republicans ranked him first, followed by Taft and Dewey.[11] Eisenhower voters in the University of Michigan Center for Political Studies (CPS/SRC) election sample were much more likely

[8] The President's News Conference of 10 February 1954, *Public Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1954* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1960), 246.

[9] Remarks at Luncheon Meeting of the Republican National Committee and the Republican National Finance Committee, 17 February 1955, *Public Papers, 1954*, 267.

[10] *Public Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1956* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1958), 1102–03.

[11] George H. Gallup, *The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 1935–1971* (New York: Random House, 1972), 2: 989–91. In a poll for which interviews were conducted from 19 to 24 May 1951, Democrats favored Eisenhower by 40 percent to Truman's 20 percent; Republican preferences were 30 percent Eisenhower, 22 percent Taft, 16 percent Dewey, and 13 percent Warren.

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to make favorable references to the Democratic party (50 percent) than were Stevenson voters towards the Republican party (9 percent).[12]

On the eve of the New Deal realignment, Charles E. Merriam and Louise Overacker noted a shift toward popularization of the selection of presidential nominees and the participation of nonparty groups in the quest for party nomination.[13] James Ceaser has recently charted the transformation of the nominating process from one of negotiated selection by party notables to a "plebiscitarian" process in which aspirants create personal campaign organizations and go directly to the people.[14] The trend has been away from "inside" strategies which emphasize leadership support, and toward "outside" strategies emphasizing popular support. Increasing reliance on primaries is part of this shift. In 1952, Estes Kefauver pursued an outside strategy and lost to an incumbent president's reluctant protégé. Eisenhower, an outsider to party and presidential politics and facing the favorite of the party organizations and stalwarts, was constrained to an outsider strategy. Thus, he created a coalition of anti-Taft party regulars and personal loyalists of marginal or no party commitment to take the nomination away from the favorite of the party stalwarts.

This was a transitional presidential campaign year in a number of senses: Harry Truman's retirement from politics after completing Roosevelt's fourth term and serving an elective term of his own marked the end of the New Deal succession; 1952 also inaugurated the age of televised conventions and campaigning; advertising and advertising agencies played prominent roles; and both candidates in the general election campaign used party-obscuring "citizens" groups to enlarge their spectra of support.

Having won both nomination and election, the outsider strategist looked for a cohesive and supporting party, and was discouraged by its diffuseness and resistance to change. He was "reported to have said that he is 'disgusted with the Republican leadership; that he does not know why anyone should be a member of the Republican Party.' "[15] In "thinking-aloud sessions . . . in the privacy of his office," Eisenhower talked with Sherman Adams about a new political party which would be internationalist and, while more conservative than the Demo-

[12] Angus Campbell, Gerald Gurin, and Warren E. Miller, *The Voter Decides* (Evanston, Ill.: Row, Peterson, 1954), Tables 4.1 on p. 43 and 4.9 on p. 53.

[13] Charles E. Marriam and Louise Overacker, *Primary Elections* (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1928), 309. Recently, John H. Aldrich incorporated such groups and the plebiscitarian process into a theory of strategies and choices in presidential nomination campaigns in his study, *Before the Convention* (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1980).

[14] James W. Ceaser, *Presidential Selection: Theory and Development* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979).

[15] Dwight D. Eisenhower, Papers as President (Ann Whitman File), Ann Whitman Diary, Box 11, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas. The Whitman File constitutes the richest historical collection at the Eisenhower Library. This article will draw upon series within the Whitman File, in addition to the Whitman Diary, as follows: Administration Series, Cabinet Series, DDE Diaries, and Name Series.

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cratic party, liberal in its domestic policy.[16] He was a recent recruit to party government, and a hyphenated Republican—"You know, what we ought to do is get a word to put ahead of Republican—something like 'new' or 'modern' or something. We just can't work with fellows like McCarthy, Bricker, Jenner and that bunch."[17] Nevertheless, it was the Republican administration to which the president adjured support—not to the Eisenhower administration or the Eisenhower party—and he was impatient with the personalization of support. The president was convinced that the Republican party must be transformed into a progressive party "or it is sunk." But he saw support for an "Eisenhower Republican party" as an evasion of the central issue confronting the Republicans, and as a movement which would collapse upon his passing from the scene.[18]

A gradualist in his approach to government, Eisenhower did not summon Republicans to an administration committed to radical change. He was wary of idealogues and of the view that a radically conservative Republican party could win elections or govern effectively. It was his firm belief that a Republican president, even with a Republican Congress, could not introduce large change in public policy and programs, but must instead be content to work at the margins. Further, Eisenhower sensed public support for the New Deal programs to be sufficiently great to deny a president support for radical departures from them. He hoped to nudge the public toward a more conservative view of the appropriate role of government, but, like Roosevelt, he measured the possible in terms of public acceptance. Edgar Eisenhower repeatedly prodded his brother with barbed references to the similarity between Eisenhower administration policies and the New Deal. Edgar suggested the president had been captured by the Eastern establishment, the centers of learning, and the press. The president responded in trenchant language the vigor of which contrasted to the Fabian arguments conveyed. Even with good majorities in both houses of Congress, the president lectured his militantly conservative brother, the best that could be realistically expected of a Republican president was that he retard the movement toward enlarging government and that he work to change public expectations of government. "It is silly to believe," he commented, "that any individual in the world—or, indeed, any party—can actually turn a whole population back from a course it has pursued in the belief that that course is assisting the majority of the population."[19]

Eisenhower proved to be a pragmatic and tenacious party politician. The

[16] Adams, *First Hand Report*, 28.

[17] Ewald, *Eisenhower the President*, 127.

[18] Robert H. Ferrell, ed., *The Eisenhower Diaries* (New York: Norton, 1981), entry for 20 November 1954, 288-91. This collection includes diary materials from the Whitman File and from other sources. In this article, references are also made directly to the Whitman File, DDE Diaries source.

[19] See Edgar Eisenhower to his brother, 22 January 1954 and 1 November 1954, Whitman Name Series, Box 11. Of the president's responses, see particularly that of 2 May 1956 (which is quoted here), Whitman Name Series, Box 11.

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rebuilding of the party had to start with available materials, and these ranged from obdurate Taft regulars to moderate Republicans and citizen activists. Eisenhower used patronage and attention to placate the Taft supporters. At the same time he attempted to bring the "irregulars"—Sinclair Weeks's term for the "citizen" activists[20]—into leadership positions in the state and national party organizations. This effort persisted into the post-presidential period, although it was not attended by success. Since he envisaged a party that was national in scope, it was necessary for the president to give attention to building Republicanism in the South, an effort which appears to have been successful with an ironic twist: the renaissance of the Southern Republican party strengthened the conservative cast of the national party and facilitated the nomination of candidates who promised to turn the nation around.

Eisenhower and the National Party Organization

In a letter to Prime Minister Harold Macmillan in 1958, Eisenhower mused: "If I could devote myself exclusively to a political job, I'd like to take on the one of reorganizing and revitalizing the Party."[21] The record suggests that the president was serious in this statement. Indeed, when he was free of the presidency, he continued to apply himself to party revitalization.[22]

The Party Chairman

Eisenhower had no doubt that the party, at the national level, was the president's party. He wished to improve the national party organization and modernize the attitudes of party activists who seemed to think the New Deal could be reversed and the United States could be insular. "The National Chairman is, of course, the alter ego on Party matters of the president." In order to lead both the administration and the party effectively, the president thought he needed and was entitled to some degree of consonance between Republicans on the Hill, in the administration itself, and in the national and state party organizations. He believed in party cohesion: "If the heads of the Congressional or Senatorial Committee take a different political line and urge a different doctrine, then not only is our effort weakened, but we have the curious spectacle of the National Committee . . . supporting with very large sums of money a Committee which is preaching something that the president, the administration and the national Chairman disapprove."[23]

[20] Sinclair Weeks to Eisenhower and to Miller, 7 July 1962. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Post-Presidential Papers, Box 19, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas.

[21] Eisenhower to Macmillan, 11 November 1958. Whitman Diary, Box 10.

[22] The post-presidential effort to bring organization regulars and Citizens under one tent is too long a story to tell here. It is documented in the Post-Presidential Papers, 1962, Box 19.

[23] Eisenhower's "Confidential Memorandum for the Record," 6 December 1958, based on his discussions of party affairs with Richard M. Nixon, Whitman File, DDE Diaries, Box 23.

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Party and campaign service were assets for persons wishing to serve in the administration. Analysis of a sample of presidential subcabinet appointments revealed that some 40 percent of the Eisenhower under, deputy, and assistant secretaries had prior party and campaign service.[24] About two-thirds of his initial White House Office staff "had been active, usually full time, in some phase of the 1952 campaign."[25] The president-elect also placed two former Republican national chairmen in the cabinet. Yet Eisenhower drew the line at simultaneous holding of government and party office, rejecting Republican National Committee (RNC) Chairman Arthur Summerfield's bid to continue that role and take on the cabinet job of postmaster general. In forcing Summerfield to make a choice, the president rejected the interpretation there was "a time-tested tradition" of such dual service.[26] The rule against dual office-holding was extended to members of the national committee as well.

To succeed Summerfield at the RNC, Eisenhower selected Wesley Roberts, incumbent RNC director of organization and former Kansas state chairman. Roberts was forced to resign under fire as a result of his questionable role in selling a building to the state of Kansas in 1951. Eisenhower opened up a process of consultation in looking for a successor to Roberts.[27] This caused some concern that the president might not be playing a sufficiently vigorous role in making the choice.[28] It also turned up considerable support for the candidacy of Leonard

[24] Derived from Tables A.1 and A.9, pp. 289 and 294, in Dean E. Mann with Jameson W. Doig, *The Assistant Secretaries* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1965). In their sample, Mann and Doig found that 19 of 47 (or 40 percent) of Eisenhower subcabinet appointees had previous political experience, compared to 11 of 24 (or 45 percent) of Kennedy's appointees. The figures for Truman were 4 of 37 (11 percent), not deemed comparable because of the inheritence of staff from the Roosevelt administration.

[25] Alex B. Lacy, Jr., "The Development of the White House Office, 1939–1967," (paper delivered at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, Ill., September 1967), 13.

[26] Eisenhower to Arthur E. Summerfield, Sr., 21 January 1953, Whitman File, Administrative Series, Box 40; and see the president's lengthy response to Arthur E. Summerfield, Jr., considering the pros and cons of cabinet membership for the chairman and explaining his objections, 13 June 1957, Whitman File, Administration Series, Box 40. The younger Summerfield had written the president in amplification of statements made in person a day previously, which were critical of the choice between the postmaster general position and continuance in the party chairmanship which had been forced upon his father in 1952. The fact is that from 1900 to 1952 only two of the twelve Republican chairmen who served during Republican administrations served concurrently in the cabinet, and the total length of the performance of the dual roles was two years and three months; three of the ten Democratic chairmen to serve Democratic presidents served concurrently in the cabinet, for a total of ten and a half years of joint service. See Cornelius P. Cotter and Bernard C. Hennessy, *Politics Without Power: The National Party Committees* (New York: Atherton, 1964), 92–93. Also see Dorothy G. Fowler, *The Cabinet Politician: The Postmasters General, 1829–1909* (New York: AMS Press, 1967), esp. pp. 302–303.

[27] White House Office, Office of the Staff Secretary, Records of L. Arthur Minnich, Subseries G, Index of Cabinet and Legislative Leaders Meetings, Box 26, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas.

[28] Alf Landon to Eisenhower, 1 April 1953, and response of 3 April 1953. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Records as President, White House Central Files, Official Files, Box 709, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas.

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Hall, who had served as Dewey's campaign manager in 1948, was chairman of the House Republican Campaign Committee for a decade, and provided liaison between the Eisenhower campaign group and the RNC in 1952.[29] Hall had won election to the position of Nassau County surrogate in New York, in preference to seeking a seventh House term. He gave up that comfortable position to accept Eisenhower's designation as RNC chairman, a post in which he served until 1957. When Hall insisted upon leaving after the 1956 campaign, the president again permitted considerable tension to arise because he refrained from stating a preference. The national committee met late in January 1957, with some six candidates available for the chairmanship and an insurgent movement afoot to assert a more prominent role for the national committee in the selection process. Eisenhower's expressed preference for Meade Alcorn, RNC member from Connecticut, settled the matter. Alcorn had played a managerial role in the 1952 campaign as one of the Republican regulars heading up a state Citizens for Eisenhower movement. He had previously served as Speaker of the House in Connecticut, and had lost the race for lieutenant governor in 1948 by a slim margin. After the 1952 campaign, Alcorn became a Republican national committeeman and in 1956 won recognition for his performance as chairman of the Arrangements Committee for the nominating convention.[30]

When Alcorn resigned in 1959 for personal reasons, the president drafted Senator Thruston B. Morton of Kentucky for the job. Morton had served three terms in the U.S. House of Representatives and had chosen not to run in 1952. He campaigned for Eisenhower in Kentucky and was appointed assistant secretary of state for congressional relations, a post which he held until his successful campaign for the U.S. Senate in 1956. A staunch Eisenhower supporter, Morton built a record for support of Eisenhower programs which exceeded that of any other senator in 1957. It was but a step from designating a former House Republican campaign committee chairman to the RNC post (Hall) to selecting an incumbent senator. In light of Eisenhower's reliance on the national committee for campaign support of off-year congressional races, the RNC linkage to the Hill was highly appropriate.

Eisenhower was personally acquainted with his chairmen, saw a good deal of them, and could be firm in his defense of a chairman who was under attack. When the president's friend and Citizens for Eisenhower leader, Clifford Roberts, presented seemingly compelling reasons for laying the 1958 congressional defeats at Chairman Alcorn's door and replacing him, the president, who had earlier given the party chairman a memorandum on steps that the Republican party should take toward rebuilding,[31] emphatically defended him

[29] See, for example, Bryce N. Harlow Memorandum for the President, 3 April 1953, Whitman File, Administration Series, Box 33.

[30] For Alcorn's appointment and background see Philip S. Wilder, Jr., *Meade Alcorn and the 1958 Election*, Eagleton Foundation Case Studies in Practical Politics (New York: Holt, 1959), 1-2.

[31] Ann Whitman notes this as one of Eisenhower's activities after a long day of legislative and other meetings. Whitman Diary, Box 10, December 1958.

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TABLE 1
President–RNC Chair Meetings

Context of meeting	*Roberts (Jan.–Apr. 1953)*	*Hall (1953–57)*	*Alcorn (1957–59)*	*Morton (1959–60)*	*Totals (type of meeting)*
Chair brings party staff or notables to White House or President attends party affairs	–	12	14	6	32
Chair meets alone with President	1	34	11	8	54
Chair meets with President and White House Office staff – may include Vice President	–	22	25	10	57
Chair attends meetings of President and Legislative Party Leaders	–	16	–	1	17
Chair meets with President and selected Cabinet Members – may include Vice President	–	6	1	1	8
Chair attends Cabinet Meetings	–	8	3	3	14
Totals (meetings per Chair)	1	98	54	29	182

Sources: Derived from Eisenhower, Records as President, Daily Appointments, 1953–61 (appointments index); Whitman File, Cabinet Series, Boxes 1–16; White House Office, Office of Staff Secretary, Records of L. Arthur Minnich, Subseries G, Boxes 17, 21, 25.

and, insisted that Alcorn's intelligence, energy, imagination and dedication had made him the best chairman Eisenhower had known.[32] Although the record of the Eisenhower–Hall relationship suggests the president may have exaggerated, he nevertheless was capable of evaluating the party chairman and was concerned about the chairmanship.

If Eisenhower conceived of the party chairmanship as a discrete role, he did not put the chairman apart from the administration. He involved the chairman in cabinet and other White House meetings, and repeatedly admonished the cabinet to work with the chairman on patronage and other matters. Hall, for ex-

[32] See Eisenhower's Memorandum for the Record, 6 December 1958, Whitman File, DDE Diary, Box 23, and the president's letter to Clifford Roberts, 19 December 1958, Whitman Name Series, Box 28. It was at this time that the president began to fasten on the idea – perhaps suggested by Percy – of creating a broadly representative Republican committee to study the condition of the party and make recommendations for its future.

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ample, participated in at least eight cabinet meetings, Alcorn and Morton (1959–61) participated in three each. In addition, Hall was present at 16 legislative leadership meetings. (Morton sat in on one and Alcorn, who unlike Hall and Morton lacked congressional experience, did not participate.) Excluding cabinet meetings, the president met with his party chairmen alone, with White House legislative leaders, staff, or a cabinet member present 136 times during his eight years.

The party chairman might occasionally speak as if his party role were divorced from his role as presidential operative and administration supporter, but the president would rein him in with the same tact which characterized his curbing of White House office staff. Hall, for example, termed Joseph McCarthy an "asset" to the party in the course of a February 1954 television program. He cited heavy demand for speeches by the senator and acknowledged RNC financing of his travel. Since the Wisconsin senator was then in the midst of his attack on army security, the irony of RNC use and support of the chief irritant to the administration was called to the president's attention at his next press conference. Eisenhower refused comment beyond saying "I don't think my approval or disapproval here is needed." But within a month of his televised comment, Hall reversed himself, telling a Republican gathering that McCarthy was hurting the party.[33]

Eisenhower probably was responsible for that reversal, just as he was responsible for stepping in to secure for the party free response time when CBS and NBC aired Adlai Stevenson's political speech of 7 March 1954, in which he depicted the Republicans as a "party divided against itself, half McCarthy and half Eisenhower." A year earlier McCarthy had secured free time to respond to President Truman's televised reference to "McCarthyism." McCarthy now confidently told reporters he had no doubt the networks would again respond favorably to his demand for equal time.[34] On March 8, however, Eisenhower telephoned the party chairman, and instructed him to ask the networks for equal time, with the understanding that the chairman of the party would designate "who makes the reply." If Hall encountered any trouble with the networks, the president would get in touch with the heads of CBS and NBC. The networks rejected McCarthy's bid and granted time to the RNC. In his phone call to Hall, the president had made it clear the White House would select the spokesman for the party. Eisenhower then participated in a conference which selected Vice President Richard Nixon to speak for the party, and he spent 45 minutes with Nixon reviewing the speech before airtime on March 13.[35]

[33] These events are narrated in Herbert S. Parmet, *Eisenhower and the American Crusades* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1972), 347–52.

[34] Edwin R. Bayley, *Joe McCarthy and the Press* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1981), 190.

[35] Parmet, *Eisenhower*, 352–53; and Whitman File, DDE Diary, Box 5. I am indebted to Fred Greenstein for drawing my attention to this phone call.

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Like other presidents, Eisenhower evaded some distasteful chores, and the party chairman sometimes became the president's agent to perform them. Hall was sent to see Nixon in 1956, to clarify the vice president's political ambitions. The chairman was instructed to be "very, very gentle," and the assignment came at the end of a discussion in which the qualifications of two Democrats (Robert Anderson and Governor Frank Lausche) for the vice presidency were considered.[36] In 1958 Chairman Alcorn was asked to conduct a secret survey of the national committee on the impact of the Sherman Adams affair. When the chairman reported back to the president, he was told: "You've got to handle it. It's your job. The dirtiest job I could give you."[37] This may have tinged the president's spirited defense of Alcorn to Cliff Roberts.

Organization and Staffing

Eisenhower "had a feeling for organization," and "more than any President in recent memory, was an organization man."[38] He was committed to building and transforming the party. He saw the party as an instrument for pursuing the administration's purposes—both rounding up votes in Congress and mobilizing support in the states. Hence he made demands upon the Republican National Committee, and he took an interest in RNC organization and staffing.

The attention which Eisenhower directed to the RNC, while potentially strengthening the organization, also led to tension and even subdued conflict between the RNC and White House staffs. The tension stemmed from the institutional development of the national committee since the 1920s, and from RNC and White House staff memories of the 1952 nominating campaign.

Eisenhower's inauguration marked a critical juncture in the development of the national party organization. In the decades since the 1920s, the RNC had been transformed from a skeletal operation of episodic significance to a well-staffed organization with budget and program, operating 12 months in the year throughout the four-year electoral cycle. Significantly for the RNC's relations with the president, nearly all of this institutional development had taken place while the party was in opposition. The Eisenhower administration provided the first experience for the party bureaucracy in adapting to the needs and demands of a Republican president.[39]

Further complication was introduced by the nature of the president's campaign and the marginal Republican credentials of many of his associates who had been carried into the White House from the campaign organization. He had relied heavily upon extra-party groups in the campaign. The veterans of the Citizens for Eisenhower movement who largely staffed the White House

[36] Ewald, *Eisenhower the President*, 185–86.

[37] Parmet, *Eisenhower*, 522–23, and see Ewald, *Eisenhower the President*, 260.

[38] Ibid., 63.

[39] Cornelius P. Cotter and John F. Bibby, "Institutional Development of Parties and the Thesis of Party Decline," *Political Science Quarterly* 95 (1980): 1–27.

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recollected the pro-Taft sentiments prevalent at party headquarters in 1952 and were dubious about the reliability of the party staff. In turn, the RNC staff did not feel that the "amateurs" understood the proper functions and the limited capacities of the party headquarters.

It was typical of Eisenhower's equivocal commitment to partisanship that he should conclude a diary entry on pre-inaugural staffing talks with the observation that "patronage is almost a wicked word."[40] Yet patronage commanded a significant part of his attention as president. It was also a topic of transcendent interest, connecting the diverse elements which the president sought to lead: the Citizens for Eisenhower supporters, the Republican party organizations at the national, state and local levels, the cabinet and subcabinet, and the Republicans in Congress.

Both the White House and the RNC agreed that party headquarters should play a key role in patronage clearance. Charles F. Willis, Jr., a co-founder of Citizens for Eisenhower and assistant to Sherman Adams, was in charge of personnel management in the White House Office. Always concerned for the Eisenhower "irregulars," he could also argue the patronage needs of state party organizations.[41] The need to reorganize, change procedures, and to turn over RNC staff toward improving the organization's performance of patronage and other functions, is a recurrent theme in his 1953 and 1954 memoranda.[42] Willis had access to the president and would use a conversation with Eisenhower to gain leverage with Adams and subsequently claimed the support of both for the proposals for change which he pressed upon the RNC.[43]

The pressures for reorganization to permit more efficient service to the White House would eventuate in threats by the RNC to discontinue such service. Consider, for example, RNC Executive Director Chauncy Robbins's note to Willis in early 1955 conceding that the RNC would continue to operate its personnel division only for the time being: "It should be definitely understood, however, that it will be necessary for us from time to time, perhaps quarterly, to re-examine the progress we are making in the field, and that it may be necessary to curtail this activity."[44] Further, if Willis and his colleagues found the National Committee staff wanting, the RNC staff in turn had ample basis for dissatisfaction with White House and administration performance. In 1953, for example, RNC Executive Director David Baumhart noted a complaint from Senator Guy

[40] Ferrell, *Eisenhower Diaries*, 218.

[41] Ibid., entry for 5 January 1953, 221.

[42] See Willis to Adams, 13 August 1953, Official Files, Box 707; and Willis to Robbins, 4 December 1954, Official Files, Box 709.

[43] See Willis to Adams, 24 February 1955, attached to Willis memo to Hall of 15 February 1955, Official Files, Box 709; and Willis to Adams, 2 December 1953, Willis to Adams, 26 May 1954, Bernard M. Shanley to Adams, 13 March 1954, and Phil Young to Adams, 2 March 1954, Official Files, Box 707.

[44] Robbins to Willis, 11 January 1955 in Charles F. Willis, Jr., Records, 1953–55, Box 4, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas.

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Cordon of Oregon about failure to notify him in advance of announcement of an appointment to the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Board: "We have informed the Senator as of this date that we did not know of the appointment of Mr. Boyd . . . until the Senator called us. Therefore we had no opportunity of preparing the necessary notification."[45] In 1954, Robbins complained to the party chairman that the Department of Justice was avoiding RNC political clearance and was directly hiring promising young law school graduates who were awaiting political clearance for positions in other agencies, in the case at hand, the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB). According to Robbins: "One of the most useful functions of the National Committee is to prevent . . . the appointment of Democrats but, it is obvious, that if the above policy should be adopted by CAB and the word gets around, the RNC will lose entire control of the situation."[46]

The president was prepared to play a direct role in National Committee staffing. He was prominently involved in the recruitment of Nixon's 1952 campaign press secretary, the novelist and *Los Angeles Times* political editor James Basset, as RNC director of public relations in 1954. He interviewed Basset at the White House and personally dealt with Basset's superiors at the *Times*; moreover, it was to the president that Basset telephoned acceptance of the position. All this appears to have been done in cooperation with the national chairman, and Hall was invited to introduce Basset at a cabinet meeting.[47] In 1957 the president interviewed Californian Frank Jorgensen, whose candidacy for a RNC position was advanced by Clifford Roberts.[48] Jorgensen was recommended as an amateur who knew practical politics. Nothing came of this.

In 1959 the president met with RNC Chairman Thruston B. Morton, and Wilton Persons and David Kendall of the White House staff, to discuss the naming of a new Republican finance chairman. Ann Whitman, the president's secretary, recorded the impression that he would like to see Charles Percy of Illinois take the job. The next day she noted that when Milton Eisenhower suggested Percy as secretary of commerce, the president responded by expressing his preference to cast Percy in the finance role.[49] The president could be quite emphatic and persistent in pursuit of persons for particular political jobs. It was, for example, Eisenhower who insisted that the Republic National Committee establish a party goals committee in 1959 and that Percy should chair that committee. The Illinois business executive thought the president had him in

[45] A. D. Baumhart, for the record, 23 December 1953. Republican National Committee, Office of the Chairman (Leonard W. Hall): Records, 1953-57, Box 99, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas.

[46] Robbins to Hall, 7 July 1954, RNC Office of Chair Files, Box 101.

[47] Eisenhower to Basset, 15 February 1954, with attached to Virgil Pinkley, 15 February 1954, and Pinkley telegram to the president, 5 February 1954, Official Files, Box 710.

[48] See Eisenhower to Clifford Roberts, 10 January 1957, Whitman Name Series, Box 28, and 28 May 1957 memorandum from Roberts, in Box 27.

[49] Whitman Diary, 10 July 1959 and 11 July 1959, Box 10.

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mind for a parallel and nonpolitical government goals commission, which he preferred, but Eisenhower would not budge. Thus the party goals were set by the "Percy Committee."[50]

The Eisenhower pattern of intervention was different from but certainly not less intensive or sustained than that of the two Democratic presidents who immediately preceded him. While personally acquainted with some of the RNC staff and close to the chairmen, Eisenhower, unlike Franklin Roosevelt (and Eleanor Roosevelt) did not have associations of any depth with the National Committee staff; nor could he make Truman's effort to place long-term political associates on the staff. The closest Eisenhower came to these patterns was in his effort to infiltrate the RNC with Citizens for Eisenhower activists, but this was part of a nationwide effort grounded more on notions of representation than personal loyalty. Like Truman, however, he promoted a staffer to chairman with disastrous results. Unlike Kennedy and Johnson to follow, Eisenhower recruited a chairman who he wanted on the job full-time and in control of the party headquarters. Clearly the White House Office and National Committee staffs related to each other on a regular basis and on a number of levels, ranging from copying each other for relevant memoranda, exchanging advance information on press releases, or, at the level of Sherman Adams, in dealing directly and responsively with RNC staff member Val Washington's complaint to John Foster Dulles about the removal of the civil rights exhibit from the American Pavilion at the Brussels World's Fair.[51]

Integrating Citizens for Eisenhower into the Party

Soon after the inauguration, the Citizens for Eisenhower sought to carve out a role in the 1954 congressional election campaign, and consistently over the years they pressed for formal recognition from the regular Republican organizations and for influence over Eisenhower administration staffing. The continuity and occasional effectiveness of this effort were enhanced by the presence of former Citizens activists in the White House. One of the most active and influential of these was Charles F. Willis, who kept the RNC under unremitting pressure on

[50] Part of the story is revealed in the Whitman Diary entries for 13 and 17 January 1959, Box 10. From his work on this committee, Percy was projected as chairman of the 1960 Platform Committee and the shadow of the Eisenhower administration was thus clearly extended to cover the platform-drafting. Indeed, in a letter to Ann Whitman, 24 November 1959, Percy states his understanding that the executive director of his Program and Progress Committee would staff the platform committee in 1960. See Official Files, Box 710.

[51] See Robert Humphreys's Memorandum to Chairman Alcorn, 22 July 1957, responding to a series of questions concerning specific operations of the RNC. The memorandum carbons Tom Stephens, Eisenhower's appointments secretary. Robert Humphreys Papers, Box 10, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas. Humphreys was director of public relations at the RNC. Also see Adams to Val Washington (RNC staff member), 22 August 1958, attached to Hall to Adams, 10 January 1956, Official Files, Box 704.

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the matters of more effective performance of the patronage advisory and clearance role, integration of the Citizens organizations into the regular Republican organizations, and an effective campaign role for the Citizens organizations.

Willis, at the White House, envisaged a process of infiltration, whereby a "new look" for the National Committee would be accomplished by diffusion through the committee—presumably the collegial body and the headquarters staff—of volunteers who shared the president's political philosophy.[52] By June 1955, the chairman was offering the president direct assurances of his desire to extend the welcome mat to Citizens activists from 1952 and 1954. Toward this end he had appointed Clancy Adamy, who headed the Veterans Division of Citizens in 1952, to the RNC staff with the title of Chairman's Consultant on Enrollment of New Republicans. The chairman was also establishing an Advisory Board composed of Walter Williams, Mary Lord, Charles Rumbough—all 1952 Citizens leaders—and a group of 1954 Citizens activists. All Republican state chairmen would be asked by letter to emulate this pattern.[53] Contextual material in the RNC files suggests the seeming initiative from the RNC chairman was responsive to White House staff pressure.

Party insurgents as well as Citizens leaders who had supported Eisenhower deplored what they saw as a tendency for the administration to bestow the plums of patronage on the persons favored by the reliably pro-Taft regular party organizations.[54] Nevertheless, the president's strategy for the party was one of infiltration. He did not intend to permit the national organization to languish in what was to be the LBJ fashion, nor did he propose to dismantle it with a view to rebuilding from scratch, an intention imputed to Wilkie.[55] The national administration and national party organization, then, was prepared to use the currency of patronage in dealing with party organizations around the country, even if dominated by Taft-regulars.

Presidential Prestige and Party Support

Lending White House prestige to the party organization may seem a trivial presidential contribution, but it is burdensome and presidents do it reluctantly. Acquiescence breeds expectation and demand, and such functions may present the public with an unnecessary reminder that in some of his roles the president

[52] Charles Willis to Paul G. Hoffman, 22 November 1954, Official Files, Box 709. Hoffman had chaired the Advisory Committee of Citizens for Eisenhower and was to become U.S. delegate to the United Nations, 1956–60.

[53] Hall to the President, 20 June 1955, Official Files, Box 710.

[54] For an insurgent's view, see Morton R. Zaller to Sherman Adams, Official Files, Box 707; for a Citizens' view, see Clifford Roberts to the President, 29 January 1959, Whitman Name Series, Box 28.

[55] See Raymond Moley, *27 Masters of Politics* (New York: Funk and Wagnalls, published for *Newsweek*, 1949), 48–50.

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represents but a fraction of the population. A president can provide solidary[56] support by bending his private social affairs to party purposes. Eisenhower included Hall and other National Committee members in invitations to his "stag dinners"[57] and received from Val Washington at the National Committee the names of black Republicans who might be invited. At least 13 of these dinners were devoted to politics.[58] The president also received a succession of party deputations from the National Committee and other segments of the party. On at least 32 occasions the chairmen brought such delegations to the White House or the president went to them. This includes at least one presidential visit to the RNC headquarters.[59]

Finance

Republican financing remained hand-to-mouth throughout the Eisenhower years, and the RNC files yield memos describing strategems for moving funds to meet the monthly payroll. As one example, in March 1955 the RNC treasurer, E. L. Bacher, reported the committee had funds for two months of operation and would take $10,000 from the reserve account to meet the February payroll. Bacher was able to identify the states from which replenishing funds could be expected—Texas, Florida, New York.[60] Chairman Hall kept Sherman Adams

[56] Peter B. Clark and James Q. Wilson present a typology of "purposive," "material," and "solidary" incentives to party activism in their "Incentive Systems: A Theory of Organizations," *Administrative Science Quarterly* 6 (1961-62): 129-66. Solidary inducements "derive in the main from the act of associating and include such rewards as socializing, congeniality, the sense of group membership and identification, . . . the maintenance of social distinctions, and so on." Political organizations are propelled by varying medleys of such incentives distributed among the organizational activists.

[57] Eisenhower described these dinners in his book on the early White House years, *Mandate For Change, 1953-1956* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Company, 1963), 264-65: "Shortly after I entered the White House, I instituted a different and personal type of social event in the form of all-male or 'stag' dinners. These were usually small, rarely involving more than sixteen guests. Dress was either a business suit or dinner jacket. I sent each guest a note rather than a formal invitation. Each, as he arrived, was brought to the president's study on the second floor. My guests were drawn from government, business, publishing, the professions, agriculture, the arts, labor, and education. Normally the guests were a mixture of all these. The after-dinner period was devoted to extended informal conversation, with the group seated in a circle in the Red Room. This conversation was not purely social. I used these dinners to try to draw from leaders in various sections of American life their views on many domestic and international questions. Thus the stag dinners were, for me, a means of gaining information and intelligent opinion as well as of enjoying good company."

[58] Juanita Shields (secretary to the RNC chair) to Hall, 19 February 1955, RNC Office of Chair Files, Box 103; and Table 1, above.

[59] Republican nationalities leaders A. B. Hermann and John J. Sirica, for example, attended a Citizens National Advisory Committee reception at the White House in October 1956. Joseph A. Jackovics to the President, 9 October 1956, Official Files, Box 710. RNC Vice Chair Bertha Adkins brought a women's group to the White House to brief the president on a voter registration campaign for 1956. Anne Wheaton to James Hagerty with press release, Official Files, Box 698.

[60] E. L. Bacher to Brenton, 4 March 1955, RNC Office of Chair Files, Box 103.

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informed of the RNC's finances, reporting for August 1955, for example, that the committee had reached only 38 percent of its quota; in November he provided the encouraging news that they were up to 79 percent, had benefited from especially successful dinners in Maine, Chicago, Boston, Philadelphia, and Indianapolis, and were planning Salute to Eisenhower dinners in every state for January of the coming year.[61] The president used his personal influence to set up fundraising efforts for specific campaigns, for example, Knowland's 1958 gubernatorial campaign in California and the 1960 Nixon presidential campaign.[62] Presidential interest in party fundraising could exceed the range of participation welcomed by the party leaders. An instance of this occurred when the White House passed on to Chairman Hall the suggestion that a presidential news conference be used to urge Democrats and Republicans to contribute at least one dollar to the party of their choice and Finance Chairman Clifford Folger and Hall advised the president "not [to] get into the money raising business"; the RNC file copy bears the handwritten qualification "any further."[63] Rejection of presidential overture is consistent with the sense of independence which accompanied institutionalization of the National Committee. Hall perhaps had to add "any further," to his advice, for the president was involved in party fundraising in the manner in which the RNC most wanted him involved, that is, in selective responsiveness to the RNC's overtures.

Campaigning

Eisenhower assumed that the presidential party should have a role in the off-year congressional campaigns and that the national committee was the agency for managing that participation.[64] Samuel Lubell writes concerning Eisenhower's role in 1954 that

> . . . he actually campaigned more extensively than any previous President had in a mid-term election—although this may be credited to a bit of mislaid research. When the campaigning question first came up, Eisenhower asked Leonard Hall, the Republican National Chairman, "What have other Presidents done?"[65]

[61] Sherman Adams to Leonard Hall, 5 November 1955 and attached from Hall to Adams, 2 November 1955, RNC Office of Chair Files, Box 103.

[62] Whitman Diary, Box 10. Diary entry for 27 September 1958 speaks of the president's meeting with Justin Dart at which he exchanged a promise to give a "stag dinner" for businessmen in return for Dart's effort through this and other channels to raise funds for William Knowland; again, in 1960, the president arranged such an affair to elicit support for Nixon. Whitman to President, 12 August 1960, Whitman Name Series, Box 10.

[63] Hall to Adams, 29 February 1956, and attachments including Adams to Hall, 16 February 1956, and John Clifford Folger (Republican National Finance Chairman) to Hall, 24 February 1956, RNC Office of Chair Files, Box 104.

[64] See, for example, White House Office, Office of Staff Secretary, Records of L. Arthur Minnich, Subseries G. Index of Cabinet and Legislative Leaders Meetings, Box 21.

[65] Samuel Lubell, *The Revolt of the Moderates* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1956), 27–28.

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Without thinking, Hall replied, "Oh, they all stumped for their party." Research by the RNC staff revealed this had not been the case, and in a post-election meeting the chairman confessed the error to the president. In whatever way he was drawn into the 1954 campaign, the Eisenhower's role in the off-year fits the pattern established by modern presidents. William Meulemans observes that "almost every President in the past thirty-five years has displayed some public indecisiveness in his plans to campaign for congressional candidates." He then points out that "only two Presidents since 1934 . . . did not make a national effort to campaign for their congressional party," Truman in 1946 and Johnson in 1966.[66] After asserting that he would not involve the presidency in partisan elections, Eisenhower, under heavy pressure from his staff, consented to campaign in 1954 and proceeded to support the congressional ticket vigorously and with increasing partisanship. He also involved the cabinet and assigned a heavy campaign role to the vice president.[67] Meulemans reports that "most political observers of both parties had expected a Democratic landslide," and the Republican losses "were significantly below the average losses for the President's party in mid-term elections." The Eisenhower campaign was credited with averting a Republican disaster.[68]

Some part of Eisenhower's disinclination to make a partisan appeal in 1954 may reflect reaction to the advice received from a Madison Avenue advertising firm that he try to convince the public that a Republican vote in the 1954 elections "is a vote *for* President Eisenhower," and a Democratic vote "a vote *against* President Eisenhower and his program." Eisenhower sought a reading from his political advisor on detached duty at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations, Henry Cabot Lodge. Lodge cautioned against assuming a campaign posture which would invite interpretation of Republican congressional losses as repudiation of the president.[69] Throughout his administration the president continued to solicit RNC aid in congressional liaison—lining up votes in Congress or providing auspices for meeting with congressional Republicans.[70] RNC

[66] William C. Meulemans, "The Presidential Majority: Presidential Campaigning in Congressional Elections" (Ph.D. diss., University of Idaho, 1971), 285–87. Equally useful is Irwin N. Gertzog, "The Role of the President in the Midterm Congressional Election (Ph.D. diss.; University of Michigan, 1965).

[67] Meulemans, *Presidential Majority*, 152–63; on Nixon's role see Herbert G. Klein, *Making It Perfectly Clear* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1980), 138.

[68] Meulemans, *Presidential Majority*, 162.

[69] Lodge to President, 22 July 1954, Whitman File, Administration Series, Box 26. Lodge's concern was not abstract. One of the consequences of the introduction of Madison Avenue advertising agencies into political campaigning was that the agencies offered political advice. Batten, Barton, Durstine & Osborn offered the president a "plan" designed to convince the public that "a Republican vote is a vote *for* President Eisenhower and his program." Also in Box 26.

[70] See memo of the president's discussion of party affairs with Nixon, 6 December 1958, Whitman File, DDE Diaries, Box 23; and Minutes of Cabinet Meeting, 8 May 1953, Whitman File, Cabinet Series, Box 2. Leonard Hall to the president's press secretary, James Hagerty, 27 July 1955, and attachments, Official Files, Box 709. Attached to this is a note of 7 July 1955 reporting the president's

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relations with the Senate and congressional campaign committees were of continuing concern at the White House.[71]

Meulemans identifies four styles of presidential off-year congressional campaigning from 1934 through 1966: purge, bipartisan, weak partisan, and strong partisan. Eisenhower's 1954 effort provides one of two instances of the weak partisan approach, and his 1958 campaign is one of three which earn the strong partisan designation.[72] The 1958 election was a disaster for the party, yet even while the president adopted a posture of detachment,[73] he revealed concern for the future of the party in the 1960 elections and beyond in numerous actions, including his insistance upon the creation of a committee to study the condition of the party and make corrective recommendations.[74] This sense of responsibility to contribute to the campaigns of other Republicans extended beyond Congress to gubernatorial campaigns and the 1960 Nixon presidential campaign.[75]

For his own reelection campaign the president used the National Committee. In a study entitled "Presidential Responsibility for National Party Atrophy," covering the period 1944 to 1976, Harold F. Bass, Jr., lays part of the responsibility for the asserted atrophy of the national parties on presidential candidate avoidance of use of the committees as campaign organizations. He rates Eisenhower's 1952 campaign just above the median on integration of the presidential campaign organization with the national committee, but for 1956 the study gives him by far the highest score for integration of any incumbent president.[76] In 1956 the RNC ran a textbook campaign, and it could only do so

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desire to meet with young Republican congressmen and Harlow's preference that he meet with all Republican members.

[71] Cabinet meeting of 5 March 1954, Whitman File, Cabinet Series, Box 3. Also see RNC News Release, 30 July 1952, Humphreys Papers, Box 1, on appointment of campaign strategy board including representatives from the Hill; RNC Press Release 22 February 1954 announcing the appointment of James Bassett as RNC publicity director with a special brief to work closely with the two campaign committees on the Hill for the 1954 congressional elections, Humphreys Papers, Box 10; Charles Willis to Sherman Adams, 23 October 1953, on the need for continued prodding to systematize RNC-Hill Committee relations, RNC Office of Chair Files, Box 99; and Bernard L. Lamb memos and Congressional Committee materials in the RNC Office of Chair Files, Box 8, suggest a high degree of cooperation between the RNC and the campaign committees on the Hill in 1956.

[72] Meulemans, *Presidential Majority*, Table III, 291.

[73] See the president's letter to Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, 11 November 1958, Whitman Diary, Box 10.

[74] See Eisenhower's "Confidential . . . Memorandum for the Record," 6 December 1958, recording discussions with Nixon, in Whitman File, DDE Diaries, Box 23. The story of this committee is told in Cornelius P. Cotter and Bernard C. Hennessy, *Politics Without Power* (New York: Atherton Press, 1964), ch. 10.

[75] See Eisenhower to Roberts, 23 August 1958, soliciting help for the 1958 Knowland gubernatorial campaign in California, Whitman Name Series, Box 28; and his memorandum to the vice president, 13 January 1960, Whitman Diary, Box 11.

[76] Harold F. Bass, Jr., "Presidential Responsibility for National Party Atrophy," (paper delivered at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., September 1977), Figures 1 and 2 at pp. 16 and 17.

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because it had won the confidence of the president over a four-year working relationship.

Eisenhower was keenly interested in campaign strategy and logistics. He offered Sherman Adams lengthy advice on organizing the 1952 campaign train.[77] He took great interest in the 1960 campaign as well. Clearly revealing his assumption that Nixon would be the nominee, the president gave his vice president a two-page "secret" memorandum of campaign advice in February 1960.[78] In May he wrote former cabinet members asking their help in the Republican campaign.[79] Following the convention, the president helped recruit a chairman for the Citizens for Nixon Committee and staged a "stag dinner" to recruit Nixon support.[80] The National Committee clearly expected the president would play a prominent role in the 1960 campaign, as is evidenced by campaign director Robert Humphreys's checklist for the campaign operation, which included numerous references to the president, the White House, the cabinet and "Mrs. Ike."[81] The president had a personal representative at the platform committee meetings in 1960 and forced emendation of objectionable wording.[82] Despite "Nixon's drive to do everything unassisted, rejecting dependence on Ike," Eisenhower involved himself and campaigned vigorously for Nixon in October, and he construed the November defeat as repudiation of his administration.[83]

The president's standards for supporting Republicans were not stringent. Late in his administration, he stated for his friend and Citizen leader Clifford Roberts of New York the three conditions which, if met, would permit him to support "enthusiastically" a Republican candidate:

(1) Must be conservative in economics—advocate of fiscal responsibility, against deficit spending, for greatest freedom of individuals in making economic decisions.
(2) Should support a strong defense, to be gained with the greatest possible economy.
(3) Should favor cooperation with the rest of the free world, including the provision of help toward improving living standards—hence freer trade and economic aid.[84]

On the other hand, he inisted that he had "never urged anyone to run for political office. I don't conceive that to be my task."[85]

[77] Eisenhower to Adams, 27 August 1952, Official Files, Box 711.

[78] Dated 13 January 1960, "handed VP 2/12/60," Whitman Diary, Box 11.

[79] See Eisenhower to Oveta Culp Hobby, 9 May 1960, attached to Ann [Whitman] to president, 12 August 1960, Whitman Name Series, Box 10.

[80] See typescript copy of undated letter from former Assistant Secretary of Defense Carter Burgess to the president, and Eisenhower's response of 8 August 1960, Whitman Names Series, Box 10. On the "stag dinner," see Whitman to Persons, 2 July 1960, also in Box 10.

[81] Undated, but after the Democratic Convention (11-15 July 1960), Humphreys Papers, Box 5.

[82] Ewald, *Eisenhower the President*, 238.

[83] Ibid., 311-14.

[84] Eisenhower to Roberts, 27 March 1958, Whitman Name Series, Box 28.

[85] The President's News Conference of 8 August 1956 in *Public Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1956* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1958), 664.

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Party-building in the States

In Eisenhower's view, one job of the RNC was to run interference with the state organizations by keeping abreast of their complaints and wants, bringing some order and threshhold standards of performance to them, and pacifying them when their demands were unreasonable or could not be met. A visit with Murray Chotiner (whom he may have been looking over for an RNC staff slot) caused the president to write on these matters to Chairman Hall in November 1953. Chotiner had described state party complaints about patronage and about the presentation of the administration's record. The president told Hall that the national committee was to reduce such generalized complaints to specifics, and then deal with them at the level of "concrete issues and instances."[86] He wanted the chairman to take the administration's record to the committee members and to work with the state party organizations, reduce complaints to specifics, respond to them, and conduct effective public relations to promote state Republican support for the Republican administration.

The RNC chairman and staff responded to these expectations, as is attested by memoranda from Hall to the president reporting on efforts to strengthen the party in the states. Other RNC staffers responded to White House inquiries based upon communications from the states.[87] Hall, who apparently considered turnabout fair play, did not hesitate to implicate the administration in local defeats. He reported to Eisenhower that the recurring factor of dissatisfaction with the Republican administration appeared to be associated with the adverse electoral outcomes in mayoral and special congressional races in November 1953.[88]

Eisenhower was quite prepared to compromise with the dominant forces in a state to achieve a semblance of party harmony. He wrote Senator Dwight Griswold of Nebraska that he did not "keep books on past political history." Some of the most important people in the cabinet and subcabinet had supported Taft, he said and appointments in the administration were made without regard to pre-convention loyalties.[89] In an effort to appease both the Taft and Eisenhower factions, the president's negotiators agreed to a 50/50 split of federal patronage with the Taft supporters in Tennessee (they included former

[86] Eisenhower's personal and confidential memorandum to Hall, 7 November 1953, Whitman File, Administration Series, Box 19.

[87] Hall to the President, 18 May 1955, concerning Pennsylvania; 1 June 1955, concerning Oregon; and 11 July 1955, about Michigan, in Whitman File, Administration Series, Box 19. Also see Humphreys to Hall regarding Sherman Adams's inquiry about Wisconsin, 19 April 1955. RNC Office of Chair Files, Box 103.

[88] Hall to president, Whitman File, Administration Series, Box 33.

[89] The president was reassuring Griswold that appointment of the senator's nominee as assistant U.S. attorney was not being held up because of that person's support of Taft. Eisenhower to Griswold, 5 September 1953, Whitman File, DDE Diaries, Box 2.

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RNC Chairman, 1946–48, Carroll Reece).[90] And, while this is but an illustration, it does fit with the pattern of behavior that emerges from the files.

If the problem elsewhere in the nation was to convert existing party organizations with anti-government views into vehicles of support or at least acceptance of a national administration which was Republican, in the South the problem was how to deal with the skeletal groups legitimized by receipt of the quadrennial call from the RNC to the national nominating convention. They had no presidential electoral function but were sustained by the anticipation of patronage distribution (some said wholesaling) in Republican presidential eras. Within these groups, vestiges of the Lily-White, Black-and-Tan factionalism and of absentee rule persisted into the 1950s. In V. O. Key's characterization, freshly published at the time of the Eisenhower candidacy, Republican parties in the South were "somewhat between the esoteric cult on the order of a lodge and a conspiracy for plunder."[91]

Ewald reports that "Eisenhower . . . had flown in the face of all his political advisers and made up his mind to campaign in the South in 1952, going after the votes of the conservative majority down there, people who had always admired him and whom he in turn admired, whether they were southern Democrats in the Senate . . . or Democrats-turned-Republican, like Bob Anderson and Jerry Persons."[92] Eisenhower won four Southern states in 1952—Florida, Tennessee, Texas and Virginia. Hoover had won these and North Carolina in 1928. Eisenhower also won 45 percent or more of the popular vote in Louisiana, South Carolina, and North Carolina. In 1956 he added Louisiana to his Southern electoral vote and received a plurality of the popular votes in the South (48.9 percent to Stevenson's 47.8 percent).[93] Republican presidential voting has remained strong in the 11 states of the formerly solid South in the post-Eisenhower years. Of the 66 opportunities for the states to cast electoral votes to 1980, the votes have gone to Republican candidates in more than half (34). Republican candidacies for governor, U.S. Senate, and for the House of Representatives have steadily increased since the 1950s, as have victories in such races. By 1982, only three of the former Confederate states had avoided Republican gubernatorial rule. In 1983, 9 of those states were represented by 11 U.S. senators, and the number of Southern Republicans serving in the House had increased, almost in linear progression, from 6 out of 106 congressional districts in 1953 to 35 from 116 districts (30 percent), down in the off-year elec-

[90] Charles Willis to Sherman Adams, 25 June 1953, reporting on his discussion of the Tennessee situation with RNC Chairman Leonard Hall, Official Files, Box 707.

[91] V. O. Key, Jr., *Southern Politics in State and Nation* (New York: Knopf, 1949), 277.

[92] Ewald, *Eisenhower the President*, 186. Robert Anderson served as secretary of the Navy, deputy secretary of the Department of Defense, and secretary of the treasury in the Eisenhower administration; Wilton B. Persons, a long-time friend, served as Eisenhower's White House congressional liaison until succeeding Sherman Adams as chief of staff in 1958.

[93] See Donald S. Strong, *Urban Republicanism in the South* (University, Ala.: University of Alabama, Bureau of Public Administration, 1960), 1.

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tion from 39 from 108 districts (36 percent). Republican membership in the legislatures of the 11 states expanded from 61 (3 percent) to 294 (16 percent) from 1953 to 1981.

Early in his administration, in a memorandum for the record, Eisenhower commented on the Committee of Southerners headed by RNC member from Louisiana, John Minor Wisdom. The committee's efforts to strengthen the party in the South met resistence, in part it was thought because Wisdom's RNC membership imparted an official quality to the effort. It now seemed necessary to reorganize the enterprise. To that end "this morning I called the National Chairman (Len Hall) to tell him of my intense personal interest in the objectives of this Committee. I have little concern as to whether the Committee is formal, informal or anything else—I am simply interested in finding out from intelligent and experienced people what should be our next and succeeding moves in that region."[94]

A June 1953 "G.O.P. Headquarters Organization Memorandum" put out by Leonard Hall shows a "Southern Activities" unit under the RNC organization director and on a par with the patronage and field service units.[95] By 1957 the RNC had established the Southern Division, headed by Virginia state chairman and RNC member (former RNC patronage chief) I. Lee Potter. To provide him with leverage, the Division was given the handling of all patronage from the 13 Southern States, and the RNC executive staff successfully argued to a retrenchment-minded chairman that the Division be continued.[96] Entering the 1950s as a set of electorally dormant organizations which existed to barter convention delegate votes for the prospect of presidential patronage, the state Republican parties in the South were established as having electoral significance at the presidential level by the time Eisenhower left office.

The much reviled instrument of patronage was employed in support of party-building in the South. The pattern of Eisenhower administration Southern patronage and the subsequent history of the Republican party in the South suggest the effort to build the party from the top down by using elite patronage to attract professionals to party service. Republican patronage in the South focused on the offices associated with the judiciary. While the RNC could make a good case for the complaint that lower level patronage, in the early years, was going disproportionately to Eisenhower Democrats and Independents, it was clear that the elite patronage was reserved for deserving Republicans. Analysis of a 1954 RNC report on Southern patronage, discloses that the bulk of the Republican patronage was concentrated in judicial and customs positions (post

[94] Memorandum for the Record, 19 August 1953, Whitman File, Administration Series, Box 33. Also see Ferrell, *Eisenhower Diaries,* entry for 19 August 1953, 253.

[95] Humphreys Papers, Box 7.

[96] Humphreys to Alcorn, 22 July 1957, and Humphreys et al. to Alcorn, 12 June 1957, Humphreys Papers, Box 10. See also George L. Grassmuck, "Emerging Republicanism in the South," (paper delivered at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, Ill., 1964), 9 ff.

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office figures are not given), where few if any non-Republican appointments are made. Plain and hyphenated Democrats, independents, and careerists were clustered in memorial commissions, agricultural boards, advisory commissions, and independent regulatory commissions when Democratic appointments were mandated by statute. Of the 59 Republican appointments, 39 were to positions in the judicial office cluster and ten to customs.[97] No judicial or customs appointments went to regular Democrats and only five to Eisenhower Democrats. In short, a little over a year into the Eisenhower administration, 91 percent of the judicial and customs positions were going to Republicans.

The record of political transformation in the South since the 1950s shows that Eisenhower moved consistently with the forces that were changing the political character of the South. Regional movements of industry and population, generational changes with associated shifts in cultural norms, and divisiveness between the national and Southern state Democratic parties were discernible in the 1950s as forces with a transforming impact on Southern politics.[98] Eisenhower's political personality was well suited to electoral exploitation of these forces, and his interest in party-building stimulated national party efforts to capitalize on them.

Party Politics and the Cabinet

The national party committee figured prominently in cabinet discussions, and Eisenhower clearly accorded the party a role in his administration. Cabinet members repeatedly were admonished to consult with the party organization—even to *report* to the chairman or staff—on patronage and campaign matters. And the president regarded the RNC as a source of instruction for cabinet members on the intricacies and proprieties of congressional relations.

Patronage, a topic relevant to almost all dimensions of party leadership in the 1950s, was distasteful to Eisenhower.[99] Like his predecessors, he felt that the more he accomplished in distributing patronage, the less appreciation he received. He did not like dealing with patronage directly, and still less hearing congressional leaders, who, when invited to cabinet meetings, lectured on the

[97] Derived from Jim McKillips to Chairman Hall, 1 April 1954, on "Presidential Appointments in the South," RNC Office of Chair Files, Box 101.

[98] Paul Allen Beck, "Partisan Dealignment in the Postwar South," *American Political Science Review* 71 (1977): 477–96; Eugene R. Declercq, Thomas L. Hurley, and Norman R. Luttbeg, "Presidential Voting Change in the South: 1956–1972," *Journal of Politics* 39 (1977): 480–92; Louis M. Seagull, *Southern Republicanism* (New York: Schenkman [Wiley], 1975); Raymond Wolfinger and Robert B. Arseneau, "Partisan Change in the South, 1952–1976," in Louis Maisel and Joseph Cooper, eds., *Political Parties: Development and Decay*, Sage Electoral Studies Yearbook (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1978), 4: ch. 6.

[99] See the president's statement at cabinet meeting of 8 May 1953, Whitman File, Cabinet Series, Box 2.

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need for patronage "as a motive power for effective organizational support."[100]

Disagreeable or not, the president recognized the importance of patronage for building the party, staffing the administration, and as a trading resource. Patronage was repeatedly on the cabinet agenda and the president, in addition to admonishing cabinet members to cooperate with the party chairmen, brought Hall to cabinet meetings to discuss the problem of patronage. The product of such emphasis can be seen in cabinet member reports on numbers of Republicans hired.[101]

Eisenhower's concern for patronage extended to recapturing some merit civil service positions for patronage use. In a letter to Republican Congressman Dewey Short of Missouri, White House office aide I. Jack Martin reviewed Eisenhower's amendment of Executive Order 9830 to provide for Schedule C positions and advised that 714 positions had been placed in this category. He reported that the Civil Service Commission was reviewing additional positions nominated for Schedule C and when that process was complete, the administration would have additional positions for appointment of loyal partisans.[102] Further, in the second year of the administration, Sherman Adams and Civil Service Commission Chairman Philip Young exchanged correspondence on ways in which the Commission could cooperate with the administration to facilitate patronage appointments.[103]

If the president did not believe in keeping books on political history, patronage books were nonetheless kept. The White House patronage bookkeeper was Charles Willis, Adams's assistant. Willis kept what he thought to be the only complete record of administration personnel actions. The president and Leonard Hall each had a copy of this account book which, by mid-1955, recorded 37,000 actions.[104] Presumably, Bryce Harlow, Person's deputy for congressional liaison, dipped into the Willis patronage accounts when, in 1957, he briefed the president for a breakfast meeting which included the Speaker of the House. Harlow attributed to Sam Rayburn the complaint that the Eisenhower administration was the most partisan he had ever known. The administration refused to appoint "real" Democrats even to those positions reserved for Democrats. Seeking to afford the president relief from the charge of undue partisanship, Harlow produced a list of about 125 Democrats appointed by

[100] Senate Republican Campaign Committee Chairman Everett McKinley Dirksen's words, but House Republican Campaign Committee Chairman Kenneth Simpson reported complaints, too, at the 5 March 1954 cabinet meeting. Whitman File, Cabinet Series, Box 3.

[101] Ezra Taft Benson to Leonard Hall on the placement of Republicans in the Department of Agriculture, 24 May 1955, RNC Office of Chair Files, Box 98.

[102] Martin to Short, 21 October 1953, responding to Short to President, 12 September 1953, Official Files, Box 707. Also see Herman Miles Sommers, "The Federal Bureaucracy and the Change of Administration," *American Political Science Review* 48 (1954): 131–51.

[103] Philip Young to Adams, 2 March 1954, Official Files, Box 707. See also Willis to Adams, 26 May 1954, and Bernard M. Shanley to Adams, 13 March 1954, in that file.

[104] Charles F. Willis to Adams, 8 June 1955, Official Files, Box 707.

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Eisenhower, and 24 of these were underlined as "assuredly 'real' Democrats!" The bulk of the Democratic appointments were in the regulatory agencies to which bipartisan appointments are required by statute. One was the short-lived appointment of Martin P. Durkin to the cabinet (Labor) and four were to subcabinet positions.[105] In 1958, Ann Whitman noted that the president was "urging General Persons to contact all Cabinet officers and Presidental appointees . . . on what each individual can do in the next two years—on a geographical and/or functional basis—to advance the cause of the Republican Party. He is very strong on this. . . . He believes that such assignments should be given to individuals down through the Assistant Secretary level. . . ."[106]

Party business was on the agenda for at least 37 out of 239 cabinet meetings during the Eisenhower administration. While the party business was largely patronage, RNC staffing, campaigns, conventions, and platforms were also discussed. Indeed, the new RNC director of public relations was brought to a cabinet meeting and introduced by Hall as a person who would be helping with congressional relations. The two Republican campaign committee chairs also attended this meeting.[107]

In addition to cabinet attention to political matters, the subcabinet, in the last years of the Eisenhower administration at least, met for lunch monthly at the Army-Navy Club adjacent to the office building which housed the RNC offices, and these meetings were purely political in nature. The RNC provided part-time staffing to cover arrangements, programs, and updating of rosters. The group heard about campaign plans for 1960 and ways in which they could aid party finance and party work, the latter especially in the field on government business.[108]

Administration relations with senators and representatives commanded recurrent attention at cabinet meetings. Exhortation and instruction in the techniques and amenities of congressional relations were expected to have consequences beneficial to the administration. Most such discussions stressed due concern for the party dimension of the contacts.

In the summer of 1953, Sherman Adams prompted the vice president to make a statement to the cabinet urging them to give forewarning or advice on agency actions of local economic and political importance to friendly senators and congressmen or to the RNC for dissemination to the state party organizations.[109] Offering political advice from his U.N. post, Henry Cabot Lodge responded to the president's complaint in 1955 about lack of Republican support in Congress for members of the administration appearing before committees and to his query about whether the cabinet and other high officials were doing their best to

[105] Harlow to the President, 18 August 1957, with attached list. Whitman Name Series, Box 7.
[106] Whitman File, DDE Diaries, Box 23, Ann Whitman note dated 17 December 1958.
[107] Cabinet meeting of 5 March 1954, Whitman File, Cabinet Series, Box 3.
[108] Author's files based on his RNC service, 1958–1960.
[109] Cabinet meeting of 27 August 1953, Whitman File, Cabinet Series, Box 2.

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cultivate Congress. He reported that the Republican members of the House had recently held a reception at the Capitol Hill Club to honor the cabinet. Only three cabinet members—Stassen, Mitchell, and Lodge himself—had attended.[110] Eisenhower intervened to reduce tensions between members of the cabinet and party leaders in Congress, as for example when he exacted from Secretary of Interior Fred Seaton a promise to talk with Senate Minority Leader William Knowland, who had complained on lack of consultation on an impending territorial governor appointment. In the same file we find the president responding to a message from Lyndon Johnson, transmitted by Knowland, about appointments to the U.N. delegation. This led to an Eisenhower note to the under secretary of state.[111]

As late as 1957, Wilton B. Persons composed guidelines for the cabinet on congressional relations, with clearly differentiated approaches to Republican and Democratic members.[112] The cabinet should take "special care to keep the Republican Leadership abreast not only of the Congressional needs of the Department but also of contacts with the Democratic Leadership." Similarly, in making contacts with members of committees, special care should be taken to deal with the most influential Republican committee members, and to keep the ranking Republican abreast of contacts with the Democratic side of the committee. An administration heavily dependent upon the good will and votes of the opposite party in Congress tried to steer a fine course between accommodation and partisanship: Cabinet members "should stay friendly and cooperative with the Democrats as distinguished from attempting to create the team spirit that is needed in the Republican members." When H.E.W. Secretary Oreta Culp Hobby asked for guidance on introducing a bill in Congress a few years earlier, she was told to consult first the ranking Republican members on the appropriate committees in the two houses, who should be encouraged to introduce companion bills, even if the legislation was introduced by the (Democratic) committee chairmen.[113]

Eisenhower's Party Leadership: A Summary

Samuel Lubell, who has provided some of the most insightful commentary on postwar American politics, offered a mid-1950s appraisal of Eisenhower's political leadership. Contrary to the "widely held image of Eisenhower as a five-star babe in the political woods," Lubell rated Eisenhower "as a highly skilled

[110] Lodge to the president, 1 July 1955, Whitman File, Administration Series, Box 27. Harold Stassen was then in the White House as special assistant to the president for disarmament, and James P. Mitchell was secretary of labor.

[111] Whitman Diary, 26 July 1957, Box 9.

[112] See Eisenhower to Persons, 23 October 1957, and Persons's attached memorandum for the president, 29 October 1957, Whitman Name Series, Box 25.

[113] Records of L. Arthur Minnich, Subseries G, Index of Cabinet and Legislative Leaders Meetings, Box 25.

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professional, as complete a political angler as ever fished the White House." Further, he noted: ". . . it would be difficult to cite any President, including both Roosevelts, who has been more adept in 'giving the people what they want,' or who has been more of a 'party' man in patronage matters and in building a party organization, or even, considering how wide was the cleavage at the outset, who has done so well in bridging the rifts within his own party."[114] More recently, Fred Greenstein has commented on "Eisenhower's continued efforts to broaden, unify, strengthen, and modify the Republican party, notwithstanding his simultaneous efforts to convey the impression of nonpartisanship."[115] Greenstein's article does not deal at length with Eisenhower's relations with his party, but his conclusion holds up upon such examination.

Eisenhower was a transition leader in three senses. His was the first post-New Deal administration. In addition, he was elected in a campaign that marked a significant acceleration of the established trend toward candidate-centered, high-cost, and media campaigns, which have come to dominate contemporary politics. And finally, in the role of party leader to which he laid emphatic claim, he sought both to modernize the attitudes of Republican activists, and to strengthen the party organization as a vehicle for competing for control of government.

As candidate and as president, Eisenhower welcomed irregular support, but he also pushed the party to seek new recruits through mobilizing the apolitical and reaching out to independents and Democrats. He pursued his party ends through the national committee, and also drew upon the party hierarchy for help in administration matters. When the committee proved recalcitrant or ineffective, he neither ostracized nor bullied it, but continued to lead it. His conception of the party could not be realized within the span of eight years, and he was prepared to aid and work at party-building in his post-presidential years.

A brick and mortar memorial to Eisenhower's influence on the Republican party now stands on Capitol Hill. The Eisenhower National Republican Center has housed the party headquarters since 1971, and the systematic fund-raising, candidate-support, and party-building programs that radiate out of that building are widely held to represent an advanced state of the art of organizational politics. The party organizations across the states are strong and closely linked to the national party. In the formerly "solid" South, the party is electorally competitive above the local level. At the presidential level, Eisenhower's 1952 victory inaugurated an era in which Republican candidates have won four out of the seven ensuing elections. Yet only twice after 1952 has the party managed to win control of even a single house of Congress (1980 and 1982), and Republican rule is synonymous with divided government. Finally, while he sought to

[114] Samuel Lubell, *Revolt of the Moderates* (New York: Harper, 1956), p. 25. See also Vincent P. De Santis, "Eisenhower Revisionism," *Review of Politics* 38 (1976): 190–207, at 192, who makes a similar point, also quoting Lubell.

[115] Greenstein, "Eisenhower as an Activist President," 579 .

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moderate the doctrinaire conservatism of the Republican party of the 1950s by infusing it with new blood and instilling it with a focus on election-winning, the party in the decades after Eisenhower has, at best, been riven, and it is probably more accurate to say that it has been dominated, by its conservative wing. Indeed, Republican successes in the South may have tipped the scales toward conservatism. Thus it is no surprise to learn that for party leadership, as for other areas of presidential leadership, the frustrating return is a legacy of successes and failures.*

* The research reported here is part of a study of presidential party leadership from Hoover through Johnson. It has been facilitated by sabbatical and other support from the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee and the Golda Meir Library at UWM, the Eleanor Roosevelt Institute, the Harry S. Truman Library Institute, and the Lyndon Baines Johnson Foundation. The Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, in addition to providing informed and friendly assistance from the staff, extended a speaking invitation, which led to the first draft of this article.

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CORRECTIONS:

Inadvertently, the article by Donald Puchala, "American Interests and the United Nations," which appeared in our Winter 1982–83 issue, did not mention that Dr. Puchala's article will also appear in Tobi Trister Gati, ed., *The US, the UN, and the Management of Global Change* (New York University Press, 1983.)

Also, the price of *Worldwide Government Directory, with Inter-Governmental Organizations, 1983*, which was listed in our Spring 1983 issue, was miscommunicated to us as $355.00. It is actually $325.00, including the optional subscription to the Update Service.

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The Congressional Veto and Administrative Rulemaking

WILLIAM WEST
JOSEPH COOPER

The twentieth century has not been kind to the United States Congress. Whereas in the late nineteenth century Woodrow Wilson could characterize American politics as "congressional government," the present century has been marked by a chronic sense of crisis regarding Congress's role in the political system. The scope of concern has encompassed not only the growth of presidential power, but the growth of bureaucratic power as well. Ironically, Congress itself has contributed in important ways to the erosion of legislative power and prerogative. Pressed by the exigencies of modern government and by its own limitations, Congress has created and sustained the institutionalized presidency and a vast bureaucratic establishment. It has delegated substantial amounts of discretionary authority to presidents, department heads, and agency officials.

Yet it is also true that Congress has sought to adapt to the condition of modern government by strengthening its own capabilities. Most decades since the advent of the New Deal have had reform movements. At times signal and comprehensive changes have been made, ranging from committee consolidation in the 1940s to budget reform in the 1970s. In addition, as is usual in most organizations, incremental changes in structure, process, and resources have been an equally if not even more important mode of adaptive innovation. Along with staff growth and subcommittee expansion, one of the most important aspects of such change has been a growing reliance on a new and distinctive oversight device—the legislative veto.

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Since 1932, more than 200 statutes, containing well in excess of 300 separate veto provisions, have subjected the implementation of executive decisions to some further form of congressional review.[1] Legislative vetoes have thus been employed across a broad range of substantive policy areas, and have been used to control a variety of administrative actions. The veto mechanisms themselves vary along several dimensions. One form of review provides Congress with an opportunity to disapprove executive decisions before they take effect; another form requires explicit congressional approval; and another merely establishes a mandatory waiting period (during which Congress may block proposed actions through the normal legislative process). Authority for approval or disapproval may be vested in either house, both houses, a committee or committees from either house, relevant committees from both houses, or some combination of houses and committees. The most common fixed review periods are thirty and sixty days, but some are much shorter and others much longer. Finally, until the 1970s statutes that instituted house forms of the veto provided for action by simple or concurrent resolutions not subject to presidential veto. In recent years, however, joint resolutions, which are subject to presidential veto, have been stipulated in several instances.

At least two developments have contributed to the current significance of the veto. First, its use has accelerated dramatically during the past decade. Well over half of the acts containing vetoes and over two-thirds of the individual provisions have been passed since 1969. Second, the veto has been extended to a greater and more broadly salient range of executive actions. In the past, veto mechanisms were used largely to control narrow decisions applying statutes in individual cases.[2] But in recent years, vetoes have been instituted in a variety of important policy areas, including military arms sales, executive impoundments, and the determination of federal salaries, to name just three examples. An important element of the trend towards increased reliance on the veto has been its extension to administrative rulemaking. Since 1972, vetoes have been attached to broad delegations of rulemaking authority in areas such as safety standards by the Consumer Product Safety Commission, energy pricing by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, and the administration of elementary and secondary education programs and college student loans by the Department of Education.[3]

[1] Clark F. Norton, *Congressional Review, Deferral and Disapproval of Executive Actions: A Summary and an Inventory of Statutory Authority*, report 76-88 G. (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 1976), as supplemented by his reports 78-117 Gov. 25 May 1978, 79-47 Gov. 12 February 1979, and 82-26 Gov. 12 February 1982.

[2] Joseph Cooper, "The Legislative Veto: Its Promise and Its Perils," *Public Policy* 7 (1956): 128-74.

[3] Robert S. Gilmour, "The Congressional Veto: Shifting the Balance of Administrative Control," *Journal of Policy Analysis And Management* 2 (1982), 13-25. See also *Studies on the Legislative Veto*, prepared by the Congressional Research Service for the Subcommittee on Rules of the House Rules Committee (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1980).

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Despite its increased use, the veto remains highly controversial from a legal and policy perspective. The veto has precipitated debate among constitutional scholars from the time of its inception.[4] Prior to 1980 the device was treated favorably in several federal court cases in which it was challenged or discussed. Since 1980 federal circuit courts have ruled simple (one-house) resolution forms unconstitutional in two instances and concurrent (two-house) resolution forms unconstitutional in one instance.[5] In March 1983, these cases were still before the Supreme Court. However, it is highly probable that some form of the veto will survive. Not only can a weighty constitutional argument be made on behalf of the veto generally; in addition, the simple and concurrent resolution forms have been used for half a century in a wide variety of important policy areas, ranging from executive reorganization to trade agreements, arms sales, and executive impoundments. Moreover, if necessary, legislative vetoes can simply be cast as joint resolutions, which have the same legal status as law. The use of joint resolutions would only reduce the amount of leverage Congress derives from disapproval forms of the veto, and would have little impact on approval forms.[6]

Beyond its legality, the veto's policy effects have also received considerable attention. Especially since World War II, the veto has been depicted as a mechanism that permits congressional power to be exercised in ways that impair representative and effective governmental decision-making—as a mechanism that introduces legislative influence into areas where it inevitably does more harm than good. This perspective has, in fact, dominated recent academic discussions of the veto's policy effects. In contrast, the veto has been endorsed by its supporters in Congress and elsewhere as a device that introduces a needed measure of accountability into the administrative process.

In this article we will focus on the veto as a means of controlling administrative rulemaking. The purpose is to examine the veto's merits as an oversight mechanism. Thus, we will not examine the question of whether the veto violates the Constitution. Rather, we assume that the veto does not and ask whether the veto is wise as a matter of institutional policy.

Administrative rulemaking provides a highly appropriate area in which to address this issue. In contrast to the period before 1970, rulemaking applications have figured prominently in the expansion of veto usage during the past

[4] Joseph and Ann Cooper, "The Legislative Veto and the Constitution," *George Washington Law Review* 30 (1962): 467–517. In addition, see Bernard Schwartz, "The Legislative Veto and the Constitution—A Reexamination," *George Washington Law Review* 46 (1978): 351–75.

[5] See Schwartz, "Legislative Veto," for a discussion of pre-1980 cases favorable to the veto. Recent cases holding one or two-house forms unconstitutional are *Chanda* v. *Immigration and Naturalization Service*, 634 F.2d 408 (9th Cir., 1980); *Consumer Energy Council of America* v. *Federal Energy Regulatory Commission*, 673 F.2d 425 (D.C. Cir., 1982); and *Consumers Union of the United States* v. *Federal Trade Commission*, 691 F.2d 575 (D.C. Cir., 1982).

[6] Another alternative is to make veto review a condition for the spending of appropriated funds. For a recent example see Norton, report 82-26 Gov., 112–13 (PL 96-126).

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decade. For example, of thirty-three pieces of veto legislation passed in the ninety-sixth Congress (1979–81), close to one-third pertained to rulemaking. Included were vetoes over such matters as Federal Trade Commission rules in general, Environmental Protection Agency rules regarding pesticides and oil drilling, and Health and Human Services rules regarding health care facilities.[7]

Criticisms of the Legislative Veto

Since the growing body of policy-relevant literature is overwhelmingly unfavorable, it is best to begin by reviewing the major arguments that have been offered against the veto as it pertains to rulemaking. Opponents of the legislative veto contend that congressional influence perverts the policy implementation process, and affects the substance of governmental decisions in undesirable ways. A comparison (sometimes implicit) between "undisturbed" administrative decision-making and veto-based legislative oversight lies at the core of their most important arguments. Critics generally extol the objectivity, openness, and balanced responsiveness of administrative rulemaking, compared with the secretiveness and bias that they allege characterize legislative intervention through the veto.

The confidence in agency decision-making expressed by the veto's critics is based in large part on the perceived virtues of the "informal" or "notice-and-comment" rulemaking provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) of 1946. Under this procedural format, an agency must first notify the public that a rule is being contemplated. Proposed rules usually must be published in the *Federal Register*, although other means of notice may be used in some circumstances. After notice, an agency must provide the public an opportunity to comment on the soundness of proposed regulations, either through written arguments or through oral hearings (or both if the agency so desires).

In recent years, the courts and Congress have attempted to promote the viability of participation in notice-and-comment rulemaking and improve the quality of final decisions by imposing requirements that go beyond the language of the APA. An increasingly common stipulation in judicial opinions and enabling legislation has been that rules must be based on a "record" consisting of all supporting evidence collected by the agency, as well as any written or oral comment received from interested parties. Related developments have been the requirements that agencies hold hearings and that participants be afforded procedural rights, such as cross-examination and rebuttal. These measures have been designed primarily to ensure that the premises of agency decisions receive rigorous scrutiny.[8]

[7] Ibid., viii–ix. In addition, there has been substantial Congressional support for legislation subjecting administrative rules generally to veto review. See *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 27 March 1982, 701, and 3 April 1982, 740.

[8] Stephen DeLong, "Informal Rulemaking and the Integration of Law and Policy," *Virginia Law Review* 68 (1979): 262–318.

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Harold Bruff and Ernest Gellhorn have argued that APA rulemaking procedures, as supplemented by the recent imposition of due process requirements, promote openness and responsiveness in the administrative process. As they state: "The essence of notice-and-comment proceedings is a public forum in which all interested parties participate openly and on equal footing."[9] The authors also feel that informal rulemaking procedures promote objective rationality in agency decision-making. Rulemaking records must demonstrate to the satisfaction of the courts that agency actions are based on sound factual and legal premises that have been tested through the adversary process. The effect of these requirements, they claim, is to ensure that agencies have interpreted statutory intent correctly, and that rules are instrumentally sound regarding legislative objectives.[10]

Just as opponents of the veto express optimism concerning the openness, responsiveness, equity, and rationality of the administrative process, they argue that congressional influence on agency decision-making typically lacks these qualities. Perhaps the most frequently made case against the veto is that legislative intervention is likely to come at the behest of special interests, who pressure oversight committees "behind the scenes" to alter the course of policy as it is being administered. Therefore, they argue, to the extent that Congress influences rulemaking (either by formally exercising the veto or by using it as a bargaining lever), "political considerations" come to supplant statutory intent and factual evidence as the basis for administrative decisions. This result supposedly undermines the objectivity, and indeed the integrity, of policy implementation.[11]

Similarly, the veto is felt to impair balanced and fair representation of all interests in administrative rulemaking. One common criticism is that the veto is biased in favor of well-funded and well-organized interests. Critics reason that not all groups who participate in the formulation of a statute and in subsequent rulemaking proceedings will possess the wherewithal for an additional round of lobbying. In this case, critics of the veto feel that it tends to enhance the influence of "high-quantity" interests, such as industry groups, who can afford to sustain their political efforts over long periods of time. For example, as Robert S. Gilmour has written:

> the public most likely to take timely notice of an unfavorable regulatory proposal, to understand its implications, and articulate its objections with enough clarity and force to be intelligible to Congress are those interests that can support on-going lobbyist activities and maintain continuous contacts with legislators and their staffs.[12]

[9] Harold Bruff and Ernest Gellhorn, "Congressional Control of Administrative Regulation: A Study of Legislative Vetoes," *Harvard Law Review* 9 (1977): 1413. See also Gilmour, "Congressional Veto," 16–17.

[10] Bruff and Gellhorn, "Congressional Control," 1375–77.

[11] Ibid., 1409–40; and Gilmour, "Congressional Veto," 22–23.

[12] Gilmour, "Congressional Veto," 18.

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A complementary point is simply that the veto is exercised by unrepresentative elements of Congress. Critics argue that even where formal authority is vested in one or both houses, the realities of the oversight process dictate that actual veto power rests largely with committees and subcommittees. As a result, the veto may be used to contravene the will of the whole house or the whole Congress. Robert G. Dixon's argument that the veto contributes to the problem of "interest group liberalism" is typical in this regard:

> the veto exacerbates . . . the problem of divisive interest group pressure on modern government. . . . This kind of politics erodes the center, rules by fiefdoms, and evades the national will. . . . The veto fragments rather than unifies power in Congress. It points toward making every member of Congress, and the interests for whom he speaks, a de facto co-administrator of the agency programs within his committee's assigned area of oversight.[13]

In what might be viewed as an extension of this argument, William P. Schaefer and James Thurber have contended that the veto is used in a conspiracy to "warp" policy to suit the narrow, mutually supportive interests of "subsystem actors."[14] By attaching the veto to legislation—ostensibly as a hedge against the possible abuse of discretion—committees (or subcommittees) are able to obtain congressional approval for vague statutory mandates. The flexibility thus gained permits policy to be implemented in a way favorable to clientele groups.

The central argument against the veto, then, is that the quality of congressional oversight it encourages and facilitates is inferior to the quality of administrative decision-making in a number of key respects. In addition, critics typically offer several other points to supplement their case. One is that mandatory review periods obstruct or delay the efforts of administrators to issue rules—especially in controversial areas in which bureaucrats and legislators have difficulty in reconciling their differences. In his study of the Office of Education, Theodore Sky argued that rulemaking delay may be especially deleterious for distributive programs, which are tied to the yearly appropriations process.[15]

Another frequent criticism is that the veto's availability encourages Congress to delude itself regarding what best serves its institutional interests. The objection here is to the presumed results of opting for future control over policy through the veto in lieu of control through the definition of clear statutory goals. Critics contend that the veto provides only the illusion of control, since

[13] Testimony of Robert G. Dixon, *Regulatory Reform and Congressional Review of Agency Rules: Hearings before a Subcommittee of the House Rules Committee*, 96th Cong., 1st sess. (1979), 549. See also Robert G. Dixon, "The Congressional Veto and Separation of Powers: The Executive on a Leash?" *North Carolina Law Review* 56 (1978): 423–94.

[14] William P. Schaefer and James Thurber, "The Legislative Veto and the Policy Subsystems: Its Impact on Congressional Oversight," (paper presented at annual meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, Atlanta, Georgia, 1–8 November 1980).

[15] Theodore Sky, "Rulemaking and the Federal Grant Process in the United States Office of Education," *Virginia Law Review* 62 (1976): 1017–43. See also Gilmour, "Congressional Veto," 16–17.

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legislative review of the vast rulemaking output of federal agencies can only be sporadic at best. The result is to distract Congress from writing detailed legislation, the only viable remedy to the problem of bureaucration discretion, and exacerbates the very problem the veto is designed to solve. Antonin Scalia, for example, has argued:

> Another deleterious effect of the . . . legislative veto . . . will be an increase of that very practice of congressional delegation of vague and standardless rulemaking authority which has placed us in our current predicament. That is to say, the delusion that it will be able to control agencies through the legislative veto will render Congress all the more ready to continue and expand the transfer of basic policy decisions to the agencies.[16]

A third argument involves the enhancement of committee staff power. Beyond the transfer of authority to unrepresentative elements of Congress, some critics feel that the veto ultimately serves as a lever that legislative staff can use to exercise unwarranted influence over the formulation of administrative policy. Scalia has also noted:

> Our elected representatives clearly will not have the time to review the torrent of regulations which pour forth every month, so that task will be entrusted to a shadow rulemaking bureaucracy on Capitol Hill – which will be the real body bureaucrats will have to please in order to forestall congressional veto. So instead of government by one bureaucracy, we will have government by two. . . . That is hardly a step towards more democratic government.[17]

A final criticism of the veto is that it may distort the choice of administrative procedure. Bruff and Gellhorn have written that when vetoes are imposed on administrative rulemaking, agencies wishing to avoid congressional interference may choose other means of implementing statutes, such as adjudication.[18] Such a situation would be unfortunate, since rulemaking is widely acclaimed as a fairer and more effective way to implement policy than the case-by-case approach in most contexts.

An Appraisal of the Criticisms

The attacks on the legislative veto discussed here seem plausible at first. However, closer examination reveals that they are invalid, and that they even lack internal consistency in several critical respects. There is no reason to be as sanguine about the virtues of the administrative process or as pessimistic about the legislative oversight process as critics of the veto contend.

[16] Testimony of Antonin Scalia, *Regulatory Reform Hearings*, 541.
[17] Ibid., 540–41.
[18] Bruff and Gellhorn, "Congressional Control," 1424–26.

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Administrative Rulemaking

The argument that rulemaking is an open, objective, and broadly representative process overlooks several important considerations. Most obviously, the Administrative Procedure Act's notice-and-comment requirements, which supposedly ensure these qualities, pertain only to a minority of all federal rulemaking proceedings. Broad exemptions exist in the act for rules governing the distribution of loans, grants, benefits, contracts, and subsidies, as well as for rules in the areas of foreign and military affairs. Essentially, APA procedures pertain to regulatory rulemaking and little else. Although a few individual enabling statutes prescribe informal procedures, and although a few agencies have adopted them voluntarily, Kenneth Davis has estimated that at least eighty percent of all federal rulemaking is conducted without notice and comment.[19] Arguments against the veto on the grounds that it negates the advantages of informal rulemaking therefore need to be qualified substantially.

Even when informal procedures are used, they control only a fraction of the decisional process in rulemaking. As William Pederson, an agency staff attorney, has written:

> The Administrative Procedure Act is only a statute; it is not the source of all agency procedures. Commentators who focus too narrowly on the APA may forget what lies behind it, and the long paths an agency rule may have to trace before even being proposed for comment.[20]

Years may be spent formulating a proposed rule. In the case of the Federal Trade Commission (whose rulemaking has recently been subjected to a veto provision), proposed rules are typically accompanied by book-length reports that document extensive staff research, often alluding to tens of thousands of pages of supporting evidence. Likewise, Pederson's study of the Environmental Protection Agency indicated that the brunt of evidence collection, consultation with affected groups and other agencies, and "policy formulation" takes place before notice of proposed rulemaking.[21] Thus, the most important phases of the rulemaking process—an agency's definition of issues and its selection of a course of action from among competing alternatives—often take place before informal proceedings begin. In sum, many rules are promulgated completely outside the embrace of the APA, and key aspects of rulemaking decisions that are ostensibly controlled by the act take place without public notice and comment.

In addition, notice-and-comment proceedings themselves are often less open and equitable than critics of the veto assume. The public must be aware that an

[19] Kenneth Davis, *Administrative Law and Government* (St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Company, 1975), 121.

[20] William Pederson, "Formal Records and Informal Rulemaking," *Yale Law Journal* 85 (1975): 51.

[21] Ibid., 38–88.

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agency intends to promulgate a rule as a precondition for effective participation in administrative policymaking. However, the *Federal Register*—the standard means of providing notice—is a voluminous, cumbersome document that few Americans know about, much less read. Monitoring the *Register* involves costs that not all elements of society can bear with equal ease.

To an even greater degree than the cost of staying informed, the cost of effective participation also leads to bias in notice-and-comment rulemaking. At the very least, effective participation demands the expenditure of time and effort in preparation. Such expenditures can be considerable in complex or technical proceedings. In addition, substantial monetary costs are typically involved in rulemaking. In 1972 for instance, an Administrative Conference study found that attorneys' fees in Food and Drug Administration rulemaking often exceeded $100,000, and that expert witness fees for Interstate Commerce Commission ratemaking sometimes totaled $40,000 or $50,000.[22] More recently, individual corporations have reportedly spent more than $1 million on single Federal Trade Commission proceedings. It is simplistic to assume, therefore, that intense, well-organized interests gain a special advantage in the veto-based legislative oversight process that they lack in administrative rulemaking. After observing that privately-owned electric and gas utilities spent more than $38,000,000 in administrative proceedings in 1974, Bruce Frederickson and his colleagues asked rhetorically if consumer groups could conceivably have afforded similar efforts.[23]

Aside from issues of access as a precondition for responsive administration, recent developments in rulemaking procedure may well militate against responsiveness *per se*. Bruff and Gellhorn have argued that the due process requirements imposed on agencies by the courts and Congress in the past fifteen years have ensured responsiveness to comment, and have thus enhanced both the objectivity and representativeness of administrative proceedings.[24] In truth, procedural rights (such as cross-examination and rebuttal) and decision-making on the record have served objectivity in a narrow sense by forcing rigorous scrutiny of factual and legal decisional premises. However, due process requirements have limited the responsiveness of agency decision-making in a broader sense by precluding the explicit consideration of values and preferences. Similarly, procedural rights and decision-making on the record have rendered agencies less able to fashion appropriate compromises among competing interests. For example, an Administrative Conference report on the Federal Trade Commission's rulemaking procedures stated:

[22] Roger Crampton, "The Why, Where, and How of Broadened Participation in the Administrative Process," *Georgetown Law Journal* 60 (1972): 525.

[23] Bruce Frederickson, et al., "Facilitating Public Participation at FPC Hearings," published in *Public Participation in Federal Agencies: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Administrative Practices and Procedures of the Senate Judiciary Committee*, 94th Cong., 2nd sess. (1976), 483–85.

[24] Bruff and Gellhorn, "Congressional Control," 1375–78.

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> The . . . emphasis on reasoned decision making and opportunities to challenge the factual basis for the rule seems to focus the attention of the agency almost exclusively on the question of whether a proposed rule is logically and factually supportable rather than on its acceptability to affected interests.[25]

It is not surprising that procedures promoting factual objectivity should detract from political representativeness. Given that recent developments in the administrative process have promoted the former at the expense of the latter, it remains to be asked if such a result is desirable. Several leading students of administrative law have argued that the answer to this question depends on the types of issues agencies are asked to resolve. "Judicialized" rulemaking procedures are felt to be appropriate for the implementation of detailed statutes that limit agency discretion to factual determinations, and inappropriate for the administration of open-ended mandates that necessitate broad policy considerations. For example, Peter Schuck has written that:

> the litigation model's emphasis on reasoned argumentation and logical deductions from first principles makes it inappropriate for resolving certain kinds of regulatory issues. . . . Such problems ordinarily involve multiple criteria, and can be solved only by applying a number of standards whose relative weightings and orderings are sufficiently indeterminate as to imply no particular solution. Such a problem . . . requires the exercise of substantial discretion rather than the application of pre-existing decision rules, and its solution will often require interaction between the decision maker and others—interaction that would be inconsistent with the traditional norms of litigation.[26]

In a sense, then, Bruff and Gellhorn are correct when they argue that the legislative veto is inconsistent with the judicialization of the rulemaking process. What they fail to realize is that the judicialization of rulemaking procedures may nonetheless render increased "political oversight" especially desirable, since many delegations of rulemaking authority involve significant policymaking discretion.

Congressional Influence through the Veto

Not only do opponents of the veto gloss over important drawbacks of the administrative process, but they exaggerate the deficiencies of legislative oversight as well. Critics contend that the veto is exercised by unrepresentative parts of the whole Congress, and that it therefore fails to "give play to all political forces."[27] Paradoxically, this argument proves too much. If reliance on the veto impairs representative government, this reliance constitutes an indictment of the

[25] Barry B. Boyer, *Trade Regulation Rulemaking Procedures of the Federal Trade Commission* (Washington, D.C.: Administrative Conference of the United States, 1979), 32.

[26] Peter Schuck, "Litigation, Bargaining, and Regulation," *Regulation* 3 (1979): 28–29.

[27] Bruff and Gellhorn, "Congressional Control," 1413. See also Gilmour, "Congressional Veto," 22–23.

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regular legislative process as well. In both cases, committees serve as instruments that Congress relies on in performing its representative responsibilities. If anything, administrators are often more dependent on committees in the legislative process than in the veto processes that vest authority in one or both houses. This is because it is harder to pass a piece of legislation to attain executive policy goals than to attain these goals simply through congressional inaction. Yet would opponents of the veto argue that Congress must abolish the committee system in the interests of representative government?

The answer, to be sure, is no. But to pose the question is to make explicit logical and empirical deficiencies in the attack on the legislative veto. Committees typically respond to widespread sentiment in their parent bodies, and they rely both on cues furnished by party leaders and on their own sense of the mood of the whole to identify such sentiment. Also, they can be and are disciplined in a variety of formal and informal ways, ranging from rejection of their proposals, to replacement of their members, and to simple ridicule or loss of prestige. On balance, therefore, committees serve as instruments of the whole and have far less than plenary power to control results. Indeed, the 1970s witnessed substantial losses in committee power and coherence. What committees acquire through the veto is not sovereignty over outcomes or leeway to indulge any and every parochial concern, but rather increased leverage to bargain and negotiate with administrators. At the same time, administrative officials are not helpless. They retain the option of mobilizing their political resources to challenge committee leaders in committee and on the floor.

Allen Schick has carried the rebuttal even further.[28] He has replied that, rather than being a tool used to serve "interest group pluralism," the veto has actually been employed in recent years as part of Congress's attempt to move away from "*ex parte* politics in which advantaged interests had privileged access and were able to influence legislative outcomes." According to his analysis, a growing scarcity of resources in the 1970s led to an increased awareness that government's regulatory and service policies have important costs as well as benefits. Politics have become more contentious as a result, and those affected by statutes have become "reluctant to entrust their fate to administrators operating under broad mandates." Vetoes thus have been added to legislation as a hedge against the possibility that narrow subsystem interests might monopolize the policy implementation process. After all, since veto resolutions may be moved by any member and can be structured to require committee reporting, the veto serves as a means of challenging "iron triangles," insofar as they exist, not of reinforcing them.

The related argument that the veto is unrepresentative (or narrowly representative) because it provides an additional opportunity for special or parochial interests to use committees to distort administrative outcomes is also far less convincing than it may appear. For better or for worse, well-financed, well-

[28] Testimony of Allen Schick, *Regulatory Reform Hearings*, 1356–57.

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organized interests generally do sustain their political efforts over time better than diffuse interests. However, such capability constitutes an advantage in the administrative process as statutes are being implemented, as well as in the veto process. As Arthur Maass observed:

> The special interests work wherever authority lies. If Congress elects to review agency rules and regulations for certain major programs, the lobbyists will work in the agencies to get them to draft agreeable rules and then in Congress to get the rules approved or vetoed.
>
> If Congress elects not to review agency rules and regulations, then the lobbyists will simply increase their efforts in the agencies. The corridors of the Departments of Energy and HEW are probably as crowded with lobbyists as are the corridors of the Capitol.[29]

In fact, the advantage narrow or particular interests enjoy may well be greater in administrative rulemaking, where there is often a premium on legal expertise and the ability to marshal evidence through expert witnesses, studies, and the like. As a high-ranking Federal Trade Commission official observed, the confrontation between consumer representatives and industry attorneys is often analogous to a baseball game between the "Bushwick Little League irregulars" and the New York Yankees.[30] In contrast, values and preferences of affected interests are relevant decisional inputs in the legislative process.

Nor should it be assumed in cases of agency-committee conflict that the former always (or even generally) stands for the public interest and that the latter stands for interests inimical to the general welfare. First, as a matter of empirical investigation, one may easily find instances in which the veto has been exercised to serve broadly defined interests or against what are normally regarded as special interests. For example, the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) was forced in 1979 to abandon a rule pertaining to housing assistance payments for new construction and other purposes as the result of a waiting-period review by the Subcommittee on Housing and Community Development of the House Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs. During oversight hearings, lawmakers were convinced by mayors and other local officials that, although the rule would benefit some builders, it would place too great a relocation burden on tenants, many of whom were low-income families or senior citizens. Commenting on the outcome, Representative Millicent Fenwick (R-N.J.) stated:

> . . . the public is a marvelous detective, and just as it was the director of the senior citizens housing who alerted me [to the HUD rule], so will we be alerted by the public when they are going to be hurt by burdensome regulations. We will get notice.[31]

[29] Ibid., 1340.

[30] Testimony of Michael Pertschuk, *Delays in Rulemaking—Regulation of Advertising: Hearings before Subcommittee on Commerce, Consumer, and Monetary Affairs of the House Government Operations Committee*, 94th Cong., 2nd sess. (1976), 41.

[31] Testimony of Millicent Fenwick, *Congressional Review of Federal Agency Rules and Regula-*

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Another prime example was provided by Stanley Brand, the House's general counsel. He noted that 1982 House veto actions included stopping Interior Secretary James Watt from placing oil rigs in the wilderness as well as negating an FTC rule regarding the sale of used cars. Brand's point is that veto opponents tend to focus on uses they dislike while ignoring those they favor, and that they would rue their own actions if their opposition to the veto as a generic mechanism ever succeeded.[32]

Second, and more important, clear and firm distinctions between general and special interests are almost always exceedingly difficult to establish. In part, this difficulty stems from the problem of ascertaining policy effects. An example is Congress's veto of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's incremental pricing rule, which would have required large industry to pay more than do residential users for natural gas. It might appear that the legislature's action was merely a concession to narrow industrial interests (who indeed lobbied vigorously in opposition to the rule). However, a probable effect of the regulation would have been to discourage exploration for new natural gas, and thus to exacerbate the national energy shortage. An additional effect might have been to raise prices for residential users and small businesses by passing on to them a higher proportion of the fixed pipeline costs. After careful analysis, the incremental pricing rule had few defenders.[33]

Beyond the problem of tracing ultimate effects, distinctions between general and special interests are so subjective that in the great majority of cases they are simply a matter of policy preference. This fact can be seen from the very examples Bruff and Gellhorn used to indict the veto.[34] For instance, the authors criticize the veto as a device through which Congress could induce the Office of Education to expand eligibility criteria for student loan guarantees. Yet, was this outcome the advancement of a special interest, or did it merely reflect a policy difference on the issue of whether the middle class should share with the poor the benefits of a costly program? Similarly, was congressional opposition to General Services Administration guidelines on use of the Nixon tapes the advancement of a special interest, or merely a policy difference over the benefits of wider access to the information? Indeed, it is the very difficulty of disentangling general and special interests on the basis of knowledge or expertise that provides the rationale for democratic politics. If we could rely on administrators to define the public "good" and trust them to implement it, there would be no need for elections and legislatures.

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tions: Hearings before Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, 96th Cong., 2nd sess. (1980). The oversight hearings noted in the text were *Disapproving and Invalidating HUD Regulations Concerning Section B: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Housing and Community Development of the House Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs*, 96th Cong., 1st sess. (1979).

[32] Michael Wines, "Legislative Veto is Down, But Not Out," *National Journal*, 30 October 1982.

[33] Christopher Madison, "Was It Really Necessary?" *National Journal*, 5 May 1980.

[34] Bruff and Gellhorn, "Congressional Control," 1382–1409.

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Secondary Effects of the Veto

Criticisms that the veto has undesirable secondary effects are no more convincing than the arguments that it is unrepresentative. Two responses readily come to mind regarding the problem of delay. The first is that the administrative process already involves considerable delay. This is especially true of rulemaking in regulatory areas, where proceedings frequently last for years. Delay of a few days or even of months imposed by mandatory review periods clearly become less significant when considered in this context. Of course, the threat of the veto may at times lead to prolonged negotiations between an agency and Congress and within Congress itself. Hence, a second important point is that, in controversial areas, delay for the purpose of conflict resolution is often preferable to quick, ill-considered decisions that fail to take account of relevant interests.

The criticism that the veto encourages vague legislation is also open to attack, since it is based on the simplistic assumption that Congress has merely to behave more responsibly to gain greater control over policy. In fact, Congress has made significant efforts to constrain bureaucratic discretion through statutory language during the past twenty-five years. For instance, the average number of pages per public law increased at a roughly constant rate, from 1.8 in the Eighty-fourth Congress (1955–56) to 5.0 in the Ninety-fifth Congress (1977–78). Nonetheless, the legislature has continued to cede large amounts of discretion to administrative units. This is unavoidable. Broad delegation results ineluctably from the scope of modern government, from the political pressures that build up in favor of giving administrators sufficient power and flexibility to act effectively in attaining widely shared program goals, and from the inherent difficulties of handling complex policy issues and building majorities. For example, the veto has been used to control executive reorganization, impoundment, arms sales, the reprogramming of appropriated funds, and gasoline rationing plans. In these instances and others, varying combinations of substantive complexity and political conflict render highly specific legislation infeasible and unlikely. Indeed, in these situations the choice is not between general legislation with the veto and specific legislation, but between general legislation with the veto and either no or severely limited legislation.

The contention that the veto is undesirable because it enhances the power of congressional staff overlooks important realities of the modern legislative process. Because a small body of elected representatives can perform only a limited amount of work, members must delegate responsibilities to their staff in order to expand legislative output sufficiently. The substantial growth of staff in the past several decades bears witness to this fact. It is true, therefore, the legislators will rely heavily on their staff in performing rigorous veto-based oversight. However, staff must also carry much of the burden in conducting traditional oversight, as well as in the normal legislative process. Critics of the veto would hardly argue for less detailed statutes on the grounds that staff gain policy influ-

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ence in preparing and reviewing detailed legislative proposals. Why, then, object to the veto because of the role staff now plays in Congress?

Finally, the argument that vetoes imposed on rulemaking might encourage reliance on other means of implementation has limited applicability. In many instances, agencies simply do not possess the choice; they must issue rules before making individual decisions. For example, this constraint existed in each of Bruff and Gellhorn's five case studies of the veto. Generally, the choice between rulemaking and adjudication as a means of developing policy is common under "old" regulatory statutes, but rulemaking is prescribed under most "new" enabling legislation. For instance, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, the Consumer Products Safety Commission, and the Environmental Protection Agency must issue rules before bringing actions against individuals in carrying out most of their statutory duties. In addition, several recent court decisions have strongly encouraged rulemaking in areas in which the choice of administrative procedure has traditionally been a matter of agency discretion.[35]

The Case for the Legislative Veto

As the preceding section has argued, critics of the legislative veto have exaggerated both the virtues of the administrative process and the defects of veto-based legislative oversight. However, the case for the veto does not rest merely on its critics' misconceptions; it rests primarily on its positive advantages as an oversight mechanism. Much rulemaking involves broad policy decisions, and one of the basic premises of the American political system is that elected representatives should control the substance of governmental action. The veto has advantages on two levels in this regard. In an immediate sense, the veto can lead to qualitatively better, more sensitive decisions. More broadly, the veto serves the goal of enhancing systemic legitimacy by enabling Congress to regain some of the power it has lost to administrative agencies during the twentieth century.

Opponents of the legislative veto have argued that agency employees are not subordinate to the president or Congress, but rather to the law.[36] In many cases, however, it is foolish to contend that "political influences" from elected officials will disturb the impartial pursuit of statutory intent, for clear intent does not exist. To use an example previously cited, Bruff and Gellhorn have been critical of constitutent-inspired influence by House and Senate committee members over the determination of family contribution schedules under the Basic Educational Opportunity Grants program. Yet the Office of Education enjoyed broad discretion in distributing grants to students under its statutory mandate. Such discretion resulted largely from disagreement in the conference committee over

[35] See, for example, *NLRB* v. *Bell Aerospace Company*, 416 U.S. 267 (1974).

[36] Richard E. Cohen, "Legislative Veto Battle Escalates—Should Congress Have the Last Word?" *National Journal*, 6 September 1980.

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how the program should be administered. As the authors admitted, the agency's rulemaking decisions involved "normative principles" that were "central to the equity of the grants.[37] Indeed, one of the major discontinuities in the critics' attack on the veto is their inclination to treat rulemaking as something that improves as it is removed from the normal processes of legislative politics, even though they concede that rulemaking often involves broad policy decisions that are not matters of expert knowledge.

In fact, then, agencies frequently make the law. In so doing, they make discretionary policy judgments that affect significant, often competing social interests. This is especially the case when agencies exercise rulemaking authority—a function often referred to as "quasi-legislation" or "administrative legislation." Indeed, one can easily identify examples of sweeping mandates from across the policy spectrum. Discretion is perhaps nowhere more broad than in the regulatory arena, where bureaucrats issue rules to accomplish such ends as the prevention of "deceptive practices in commerce" and "unreasonable risks to consumers," and where they control various industries on behalf of the "public convenience, interest, or necessity."

Legislative influence therefore may well improve the quality of administration where decisions involve significant policy issues. Congress is not perfectly representative in a number of important respects. However, it remains an institution composed of people with varied backgrounds, training, and experience, who are electorally accountable to diverse constituencies. Of necessity, Congress reflects and is accountable to a broad range of interests. In contrast, agencies frequently have been attacked for having narrow, biased orientations. Administrators often become tied to the goals of the programs they implement and to their own professional training and norms, to the exclusion of broader policy considerations. In this regard, students of the administrative process have become increasingly sympathetic to Harold Laski's view that "*expertise* consists in such an analytic comprehension of a special realm of facts that the power to see that realm in the perspective of totality is lost."[38] Another common theme of criticism is that agencies tend to become overly solicitous of narrow clientele interests. This phenomenon has led to charges that regulatory agencies are "captured" by the groups they were established to control. Although these criticisms have been overdone in many cases, they do contain important elements of truth, and indeed have been supported by a substantial amount of evidence.

A related advantage of reliance on the veto is that Congress, because of its structure and its traditional role in the political system, is simply more adept at accommodating competing interests than any agency. Lon Fuller has argued that there are essentially two modes of "social ordering"—"organization by common aims" and "organization by reciprocity."[39] As hierarchically structured

[37] Bruff and Gellhorn, "Congressional Control," 1383–84.
[38] Harold Laski, "The Limitations of the Expert," *Harper's Monthly Magazine* 162 (1930): 106.
[39] Lon Fuller, "The Forms and Limits of Adjudication," *Harvard Law Review* 92 (1978): 357–62.

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organizations, whose internal currency is formal legal authority, administrative bodies are designed with common aims in mind. That is, they are set up to make efficient, instrumental decisions in the pursuit of predefined objectives. In contrast, legislatures are designed to engage in organization by reciprocity. They are ideally suited to formulate policy goals by adjusting competing interests through the processes of bargaining and compromise. To be sure, agencies also must attempt to reconcile competing interests when they implement broad policymaking mandates. But the very structural characteristics that enhance their effectiveness in an instrumental sense detract from their effectiveness as political institutions. Ernst Freund recognized in 1928 the superiority of legislatures over agencies for making policy:

> The process of legislation gives play to all political forces and favorably admits the preponderating effect of political considerations. . . . A government department charged with framing regulations will consult parties in interest and representative bodies; what it cannot produce is the "political" atmosphere of parliamentary procedure with its attendant checks.[40]

As discussed earlier, the "judicialization" of administrative rulemaking procedures in recent years has exacerbated the inadequacy of agencies as policymaking institutions. For a variety of reasons, then, another round of politics in areas of rulemaking where delegations are broad and issues controversial does more to serve the assumptions and purposes of American politics than to negate them.

In a broader sense, the legislative veto may be regarded as a device that helps reconcile American government's need for both effective and legitimate policymaking. During the past fifty years, bureaucratic power has continually increased at the expense of congressional and presidential power because of pressures for action within the political system. In fact, this trend accelerated considerably during the 1960s and 1970s, notwithstanding Congress's attempts to write more specific legislation. The *Federal Register*, in which most rules, regulations, and other agency policy statements must be published, is often cited as a crude illustration of this point. In 1960, the *Register* contained 14,479 pages. By 1970, the figure had risen to 20,032; by 1975 to 60,221; and by 1980 this document totaled in excess of 87,000 pages. The problem with this development has been that, although spawned by public demands, the accretion of policymaking authority to nonelected officials has been widely perceived as illegitimate. Evidence of this perception can be seen daily in the media, in Congress, and wherever else public opinion manifests itself.

A critical need of the American political system is thus to find ways of adjusting its primary institutions to the imperatives of modern government—to find ways of adapting its structures and processes to enhance its capacity to act in

[40] Ernst Freund, *Administrative Power Over Persons and Property* (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1928), 220–21.

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a timely and comprehensive manner, while maintaining the representative quality of such action. The veto, because of the manner in which it combines executive initiative and congressional control, offers distinctive and substantial advantages in this regard.

On the one hand, the ability to reserve veto control can induce Congress to maintain or extend the levels of discretion that executive officials need if they are effectively to pursue national policy goals. The veto tempers congressional inclinations to obstruct or cripple the executive's capacity to act in policy areas that are novel or turbulent, and hence highly resistant to detailed statutory guidance. The use of the veto with respect to impoundment, war powers, energy policy, military arms sales, and FTC rules serve as good illustrations. In stable policy areas, the veto provides incentives for Congress to adjust its processes to national needs and to the demands imposed by its growing workload. For example, the veto may be used as a substitute for line-item authorization and appropriation in a variety of project and contract areas, as well as in the area of executive reorganization.

On the other hand, the veto provides Congress with a timely, flexible, and potent means of review and control. The veto serves as an innovative and valuable oversight option in areas in which substantive or political complexities make it difficult to constrain discretion in advance, as well as in areas in which the character of administrative performance *per se* makes it difficult to alter the impact of past decisions. Although one should avoid endorsing all forms or uses of the veto or dismissing the virtues of traditional oversight mechanisms, it is nonetheless true that control through regular legislative and appropriations processes may be too blunt and general in some cases or too narrow and constricting in others to match the veto in efficiency or effectiveness. This point applies generally, but especially to rulemaking. Moreover, control through the veto has an added advantage that its critics overlook. In contrast to informal processes of committee-agency interaction and influence that often fill the interstices left open by traditional oversight mechanisms, the veto can be structured both to require reporting and decision-making on the floor and to protect the president's prerogatives with respect to the bureaucracy. In short, the veto can be institutionalized an an instrument of the whole, both in the legislative and executive processes.

In summary, the veto provides one of the most effective mechanisms for helping Congress adapt to the demands of modern government. It frees Congress from the need to choose between impairing the executive's capacity for action and ceding its ability to control basic policy choices. At the same time, the veto confers benefits upon the executive as well. For example, James L. Sundquist has concluded that a dismissal of the veto generically as an oversight mechanism "would bring to the executive more loss than gain."[41] He has affirmed what has

[41] James L. Sundquist, *The Decline And Resurgence of Congress* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1981), 356–60.

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been argued here; that wholesale reliance on traditional mechanisms "would add to the burden on the Congress, would make relations between the branches more cumbersome, and would lead to a net reduction in the authority Congress would be willing to delegate."[42]

It is true, of course, that the veto involves Congress more intimately in the implementation of law than would be the case without it. However, this result is neither surprising nor undesirable, since modern government often requires that executive officers be delegated decisions that are so highly determinative of basic policy goals that they are "legislative" in terms of constitutional intent. If substantial delegations of authority and discretion to executive officers must be permitted in order to preserve the American political system's capacity for action, new forms of legislative review and control must be permitted in order to preserve the legitimacy of a system based on tying such action to consent.

Conclusion

Attacks on the veto often involve biases against politics in favor of executive or administrative wisdom, as well as static and conventional conceptions of what constitutes sound institutional practice. Opponents of the veto often ignore the fact that many implementation decisions (especially rulemaking) are essentially political in nature. Yet if this is true, the primary issue reduces to a simple and classic one—should legislators or administrators be trusted with making the basic policy decisions in the framework of government established by the Constitution? In addition, opponents should perhaps be reminded that the role of parties in the American political system, the use of the president's veto for policy purposes, presidential bill drafting and bargaining in the legislative process, and continuing oversight by congressional committees all at one time or another violated conventional conceptions of sound practice and were bitterly attacked. Yet all these innovations, representing adaptations to institutional needs, have survived and have subsequently been regarded as tolerable and even essential.

In defending the veto generically, we have emphasized that not all of its forms and uses are equally desirable. This is a separate and complex problem. However, the preceding discussion points to several broad guidelines that merit brief mention.

First, though the character and dimensions of committee and agency power do not justify rejection of the veto mechanism *per se*, they constitute factors that should guide its usage. To protect the prerogatives of the presidency and Congress, the veto should generally be structured to require administrative officers to report through the president and to vest the affirmation or negation of administrative proposals in one or both houses, not in committees. In addition, executive proposals should be rendered immune to amendment, veto pro-

[42] *Ibid.*, 360.

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posals should be guaranteed access to the floor, and the veto should be used to control policy decisions that are salient to large numbers of members rather than to small or restricted groups.

Second, though the legislative process exists as the best location for policy-making, congress must share discretionary authority with administrative officials, both for reasons of its own limited time and for reasons of administrative effectiveness. This was true in 1789, and of course, it is even more imperative today. Congress's problem, therefore, is not how to monopolize all discretionary decision-making power, but how to preserve its ability to make the most critical policy decisions while still providing for the implementation of its policy goals. Given this formulation of the problem, use of the veto should be constrained by the importance of the policy decisions involved, the need for administrative flexibility, and the adequacy of other mechanisms. Thus, for example, the narrower the scope of the decision-making proposed for veto control, the clearer it must be that important policy benefits in terms of control are involved and that the veto exists as the most practical and effective means of attaining them.

It must be admitted that the criteria outlined above do not provide absolute or definitive answers to specific issues of veto structure or usage. The absence of such answers is not surprising, given the necessarily subjective character of terms such as "benefits" and "importance." Nor should we expect to find such answers if we truly understand democratic politics. Nonetheless, it is hoped that these criteria will frame the discussion in a useful manner and direct attention and debate to the issue of how best to use the veto, rather than to whether it is inherently ill-suited to the needs of government in modern America.

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Book Reviews

Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy: Autonomy vs. Control *by Robert A. Dahl. New Haven, Conn., Yale University Press, 1982. 229 pp. $18.50.*

As set forth elegantly on the first page, the central premise of this volume is that democracy on a large scale is unthinkable without autonomous private organizations. The rights accorded to citizens by democratic governments make it not simply possible but advantageous to organize for joint political ends. Moreover, not only does democracy spawn autonomous political parties and interest groups, but such organizations protect democracy by minimizing domination and securing the very liberties that nurture their existence. Although democracy is impossible without them, such independent associations—if uncontrolled—have the potential to do great mischief. Indeed, autonomous political organizations create at least four serious problems for democratic government: by freezing out the unorganized, they reinforce existing political, social, and economic inequalities; by amplifying the expression of particularistic points of view, they impede the consideration of broadly shared interests; by dominating the process by which acceptable political alterations are defined, they distort the public agenda; by appropriating public functions, they become private governments which citizens cannot effectively render accountable. Thus, a pivotal question for democracy becomes the degree to which such organizations should be subject to control and the degree to which they should be left alone.

Because serious students of democracy have been ruminating about the problem of organizational pluralism at least since James Madison warned of the dangers of faction in *Federalist No. 10*, Dahl is not attempting to map hitherto uncharted terrain. Rather, by stating the question with clarity and elaborating it with care and grace, Dahl succeeds in consolidating his own thinking over a period spanning nearly three decades about democracy. In so doing he managers both to defend against his critics the cogency of his own previous analyses and to demonstrate that he has learned from them. With respect to the former, there is very little in the way of the settling of scores; only in an

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appendix does he take on his detractors directly for what he perceives, seemingly justifiably, to be their misreading of the degree to which so-called pluralist theory minimizes inequalities among citizens. With respect to the latter, his discussions both of the setting of the political agenda and the cooptation of public functions by corporations reveal his ability to incorporate into his own thinking telling points made by others.

Two chapters bear special mention. Starting from the proposition that many of the effects that are ascribed to democratic pluralism reflect American scholars' concentration on the American case, Dahl undertakes a brief cross-national survey in Chapter 4. Focusing on differences among polities with respect to the nature of social conflict, the structure of political institutions, and the character of the autonomous organizations themselves, he concludes that certain of the peculiarities of American politics—most notably the absence of a socialist alternative—cannot justifiably be attributed to the vigor of the organizational pluralism in the American context. In the final chapter he concentrates exclusively on the United States and discusses how some of the pernicious consequences of democratic pluralism, in particular the extent of economic inequalities, might be ameliorated.

The expansiveness both of Dahl's subject and of the erudition that he brings to it is somewhat double-edged. On the one hand, Dahl demonstrates once again that he is capable of thinking harder about fundamental issues than any other student of contemporary democracy. On the other, the very enormity of his enterprise forces him to dismiss too readily what are, in themselves, complicated subsidiary issues. He devotes, for example, only a couple of sentences (p.171) to the effects of large campaign contributions on the behavior of legislators and concludes that the influence of big campaign money is often overestimated. Scholars in the field, however, have reached no consensus on this question and would probably hold that additional inquiry and debate are needed. Furthermore, while the breadth of Dahl's reading is nothing shy of stunning, additional footnotes would have rendered this volume more helpful to those of us who are regrettably less professionally literate. Still, there are minor qualms about a volume that is essential reading for anyone who takes democracy seriously.

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Felix Frankfurter and His Times: The Reform Years *by Michael E. Parrish. New York, Free Press, 1982. 330 pp. $17.95.*

The Enigma of Felix Frankfurter *by H. N. Hirsch. New York, Basic Books, 1981. 253 pp. $14.95.*

He was *sui generis*! He veritably sparkled with intellect, ideas, intelligence, charm, wit, sarcasm, nastiness, warmth, friendship, and ambition. Yet "F.F." never achieved on his beloved Supreme Court perch, where he served with indubitable distinction for almost a quarter of a century, what he most wanted to achieve: court leadership with domi-

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nance—not the chief justiceship, to be sure, but the kind of blend of jurisprudential and personal leadership that would have been his Nirvana. That distinction went to Hugo Black, a sometime ally but more often adversary who Felix Frankfurter underrated, in terms not of Black's political skills, but of the quality of his mind.

Nonetheless, "F.F." was a towering figure on the American educational, legal, governmental, judicial, and political scene for half a century. He never held a public post other than associate justice of the Supreme Court, yet his influence, informed by one of the best brains in his adopted America's history, and his ability to befriend as well as to ingratiate himself with figures of power both in and out of government, rendered him an actor and powerful behind-the-scenes influence on the stage of government and politics in a way unlike almost any other contemporary. His achievements—his stamp on seminal aspects of the New Deal; his role in furthering a Jewish homeland; his labors on behalf of America's aid and comfort on the side of Britain (second only in his affection to the former); his enhancement of civil rights and liberties; his role in placing the finest young men—mostly with a Harvard Law School background—in critical governmental posts ("Felix's Happy Hot Dogs" they were styled, either approvingly or derisively); all remain a tribute to his remarkable energy, his resolve, his brains, and his ambition as a major influence in what he deemed to be best for his beloved America—and, in most instances, it was for the best.

"Felix has more ideas per minute than any man of my acquaintance," marveled FDR on one occasion. "He has a brilliant mind but it clicks so fast it makes my head fairly spin. I find him tremendously interesting and stimulating" (Parrish, p. 202). FDR's head of the National Recovery Administration (NRA), General Hugh Johnson, declared flatly that F.F. was "the most influential single individual in the United States" (Parrish, p. 220-21). The journalist John Franklin Carter, observing the marvelous relationship between FDR and F.F., commented that "Felix, more than any other person, is the legal master-mind of the New Deal" (ibid., 221). It is needless to relate that not all shared such encomia. The Boston "establishment," with some important exceptions, considered him a pushy, loathsome, radical upstart. Segments of the press likened him to Shakespeare's Iago, others suggested comparisons with Rasputin or Cardinal Richelieu. He was loved and hated; he never failed to invoke strong feelings—and he was delighted to do so. Quick to be critical of "dodos" and "shallow intellects," his closest friends and those he admired were among America's giants, and it was to them that he brought his abiding affection. Above all, he loved "Frank" (FDR), the last name he whispered on his death bed—"tell them I loved America, tell them I loved F.D.R." Not far behind in his loyal and enduring affections stood Henry L. Stimson, Oliver Wendell Holmes, and Louis D. Brandeis.

These traits, facts, assumptions, and characteristics of the Viennese immigrant who rose to achieve the American dream are engagingly chronicled in the two important books at issue, albeit on entirely different levels. Parrish's tome is historical analysis at its best—ably organized and chronicled, faithfully reported and analyzed, informative, well written, a happy blend of straightforward account and anecdote. If the promised second volume on "Frankfurter, the Judge" will be similarly successful—there are some

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signs in the first volume that it may prove to be a considerably more formidable task for the historian—we may well see a definitive F.F. biography at last.

Although the book by H. N. Hirsch, a political scientist, is clearly the more original, intriguing, and challenging, and indeed the more fascinating, its admitted design as "judicial psychobiography" renders it a rather controversial approach to an explanation of what Hirsch styles "the enigma" of F.F. The work's central hypothesis, in the author's own words, is that "Frankfurter can only be understood politically if we understand him psychologically, and that we can understand him psychologically as representing a textbook case of a neurotic personality: someone whose self-image is overblown and yet, at the same time, essential to his sense of well-being" (p. 5). A quick, though grantedly glib, response might be: "So what, aren't we all a bit neurotic?" Be that as it may, drawing on the theories of personality propounded by the psychologists Karen Horney and Erik Erikson, Hirsch proves his hypothesis with skill and stylistic elegance. He brings F.F. alive, and he catalogues and analyzes his undisputed achievements faithfully, convincingly, with style and élan. His conclusions that "judicial outcomes cannot be wrenched out of the context of a man's life" and that "a member of the Court is not a composite of juridical abstractions but a complex individual of flesh and blood" (p. 211) are beyond dispute. Hirsch demonstrates that fact of life well. As F.F. himself, in one of his oft quoted aphorisms, remarked: "Judges are men, not disembodied spirits; as men they respond to human situations." And how! Indeed, it is common sense. . . .

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The New Deal Lawyers *by Peter H. Irons. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1982. 351 pp. $19.50.*

Irons's goal is to show how the New Deal served as a forge on which Edward S. Corwin's "Constitutional Revolution, Ltd.," was hammered out. The 1930s provided a rich atmosphere for developing legal doctrine. Young and talented lawyers, imbued with the tenets of legal realism and the belief that the law could be used to promote social good rather than to obstruct it, found opportunities to put their ideas and values in motion through the myriad agencies that needed staffing during the Great Depression. Felix Frankfurter personified this movement and the changes it wrought. If he was not the legal manager of the New Deal, it was not for lack of trying. Frankfurter knew the graduates from the elite triad of Harvard, Yale, and Columbia law schools, and through carefully developed contacts was able to find niches for many of them in Franklin Roosevelt's administration. To a remarkable degree the "Happy Hot Dogs," while far from being his clones, shared Frankfurter's mixture of adherence to industry, idealism, and effective lawyering. It was they who were mostly responsible for the doctrinal changes that occurred. Basically, these changes involved broadening the commerce clause and eliminating liberty of contract as a sacred due process right—the same reforms that Frankfurter suggested be achieved by constitutional amendment in 1936.

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Irons makes clear why so much time and effort was required to bring about seemingly modest change. While talented and eager, New Deal layers were often inexperienced in the beginning and found themselves overmatched against the cream of the corporate bar. In addition, counsel was often divided, or even fragmented, as to abilities, objectives, and ardor. This unfortunate condition was worsened by bureaucratic jealousy, particularly on the part of Homer Cummings's Justice Department, and by FDR's proclivity for setting up administrative cockpits. For example, Agricultural Adjustment Administration (AAA) Counsel Jerome Frank was confronted by AAA's director, George Peek, a spokesman for agribusiness. Finally, Republicans, like their Federalist predecessors of 1800, were ensconced in the federal judiciary. Often, the judge hearing a case had, as an attorney, represented the kinds of small business clients who, under the aegis of the Liberty League, were challenging New Deal legislation. The result was, as Irons points out, that federal courts rather than congressional halls or presidential campaigns served as the primary arena for ideological confrontation between the New Deal advocates and opponents. Given these circumstances, the irony of Hamiltonian constitutional doctrine being used to overwhelm Alexander Hamilton's political heirs, several generations removed, is inescapable.

In a format used in another context by James David Barber, Irons focuses on the general counsels of three New Deal agencies: Donald Richberg of the National Recovery Administration (NRA); Jerome Frank of the Agricultural Administration; and Charles Fahy of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). Adherence to this plan meant that some of the most interesting and colorful of New Deal lawyers, such as William O. Douglas, are not considered. In the same vein of restraint, *New Deal Lawyers* is not a social profile of the "Boys with Their Hair Ablaze," enlightening and entertaining as such an exercise might be. For admirably confining himself to the chore at hand, Irons is rewarded by achieving a sharply lined picture of constitutional doctrine in the making. Each of his chosen agencies serves as a model, with their legal captains creating teams in their own images and politicians gravitating to NRA, legal reformers to AAA, and legal craftsmen to the NLRB. From that juncture, we can watch the selection of strategies and tactics, creation of argument, ordering of precedent, and finally judges' decisions and opinions unfold in response to economic, social, and political pressures, always allowing for personal differences. In short, Irons has written a model constitutional history.

DONALD M. ROPER
State University of New York at New Paltz

Planning a Tragedy: The Americanization of the War in Vietnam *by Larry Berman. New York, W.W. Norton and Co., 1982. 203 pp. $14.95.*

Post-mortem reports on the Vietnam War proliferate. It used to be said that every English professor in the country hoped to write the "great American novel." Nowadays,

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historians and political scientists vie for the honor or writing *the* book that will explain Vietnam. Bookshelves groan under the weight of their efforts.

But Larry Berman has written a slim volume, focusing on the 28 July 1965 decision to commit 125,000 land troops to the war. Actually it was a non-decision, in the sense that Lyndon Johnson had made up his mind earlier not to consider any alternative. The advisory process was used, argues Berman, simply to legitimize a prior decision to both political elites and the general public. The reason is not hard to find. Johnson was afraid that if America lost in Vietnam in the summer of 1965, the Great Society would do down as well. In a perverse sort of way, a bad military decision became the best of all political decisions "for a president who still dreamed of increasing his legislative scorecard" (p. 145).

Was Vietnam simply "Mr. Johnson's War"? Berman is persuasive in arguing that LBJ lacked the self-confidence to buck the advice offered by the powerful Kennedy holdovers, Robert McNamara and Dean Rusk, who in turn were seconded by the whole national security planning apparatus that had grown up in the cold war. He preferred to hide in the middle, as Berman puts it. When the troop decision was made, Johnson did not go before the nation to declare a national emergency, he did not mobilize the reserves, he did not even give a speech. Instead, the decision became known to the public through an afternoon press conference.

Yes, Johnson had doubts. He feared triggering some hidden agreement between Russia and China; and he questioned whether Westerners could successfully fight Asians in jungle rice paddies. He also heard powerful arguments against the decision from George Ball. Perhaps, therefore, the question should be turned around. In the face of his desire to forge a domestic record worthy of Mount Rushmore, and in the face of his own doubts, why did LBJ have the confidence to go ahead in Vietnam?

Berman, like many others, sees the key turning point in 1963, with the overthrow and assassination of Ngo Dinh Diem. After that, it was almost impossible to get out. Having made it plain to the South Vietnamese generals that Diem had to go, Washington was trapped in its own advice. Yet there was something else. It was impossible for Johnson's advisors to believe that the North Vietnamese would really continue the war, once it had been made plain to them that American power was committed. Maxwell Taylor, for example, recorded his astonishment that Hanoi fought on, accepting losses that, by Western calculations, greatly exceeded the value of the stake involved.

McGeorge Bundy, who at one point recalled Eisenhower's supposed success in breaking the prisoners-of-war impasse with an atomic threat, later conceded that while the president was indeed the chief actor in the 28 July decision, "everyone else has his share of responsibility" (p. 143). So many things flowed from the assumption that North Vietnam would realize the folly of trying to defeat America: the troop decision was only the beginning. Then came the escalation of the air campaign, and, most important, the fear of dissent at home.

McGeorge Bundy put it this way: "The world, the country, and the Vietnamese people would have alarming reactions if we got out" (p. 110). Larry Berman has succeeded in focusing our minds not simply on the summer of 1965, but on the larger tragedy as well. This book will make an excellent classroom teaching device, as it will challenge students

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and teachers alike. It is well written, and full of the "courtroom" drama of National Security Council meetings. Berman also makes excellent use of interviews with the leading figures. All in all, a fine effort.

LLOYD C. GARDNER
Rutgers University

To the Lesser Heights of Morningside: A Memoir *by Rexford G. Tugwell. Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982. 264 pp. $25.00.*

This posthumously published volume spans the years 1911–33 and closes a gap in Tugwell's previous autobiographical writings. In 1911, already twenty, he entered the Wharton School in Philadelphia. His story here runs through the months between Roosevelt's election in 1932 and inauguration in March 1933. Tugwell was in his eighties—born 10 July 1891—when he composed those well-tempered reminiscences. Leon H. Keyerling, an undergraduate student of his at Columbia, later a collaborator on two books and a longtime personal friend, contributes an appreciative Introduction. Otis L. Graham, Jr., also a one-time student, and historian of twentieth century American political currents, undertakes in a perceptive Afterword to locate Tugwell in these streams. He sees a persistent ambivalence in Tugwell's thought.

The book covers three main periods: his undergraduate and graduate year at Wharton and Penn, the latter interrupted for two years during World War I; then his teaching years at Columbia; and finally, his growing involvement in the New Deal. He confines this story to his professional development and career, apart from explaining that his father was a prosperous upstate New York businessman.

He opens with an altogether charming, nostalgic account of his college life. Wharton was a school for cultivating an elite, "young men of inherited intellect, means and refinment, [*sic*]" so its founder wrote (p. 6). Young Tugwell ate it up, exploring and excelling in English composition. But his interests soon focused on economics and contemporary social problems as he came under the influence of two economists, both heretics in their separate ways. Simon N. Patten, German-trained and philosophical, attempted to see civilizations whole. Scott Nearing, an activist reformer, was morally outraged at social injustices and pious hypocrisy. In 1915, Nearing's appointment was terminated, an academic *cause célèbre* that soured Wharton for Tugwell, who reprints here Charles Beard's famous letter of resignation and denunciation to the Columbia trustees over a similar case (p. 152).

Restless, he took an appointment at the University of Washington, Seattle, in 1917. It lasted only a few months, just long enough to give him a close-up view of the International Workers of the World ("Wobblies") forest workers. Carlton Hubbell Parker, the labor economist who had attracted him there, died in midyear. Barred by chronic asthma from military service, he went overseas as an ambulance driver in France, and so was in Paris at the war's end.

Back home in New York, after an unsatisfying spell of managing the family farm, he

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decided, against the advice of the new chairman at Penn, Ernest Minor Patterson—who judged him to be more activist than scholar—to resume graduate work; but he readily accepted an instructorship at Columbia. There he quickly becme a popular teacher and took a leading part in the development of a college-wide introductory course in social studies that presently acquired a wide reputation: Contemporary Civilization. But he found senior colleagues, Wesley C. Mitchell excepted, uninspiring, and pursued outside interests. One of these, agricultural economics, led him to join a summer-long tour of the Soviet Union in 1927 to study the impact of Communist rule on peasant's lives and the workings of *Gosplan*. It marked him as a radical thereafter.

His part in the Brains Trust has previously been told. A major achievement was to develop and sell his agriculatural adjustment and domestic allotment plan—not least of all to a reluctant president who was getting contrary advice, by way of Henry Morgenthau, from economists at "Cornell, the bastion of reaction in agricultural policy" (p. 238).

Advice, and temporary emergency service in Washington, were one thing; actually leaving Columbia, even its "lesser heights," was a traumatic experience, he says. He quotes advice against the move from a smiling senior colleague, "a Columbia professor can't be promoted."

HARVEY C. MANSFIELD, SR.
Columbia University

The President's Agenda: Domestic Policy Choice from Kennedy to Carter *by Paul C. Light. Baltimore, Md., Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982. 246 pp. $17.95.*

Students of such political institutions as the presidency and Congress are regularly stymied by a problem that restricts interest in their work to a handful of other specialists: granting the inherent importance of powerful institutions, how can they be studied in such a way that in understanding them we understand something about the broader social system of which they are a part? To break through the walls that make the study of institutions a rather insular subfield of already highly specialized disciplines would seem to require some macro-social theory that specifies what is important to know about political institutions and how such institutions fit into the overall framework of relations that together make up the social system under investigation, and that ties the results of such research to the intellectual labors of other scholars attempting to understand and explain complex social systems. How, in other words, can the parochialism of presidential studies be overcome unless students of the presidency (and institutions generally) start with a general theory of politics? Typically, institutional specialists do not begin with such a theory. Just as typically, their work is more or less rapidly outdated by the passage of time and events.

To be sure, some students of the presidency have attempted to raise general questions. But this is far different from proceeding from a general theory of politics. Richard

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Neustadt's focus on power or Clinton Rossiter's emphasis on presidential roles achieve unusual breadth for institutional studies, but they tend to yield generalizations that are both highly problematic and confined to the institution under examination. Such studies yield a literature on the presidency that is divided into works that stress the broad scope of presidential power (such as Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.'s *Imperial Presidency*) or that stress the problematic nature of such power. But the literature says relatively little about how the presidency as a political institution ties into a capitalist political economy, an industrial or post-industrial society, or an international system of conflict between regimes that are dominantly capitalist and those that are not.

Light's book is a recent case in point. This book is a competent and at times insightful study of how presidents since John Kennedy have tried to set the domestic policy agenda. Based on interviews with 126 (rather disgruntled) former White House staffers, the author draws on organizational theory to shed light on the internal dynamics of agenda setting. In the process one learns some rather mundane things (such as "Presidents must cope with fixed limits on internal and external resources as well as on both the timing and the size of the domestic agenda" [p. 225]). But the most noteworthy finding is not that "policy is the result of organizational dynamics" (p. 199) but that, in Light's view, the restraints on presidential power are so great that there has emerged what he calls the "no win Presidency." In short, after detailed inspection of the frustrations and difficulties facing the presidency in terms of resources, issues, ideas, alternatives, and priorities, the central issue raised by this study has relatively little to do with how presidents set agendas and everything to do with the broad system within which they employ their sharply limited agenda-setting resources.

Findings such as these have been repeated in enough studies of the internal dynamics of political institutions to suggest that "decision-making" and organizational theory perspectives are likely to continue to yield relatively arid generalizations about questions of interest mainly to professional president-watchers. It remains to be seen whether studies that break out of the traditional mold will tell us more about the systemic issues that might be raised in the context of presidential studies, but it seems reasonably clear that unless such efforts are made, the accumulation of literature will continue to outstrip the cumulation of broad political, economic, and social understanding.

JOHN F. MANLEY
Stanford University

Security in the Persian Gulf: The Role of Outside Powers *by Shahram Chubin. Totowa, N.J., Allenheld Osmun and Co., 1982. 180 pp. $10.00.*

Shahram Chubin has written an excellent book on the relationships that have developed between the "outside powers" (primarily the United States and the Soviet Union) and the Persian Gulf states. In the final contribution to a four-volume series (published for the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London) on "Security in the Persian Gulf," Chubin seeks to explain the nature of politico-military relations among the superpowers

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and regional states considered by Washington and Moscow to be potentially valuable allies. The author argues that the nature of modern challenges to the stability of Gulf states is complex and is not effectively addressed by the traditional diplomatic and military prescriptions on which the superpowers have historically relied.

The most valuable section of the book is its opening chapter, "The Record of Outside Power Influence," which includes discussions of U.S. relations with Iran and with Saudi Arabia and a third section on Soviet relations with Iraq. The three cases are set in stark contrast to each other. Chubin argues that the U.S. eagerness to cement an arms-supply relationship with the pre-revolutionary regime in Tehran also created a dependency that Washington had hoped to exploit in a larger attempt to manipulate the Shah's policies and those of the successor revolutionary government. That hope disappeared in the political and social transformation that solidified the Ayatollah Khomeini's position.

The discussion of U.S.-Saudi relations emphasizes indigenous and regional pressures to which the Saudis must respond, as well as Riyadh's wielding of the "oil weapon." Although the former will continue to affect Saudi policy toward the U.S., the potency of the oil weapon has been considerably eroded by economic alterations in the international oil market. The struggle within the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) to achieve a consensus on levels of price and production will reduce the aggregate economic leverage of the cartel and, more particularly, the previously unchallenged Saudi leadership of OPEC.

As Chubin suggests, the Saudis will be inevitably caught in the dilemma of accepting U.S. military aid while assuring the Arab rejectionist states that a close relationship with Washington will alter neither Riyadh's condemnation of a U.S.-Israeli alliance nor Saudi refusal to endorse the Camp David process.

In Chapter 2, "The Superpower Contributions to Conflict Management," Chubin offers a theoretical discussion to categorize both the range of conflict contingencies and "superpower instruments." Such attempts are difficult particularly at the micro-level where, for example, one must distinguish between a variety of inter-state conflicts. On the macro-level, one can develop a useful analysis of the comparative utility of superpower instruments in regional versus extra-regional aggression. Chubin's discussion here is strained, however, due in part to a rather sterile lexicon that fails to capture the subtle and complex political dynamics of the region. The best part of this chapter is an analysis of Soviet interests in the region, and the region's potential vulnerabilities. As Chubin correctly asserts, Soviet proximity to the Gulf, its lack of dependence on Arabian oil, and its historically proven skill and taste for covert politico-military operations, all combine to increase the potential for Soviet influence in the region.

In sum, Chubin has produced a sophisticated and illuminating study. Scholars will find the detailed historical sections almost unique and thus a valuable contribution to the literature. Analysts will find the work useful as well, but might regret that the author did not expand the analytical parameters of the book to include a discussion of the potential role of other outside powers (the European nations, for example), whose potential influence in the region remains largely unexplored.

JED SNYDER
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars

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Dictatorships and Double Standards: Rationalism and Reason in Politics *by Jeane J. Kirkpatrick. New York, Simon and Schuster, 1982. 270 pp. $14.95.*

Those who wonder if any "theory" informs the practice of the Reagan administration will greet this collection of essays with considerable interest. Like other volumes that include disparate works published over a twenty-year period, this one has a disjointed quality. The organizing principle of "rationalism" in foreign and domestic affairs does not really unify the vast field of politics that the current U.N. ambassador seeks to illuminate. Yet her blunt prose and no-nonsense style propels the text forward.

The book should really be subtitled "Memoirs of a Disaffected Democrat." Much of it is an unremitting diatribe against the electoral reforms of the Democratic party that the author blames for the subsequent disarray of party politics in the United States. Her already familiar attack on the naïveté of the Carter entourage for its handling of foreign policy rests in part on a dubious distinction between "authoritarian" and "totalitarian" regimes, a distinction that many have found dangerous rather than simply pedantic or eccentric. Indeed, events in El Salvador, among other places, do little to enhance the credibility of this allegedly crucial difference, as the Republicans struggle with many of the same intractable conflicts that plagued the Democrats.

After the debacles in Iran and Nicaragua, observers may initially sympathize with the author's insistence that the United States should refrain from destabilizing certain governments in the mistaken view that they will be succeeded by presumably more "moderate" elements favorable to American interests. But practitioners especially will be disappointed if they expect to find in her ruminations a thorough analysis of the local conditions in much of the world that frustrate American objectives, regardless of the party in power in Washington. Equally, commentators may applaud her statement that "bad ideas have bad consequences" (p. 8), while they find that the present administration is even more devoid of good ideas than the predecessor she excoriates here.

Kirkpatrick's denunciation of President Carter's appeal to moral verities would be more convincing if she explored in some detail the domestic turmoil that made the American public receptive to such pleas after the Nixon era, even though these "home-truths" proved so debilitating subsequently. She partially redeems herself by noting that "in undertaking the use of power to enhance freedom or equality, modesty and caution are surely the appropriate posture" (p. 214).

Since the Reagan administration need yield to none in its "ideological" orientation toward a host of foreign and domestic issues like arms control, inflation, toxic waste, or international trade, readers must hope that, once out of office, Kirkpatrick will turn her caustic eye on the policymakers who are now her colleagues and superiors.

LINDA B. MILLER
Wellesley College

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The Politician: The Life and Times of Lyndon Johnson—The Drive for Power, from the Frontier to Master of the Senate *by Ronnie Dugger. New York, W.W. Norton and Co., 1982. 514 pp. $18.95.*

The season of Lyndon B. Johnson is upon us. Ten years after his presidential library at the University of Texas opened its doors and its shelves to researchers, a spate of books has appeared on the life of perhaps the foremost modern practitioner of the art of politics. In contrast to the "Trumania" and "Ikeophilia" currently in vogue, so far there has been no "Lyndonslide" of adulation. Although numerous monographs await to be written on nearly every phase of Johnson's abundant career, especially the presidential era, several biographers have undertaken the arduous task of giving meaning to the sixty-five years that the Texas lived. Their results have not increased LBJ's popularity.

Ronnie Dugger, editor of the liberal *Texas Observer*, is part muckraker and part historian. The portrait he paints does not flatter its subject, and the figure who emerges in the finished canvas is unattractive. Dugger draws an image mainly in black and white, revealing few shades of gray. The sketch depicts the Johnson of greed and generosity, rudeness and charm, ruthlessness and compassion, idealism and cynicism. Above all, it illustrates a man who placed enormous energy into acquiring political power both for his own and the general good; however, the former usually took precedence. Concern for public power was shoved aside by the necessity of courting gas and oil interests; sympathy for working people yielded to anti-unionism; and thoughts of postwar co-operation with the Soviets degenerated into red-baiting and cold warfare. Thus, as congressman and senator, Lyndon Johnson ebbed and flowed with liberal and conservative tides.

Nevertheless, this book is not so much a personal indictment of Johnson as it is a critique of the culture that spawned him. Although Johnson helped forge most of what Dugger finds wrong with domestic and foreign policy since the 1930s the author argues that LBJ epitomized the values of his Texas heritage. He explains the policy in Vietnam as an outgrowth of the experience of Johnson's pioneer forebearers with Indians on the frontier and the "never-say-die" bravado of the Texas Rangers. Such historical determinism ventures too far when Dugger attributes LBJ's brand of foreign policy to an "Alamo" mentality. After all, despite his escalation of the war in Southeast Asia, Johnson finally refused to fight to the death, symbolically or otherwise. Furthermore, it is difficult to understand how his early, first-hand familiarity with electoral chicanery in the Lone Star State later figured into the president's dedication to the concept of free elections in Vietnam.

Primarily an overview of Johnson before 1954, this book separates fact from the kind of fiction associated with the beginning years of American presidents. Occasional digressions in the text on nuclear armageddon and the bankruptcy of liberal capitalism are annoying, but these passages do pose thoughtful questions concerning the past and present. Clearly, Dugger has little respect for politicians such as Johnson, but he is bothered as much by the system that nurtures them. "In Johnson's career and period," he declares, "we can plainly see that conventional politics is just the puppet show of economic power" (p. 13). Johnson surely was the consummate politician Dugger de-

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scribes. However, the author exaggerates in attributing nearly all of his actions, including his marriage to Lady Bird, to political designs. Like it or not, the drive and adaptability of LBJ lifted him to the highest elected office in the land, while other contemporary southerners of considerable talents such as Huey Long, Maury Maverick, Sam Rayburn, and Richard Russell came up short. Whether this selection process turned out for the better or worse, readers of the promised second volume will have to judge.

STEVEN F. LAWSON
University of South Florida

The Hidden-Hand Presidency *by Fred I. Greenstein. New York, Basic Books, 1982. 286 pp. $16.95.*

Harry Truman once argued that "nobody will be able to assess my administration until about 30 years after I'm dead." Truman's Rule (that is, that time is on the side of presidents) is certainly working for Eisenhower. Fred Greenstein, Henry Luce Professor of Politics, Law and Society at Princeton University, has produced a study of Eisenhower's leadership style that refutes Clinton Rossiter's 1956 description of Ike as an "elegant amateur" (*The American Presidency*, 1956, p. 28) and Richard Neustadt's verdict that Ike "neither liked the game he was engaged in nor had gained much understanding of its rules" (*Presidential Power: The Politics of Influence from FDR to Carter*, 1980, p. 121).

Greenstein relies on recently available sources, including correspondence, phone transcripts, minutes of meetings, records of Ike's confidential secretary, and Eisenhower's diary, all of which "provide a glimpse of Eisenhower's leadership from *his* perspective and from that of his associates or at least sometime political allies" (p. 10). Greenstein uses these sources to provide a view of the presidency from the inside, restricted to strategy, tactics, and style, rather than offering a complete history of the Eisenhower administration.

Greenstein's thesis is straightforward. Eisenhower recognized that there were two aspects to the presidency: the symbolic head of state, whose legitimacy and authority must be protected; and the effective head of government, who must work with autonomous centers of power in Congress and the departments, and must deal with domestic and foreign constituencies. Ike played the visible role of head of state to the hilt, drawing on his popularity and prestige as military commander, while pretending to be above the political battles. But he would attempt to govern, and would do so using five specific techniques of leadership. These he had learned and applied in several different settings, most notably the European theater during World War II.

First, using the technique of "hidden-hand" leadership, Eisenhower operated as "a politician with apolitical protective coloration" (pp. vii–viii). He actively bargained, persuaded, and negotiated with other politicians, but kept his activities confidential. Second, Eisenhower used language instrumentally. He was deliberate, precise, logical (and grammatical) in his public addresses, when he sought public support. But he was

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obtuse, obfuscating, and masterfully asyntactical when it suited his purposes—which it did to throw his critics off the path.

Third, Eisenhower had two rules of conduct—never criticize others in public, and never engage in conflict based on personalities. But his fourth technique was to base all his political maneuvers on a close and careful reading of the personalities and characters of his friends and foes.

Finally, Eisenhower selectively delegated authority. His assignments maximized the contributions his subordinates could make, based on their own abilities. He kept them from taking on responsibilities they could not handle. Moreover, he delegated broadly in areas in which he was uninterested, while retaining control over matters he cared about: diplomacy and defense.

In Chapter 5, Greenstein offers a lengthy case study dealing with Eisenhower's relations with Senator Joe McCarthy. Most accounts of the period rely on Robert Donovan (*Eisenhower: The Inside Story*, 1956), Emmet John Hughes (*The Ordeal of Power*, 1962), and Sherman Adams (*Firsthand Report*, 1961). In each account Eisenhower appears angry with McCarthy, but determined that Congress put its own house in order without presidential interference. Meanwhile, the White House aides split into two factions, one favoring accommodation (led by Richard Nixon), the other confrontation (led by C. D. Jackson and Hughes). Adams remained uncommitted, balancing claims on the president by the two camps.

In these accounts the White House staff and vice president play the crucial roles. Adams instigates a memorandum released by the Army that cites numerous occasions on which McCarthy or Roy Cohn ask the Army to give Private David Schine special treatment. Adams, Nixon, and Jerry Persons coach Secretary of the Army Robert T. Stevens during the Army-McCarthy hearings. When Eisenhower acts, which is rarely, it is to approve or overrule staff initiatives. Donovan argues that while some people believe that Eisenhower had a "conscious strategy of giving McCarthy enough rope to let him hang himself," most of those "closest to the problem" in the White House "do not believe that the President followed any carefully planned, deliberate strategy toward McCarthy. In their opinion, it was an attitude rather than a strategy that guided him" (Donovan, p. 257).

Greenstein argued that Eisenhower *had* a strategy, but one so secret it was kept even from the cabinet (p. 174). Ike used an indirect approach. He would refrain from a direct confrontation, but uphold the principles of fair-play and due process of law. This strategy would amount to a strong, though indirect, criticism of McCarthy. Eisenhower would not personally initiate actions, but "monitor the activities of each faction and lend his support to one or the other when he found it propitious to do so" (p. 177).

Greenstein focuses on the attempt by the White House staff to salvage Secretary of the Army Stevens. Stevens agreed to compromise with McCarthy during a luncheon with Senators Karl Mundt and Everett Dirksen. According to Greenstein, Ike immediately swung into action. Stevens was told to repudiate the agreement. Ike held meetings or spoke over the phone with personal advisors, such as General Lucius Clay, members of the cabinet, White House aides, and the vice president. These discussions culminated in the drafting of a press release, heavily edited by Eisenhower, then released by the Army,

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that retrieved the lost ground. The impression one gets from Greenstein's account is of a president aroused, in fighting trim, taking charge of the situation, and launching a counter-offensive (pp. 185–86).

Yet questions remain. In Sherman Adams's account, it is the staff that gets wind of Stevens's compromise. Adams, Nixon, and Persons get hold of Stevens to keep him from becoming completely unglued. They draft a statement for him to release. Adams takes the statement to Eisenhower, interrupting him on the White House putting green, and carries him off to the staff conference, at which time Eisenhower edits the statement. The staff takes the initiative and Eisenhower goes along (Adams, pp. 146–7). Since Greenstein cites Adams as his source, his own narrative and chronology of events remains unclear (p. 186). Which was the case: a "hidden-hand presidency" or a president sitting on his hands until prodded into action by the White House staff?

Another case illustrates how difficult it is to come to a definitive conclusion. Again, this involves the Army-McCarthy hearings, and the memorandum the Army had leaked to members of McCarthy's committee about the requests McCarthy and Cohn had made for special treatment for Private Schine.

McCarthy decided to question members of the White House staff to get them to admit that they had instigated the Army memorandum. Eisenhower thereupon sent a letter to the committee, along with a memorandum prepared by Attorney General Herbert Brownell, indicating that the administration would claim "executive privilege" in this matter. Prior accounts state that the claim was made at the time of the first disclosures that the White House staff and the Army had communicated about the memorandum, which would have been early in May. But Greenstein points out that the date on the Brownell memorandum was March 2. He concludes that Eisenhower had wisely prepared his administration for a seige by McCarthy. In support he cites a call Eisenhower made to William Rogers, deputy attorney general, ordering the preparation of a memorandum (p. 204).

But an alternative explanation is possible. Brownell had been part of the administration team (along with Sherman Adams) that had dealt with Army Counsel John Adams and convinced him to prepare the original memorandum leaked to Congress. They were part of the group that decided to release the memorandum to McCarthy's committee on March 11. Undoubtedly they would want to protect themselves and to keep their role confidential. Perhaps a week or two earlier, they decided to convince the president that no one in the administration should be required to testify about such matters. This might explain why Rogers and Brownell, instead of coming up with the memorandum Eisenhower called for (which would have involved measures a president could take to protect public servants from abuse by congressmen at hearings), re-worked the older "Herman Wolkinson" memorandum on executive privilege and sent a revised version to Eisenhower. The document was now geared toward confidentiality and protection for the White House staff (p. 204). This interpretation is bolstered by the fact that the group working on the administration response to McCarthy's request for information about the Army memorandum consisted of Brownell, James Hagerty, Persons, Bernard Shanley, and Adams.

Greenstein makes a compelling argument that the presidency was more active in the

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McCarthy affair than previously known, but Eisenhower's own role remains open to several different interpretations. Greenstein has demonstrated a hidden-hand presidency, but not necessarily a hidden-hand president. Nonetheless, this book is a fascinating exposition of Eisenhower's leadership techniques. It provides alternative explanations for many cases in the Eisenhower administration. The light shed on Eisenhower's leadership style will do much to illuminate the entire historical record, especially when other scholars make use of the same sources to go deeper into particular episodes.

RICHARD M. PIOUS
Barnard College, Columbia University

Personal Rule in Black Africa: Prince, Autocrat, Prophet, Tyrant *by Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1982. 316 pp. Cloth, $25.00; paper, $9.95.*

Of the thirty-six countries of Black Africa that have gained independence since 1956, seven have had the same ruler for at least the past fifteen years and another twelve have been led by the same prime minister or president for more than a decade. Yet many people think of Africa as more or less permanently beset by assassinations, military coups, and sporadic anarchy. That there has been plenty of violence is undeniable, but it has not affected all African countries, and it has not affected any one country all the time.

If in the modern era Africa can show plenty of successful rulers, what accounts for their success? And why have some been more successful than others? The authors of *Personal Rule in Black Africa* provide answers to these questions by analyzing the means and methods by which the continent's rulers have gained and retained power. They divide them into four categories.

First, there are the princes: Léopold Sédar Senghor of Senegal and Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya, nationalists who surrounded themselves with "courtiers" who they knew they could control; Haile Selassie I of Ethiopia and Sobhuza II of Swaziland, monarchs who maintained their rule by traditional means; and William Tolbert of Liberia and Gaafar Mohamed Numeiri of Sudan, the one the inheritor from an entrenched predecessor of a party apparatus that slipped from his grasp, the other an army officer turned skillful politician. Second are the autocrats: Félix Houphouët-Boigny of Ivory Coast, Ahmadou Ahidjo of Cameroon, Omar Bongo of Gabon, H. Kamazou Banda of Malawi, and Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire. All of these men have held office for long periods and all make sure that their word is the law of their lands. Third, the prophets: Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Sékou Touré of Guinea, and Julius K. Nyerere of Tanzania, rulers who placed ideology before pragmatism and in the case of Nkrumah, suffered for it. And fourth, the tyrants: Idi Amin Dada of Uganda and Francisco Macías Nguema Biyogo of Equatorial Guinea, who operated outside any law, whether constitutional or moral, and brought ruin on their peoples as well as themselves.

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The authors of this excellently written volume confine their attention to post-colonial times. They do not speculate on the possibility of a connection between the style of personal rule adopted by men like Nkrumah, Senghor, or Banda, and traditional African methods of gaining and keeping power. On the contrary, the closest parallel to post-colonial Africa, in their view, is early modern Europe. The most useful guides to an understanding of present-day African rulership are the works of Machiavelli and Hobbes. In the worlds of renaissance Italy and Stuart England, the stakes were high and one slip by a ruler or courtier could bring disaster. In those days, as in modern Africa, the game of power politics was played not by philosophers, lawyers, and administrators, but by clever politicians, whose weapons were coercion, violence, and ruthlessness. Institutional guidelines were lacking. One had to hack one's way to the top by the best means available, fair or foul.

The parallel is suggestive. But it may be going too far to discount as irrelevant the pre-colonial political traditions to which Africans of the second half of this century are heir. It is true that the boundaries of today's sovereign states rarely correspond with the traditional African polities of the past. It is also true that the institutional arrangements that the departing colonialists left in place were often unworkable, and did not last. And it is true that there is a certain hollowness about the harking back to the past in which some of Africa's recent rulers have indulged—the praise-names, the fly-whisks, the ceremonial dress, and the like. But to imply that post-colonial Africa was unaware of or unaffected by its pre-colonial history is unwise. The roots of modern Africa's political culture are hundreds of years old. This culture owes nothing to the influence of the West and long predates colonialism. Many Africans today believe that the failure of their leaders to take account of their past creates many of the continent's problems.

Nevertheless, this book is an excellent summary of the objectives, style, and performance of Africa's major rulers in the post-independence era, informed by the latest scholarship in the field.

GRAHAM W. IRWIN
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Tax Revolt: Something for Nothing in California *by David O. Sears and Jack Citrin. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1982. 278 pp. $22.50.*

This book adds to a growing literature on the subject of Proposition 13 and the tax revolt. Its interpretation of the tax rebellion reflects the social-psychological orientation of David Sears and the public opinion focus of Jack Citrin. Apart from a historical chapter on the events leading up to the California tax revolt, the book says virtually nothing about the effects of Proposition 13 on the state's economy, its public services, or its political and judicial processes. These omissions are disappointing given the recent debate over "supply-side" tax cuts and their impact on economic growth and government services directed at the poor and the elderly.

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Californians appear to want both tax cuts and a high level of public services, which are seemingly incompatible goals. To analyze this phenomenon, Sears and Citrin apply a model of psychological coherence, explicitly rejecting the standard of logical consistency, to explain support or opposition to three consecutive tax- or spending-limitation measures that California voters faced between June 1978 and June 1980. After running dozens of multiple regression and factor analyses of their own survey taken in November 1979 and various California polls, they find that causes of the tax revolt encompass such symbolic factors as general political conservatism, racism (reflecting Sears's earlier work), and mistrust of government. Additional factors include some demographic variables, such measures of self-interest as homeownership (remember that Proposition 13 promised major property tax cuts), and some general beliefs about the proper size and scope of government. All told, 21 variables explain about 28 percent of the variance in their model.

Unfortunately, their results are not logically compelling. Their error is one of omission. Had they employed an "expected utility" model, including survey questions to tap expected gains and losses from the tax-cut measures, they would have found that demographics (including race), symbolic predispositions (such as racism), homeownership, or being a public employee are all statistically insignificant. In my own analysis (with Pauline Ryan) of the vote on California's tax-cutting initiatives using surveys of each election taken by the *Los Angeles Times*, we explained 36 percent of the variance of the vote on Proposition 13 with 5 variables and 63 percent on Jarvis II (Proposition 9, Howard Jarvis's follow-up income tax-cutting initiative) with 8 variables. These variables measured voters' expectations that education and public safety would decline, that the rich would benefit most, that the economy would be stimulated, and that inflation would fall. (The Sears/Citrin variables wash out, proving to be insignificant in our results. It seems they have simply misspecified the model.) The reason that supporters of Proposition 13 turned on Jarvis to defeat his second measure was their conviction that a reduction in income tax rates would lead the government to impose new or higher levels of taxes, thus yielding no gains to themselves or the economy.

Low R-square results throughout their analyses compel Sears and Citrin to contrive ad hoc explanations of the remaining unexplained variance. Worse, their obsession with symbolic racism is wholly unwarranted, both analytically and from a public policy perspective.

Space permits only one more correction. They charge that there has been a continuing shift in the share of the local property tax burden toward homeowners since Proposition 13. However, figures published since 1978 by the State Board of Equalization show that such a trend occurring before 1978 was halted by Proposition 13; businesses have since paid an increasing share.

Finally, this book is hard to read, because it is written in the language of social psychology and social science jargon. Such expository style belongs in the social science journals, not in a book that the general reader might pick up to learn about the tax revolt.

ALVIN RABUSHKA
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The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social Rigidities *by Mancur Olson. New Haven, Conn., Yale University Press, 1982. 273 pp. $14.95.*

For production, distribution, and exchange, modern society relies on corporations; for organizing labor, it relies on trade unions; for political action, on parties, interest groups, and other forms of voluntary association. Modern Western society, in both its political and its economic aspects, is a network of voluntary associations even more pervasive than the one that so impressed Tocqueville in early nineteenth century America. In *The Logic of Collective Action*, Mancur Olson developed a rational explanation why people pursuing their own gain as individuals should embark on collective action in this way. In the present work, Olson takes the implications of *The Logic* and develops from them a far reaching argument about the dynamics of political and economic development.

Central to his thesis is the observation that over time stable democracies develop an increasing number of what the author calls "distributional coalitions." These are groups capable of exerting political or economic influence in the collective interests of their members. They include trade unions, professional associations, farm organizations, and lobbies of all kinds. Their effect is similar to that of a cartel. The longer a society has been stable, the more the texture of that society develops a dense network of distributional coalitions, until eventually the society ossifies into political and economic stagnation. Britain and the United States have been stable pluralist democracies for much longer than Japan or West Germany. The denser networks in the former have resulted in slower economic growth than in the latter two countries since World War II, which largely destroyed the pre-existing network in Japan and West Germany. Within the U.S., the northeastern states have had political and economic stability for longer than the southern states, which is one factor that has contributed to their currently slower rate of economic growth. The type of distributional coalition also makes a difference. When a coalition is so large that its membership embraces most of the nation, the collective interest of the coalition becomes almost coterminous with the national interest. Thus, the well-integrated and comprehensive West German trade union movement is less damaging to economic growth than the numerous, scattered, and factious trade unions of Britain. On this point, Olson's argument has definite relevance to the arguments about neo-corporatism.

The basic argument is applied to a wide range of societies at many different periods. An interesting conclusion Olson draws from this survey is that impediments to the operation of free market forces, which he attributes to the influence of distributional coalitions, result not only (as is generally recognized) in less efficiency but also (as is generally denied) in greater social inequality.

The basic argument about the effect on the political economy of the gradual growth of an ever more dense network of distributional coalitions is finally used to develop an economic theory that differs from, on the one hand, Keynesianism and disequilibrium theory and, on the other, monetarism and equilibrium theory. Olson's theory provides a credible explanation for both the occurrence of involuntary unemployment and "stagflation." This is something the other theories have had difficulty in doing. The theory

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depends on two variables: the density of the network of coalitions and the extent to which economic actors allow for inflation. When distributional coalitions are weak, an economy will attain equilibrium even in deflationary conditions, but when the network is dense, inflation less than expected (or deflation greater than expected) results in involuntary unemployment and falling output. As the network becomes more dense over time, the trade-off between inflation and unemployment worsens.

There is clearly an element of hubris in a book with a title such as this and a theory that, in the words of the jacket, claims to explain "the British class structure, the Indian caste system, the timing and forms of racial discrimination in South Africa, unemployment, depression and stagflation today . . . and a great deal more." Yet the jacket is less than fair to the text. Olson is at pains to point out that none of the phenomena he examines are mono-causal in origin. He is interested in only one causal thread among many, but it is a thread that appears in many diverse contexts and has received relatively little scrutiny. The book presupposes many of the assumptions of conventional economics. I am not certain how Olson's argument would be affected if one accepted, say, Joseph Schumpeter's argument that a measure of oligopoly is beneficial in counteracting the tendency of unfettered competition to optimise on too short a time scale. The book is clearly topical. Olson emphasizes that although trade unions are distributional coalitions, they are not the only one or necessarily the most harmful. Nonetheless, the thesis, with its Rousseauesque oppositions to partial societies coming between the citizen and the state, has an obvious application to many current controversies about the role of trade unions.

Political scientists should welcome the work of an economist who reemphasizes the crucial role of the structure of institutions in the political economy. Moreover, there is both a challenge and a stimulant in this ambitious theory, which is not frightened of ranging widely and drawing conclusions about great matters.

JAMES DOUGLAS
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Governor Rockefeller in New York: The Apex of Pragmatic Liberalism *by James E. Underwood and William J. Daniels. Westport, Conn., Greenwood Press, 1982. 335 pp. $35.00.*

The authors state that their purpose was to examine Nelson Rockefeller as a case study in executive leadership and in policymaking at the state level. A further purpose was to determine the degree to which the Rockefeller administration reflected the public philosophy of "pragmatic liberalism." Since the authors' purpose was threefold, they were selective in the policies they examined. They concluded that Nelson Rockefeller, although a Republican, reached the apex of pragmatic liberalism as governor of New York State. Most Republicans would agree.

A brief opening chapter defines "pragmatic liberalism" and could have been considerably expanded for clarity. The material covering Rockefeller's life before he entered state

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politics and his first gubernatorial campaign adds little to ground already well covered by others. However, secondary sources have been thoroughly examined, and several interviews add new data.

The main portion of the book includes chapters on Rockefeller's executive style and the substance of his programs. Particular attention is given to his fiscal and spending programs. Finally, how he coped with crises and controversy is described in four brief case studies dealing with nursing homes, corruption in the party, Attica, and mass transit. The longest of these case studies concerns Attica and is based largely on the McKay Commission report.

In a volume of 335 pages, 66 pages are devoted to footnotes, printed in the back of the book. This section contains some of the most interesting material. Not only do the authors extensively cite sources, but include notes on their interviews with Governor Rockefeller and various other politicians. Purists may question whether direct quotations should be put in footnotes rather than in the text. Since the footnotes contain considerable new material they should be carefully read.

Any momentary inconvenience to the reader, however, is a small price to pay for an excellent study of Nelson Rockefeller and his governorship. The volume is a much-needed addition to the studies of state executives.

ROBERT H. CONNERY
Columbia University

Essays in Supply Side Economics *edited by David G. Raboy. Washington, D.C., Institute for Research on the Economics of Taxation, 1982. 173 pp. $5.95.*

This volume is intended to supply the theoretical underpinnings to supply-side economics, and thus to the economic policies (in particular the Economic Recovery Tax Act) of the Reagan administration. It provides a varied menu for the reader, ranging from an analytical essay by Norman B. Ture through a historical analysis of the role of federal intervention in the U.S. economy by Naomi R. Lamoreaux. In between, David Raboy provides a view of the history of supply-side theory that takes us back to Adam Smith, David G. Tuerck discusses the interface between rational-expectations theory and supply-side theory, Richard E. Wagner looks at market structure with an eye toward the impact of government intervention, and Mai Nguyen Woo looks at the empirical and theoretical evidence on the responsiveness of saving and work effort to tax policy.

The express purpose of the volume is to persuade both economists and policymakers that the central tenets of supply-side economics have solid theoretical foundations that are supported by empirical evidence. Three of the essays (Raboy on the history of economic thought, Wagner on the analysis of market failure, and Tuerck on the link between rational expectations and supply-side economics) are essentially descriptive summaries geared to a nontechnical audience with limited sophistication about economic concepts. None of the three has any empirical content, although all make use of the kind

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of simple illustrations that one finds in elementary economic analyses. The essay by Mai Woo summarizes the current state of empirical findings vis-à-vis the tax effects on saving and effort, and also uses the homely illustration technique to explain the analytic issues. The Lamoreaux essay takes a historical perspective on supply-side economics, and suggests that the new policies represent a watershed in the sweep of broad national economic policies.

These essays contain a number of common strands. One is the recognition that the analytical case for supply-side economics is basically stated in the essay by Ture, and the other essays are in the nature of supporting statements to that centerpiece. Thus, if one wants to judge whether this volume will persuade skeptics on analytical grounds, one must look at the Ture contribution as carrying the main weight.

Ture's essay takes dead aim at the mainstream of macroeconomic thinking. It argues that supply-siders have discovered an essential truth about the nature of macroeconomic relationships that discredits conventional theory and explains why policies based on those theories have failed to produce the predicted results.

According to Ture, supply-side economics "denies the possibility that government action can initially and directly change the total real income of the economy" (p. 12). Rather, "the basic and distinctive characteristic of supply side economics is that it identifies the *initial* effect of government actions in terms of the changes in relative prices . . . confronting households and businesses which these actions entail" (p. 12). Thus, supply-siders argue that a tax cut, for example, affects total real economic activity only insofar as it changes the relative price of work or saving, not because it changes the real disposable income of recipients. In contrast, mainstream macroeconomics has always held that government policy can affect the level of real aggregate demand directly by conventional fiscal or monetary policy.

What is one to make of Ture's theoretical structure? On the face of it, it involves a straightforward confusion of *ex post* with *ex ante* relationships—a confusion that filled a great many journal articles in the 1930s, when Keynes's *General Theory* was in the forefront of professional discussion. It is certainly true that the definitions hold *ex post*—that is the nature of accounting identities. But changes in real aggregate *ex ante* demand can obviously occur without a preceding change in total output. If taxes are cut, consumers can increase their spending instantaneously (they can even increase spending in anticipation of the tax cut), thereby creating an *ex ante* demand that will justify a larger real output in the following period. Thus real aggregate (*ex ante*) demand can certainly change without a preceding change in total output, and does so all the time, in both directions. In short, the argument makes no sense at all unless one makes some very peculiar assumptions about short-run supply curve in the presence of large unutilized resources.

The supply-siders recognize the problem, and insist that the short-run supply curve cannot be horizontal. Concretely, Ture apparently believes that no unemployed worker is willing to work unless his or her real wage is increased, and no owners of capital are willing to let their capital be used unless they get a better return than the prevailing one. As numerous mainstream economists have pointed out, that amounts to saying that roughly 25 percent of the labor force was unemployed during the Great Depression

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because they refused to accept a cut in real wage rates, and that at present over 11 million unemployed workers are sitting around demanding higher real wages before they will willingly give up their present happy state of leisure. While one can find isolated instances where that analysis fits reality (for example, the Chrysler strike in Canada), it is difficult to take the theory seriously. Presumably, that is why hardly any economists do.

There is after all a simple empirical test that anybody can employ—one could take out highly visible advertisements in the major newspapers and television stations across the country, offering to provide work at prevailing wage rates in each market area and occupation. If the supply-siders are right, nobody would show up—workers being unwilling to give up their leisure unless they are properly compensated. If any of the authors of this volume would like to place a large wager on the outcome of that simple experiment, I would be more than pleased to act as the banker.

Despite its visible flaws and unpersuasive content, *Supply Side Economics* is a straightforward attempt to put a set of theories on the table and allow friend and foe to argue the merits. For that, the author and the editor are to be commended. Finally, unless the reader thinks that the deficiencies of supply side economics imply that conventional macroeconomic theory is in good shape, let me hasten to add that conventional (demand-side) theory has not exactly flourished either during recent years. Macroeconomic theory is not in good shape, in part because economists have been unwilling to try to understand how decision-makers act, what information they base their actions on, how people cope with both technological and financial uncertainty, and the like. In short, we have too much theory that looks at aggregates and tries to infer the process, and too little tested micro-theory that explains how economic actors actually behave and why they do what they do. Supply-side economics has not contributed much to closing that gap, and it would be more helpful if it had.

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The American Governorship *by Coleman B. Ransone, Jr. Westport, Conn., Greenwood Press, 1982. 197 pp. $27.50.*

A quarter of a century after the appearance of his first major contribution on the subject, Coleman Ransone returns in this volume for a second look at the American state governorship. The author's purpose is to explore, through a review of the secondary literature and interviews in selected states, whether the principal functions he identified in 1956 for the office of the state chief executive—public relations, policy formation, and management—have remained the same, and to examine whether the relative weight given each of these by governors has changed over time. In addition, Ransone seeks to identify alterations, since he last wrote, in the political and governmental environments within which the state governor must operate.

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Unfortunately, the result of this effort is a book that neither breaks new ground in the study of the governorship nor systematically summarizes current research. One attempt at innovation is the measure offered as an "index of party control" in the states. But there are serious problems with the validity of this measure. Sequential periods of total dominance by each of the two major parties would produce the same index number as divided control over the same period of time. Furthermore, the key finding generated from the use of this index, the growth in the number of "normally one party dominant Democratic states," is apparently at variance with findings of other scholars that competition is growing in state politics. Ransone does not address this difference.

In some areas of substance, the politics of the veto and veto override and the governor's role as lobbyists in Washington for the states, to cite two of many possible examples, the author would have benefited from a greater familiarity with published research on the governorship. Opportunities are missed, too, for the linkage to the broader professional literature on such subjects as the problems political executives face in marshaling legislative majorities in periods of party decline or the impact of technological change on campaigning for public office. The discussion of the escalation of campaign finance costs misses a key behavioral point, namely, the difficulty that candidates and their managers have in knowing by some objective measure "how much is enough" and their consequent tendency to see no limit to the resources they need. Public financing of elections is endorsed in an off-handed way as "a step in the right direction" with little consideration of its possible negative consequences. New Jersey, a state discussed by Ransone, found that its public financing law encouraged many marginal candidacies for the governorship in both major parties.

One of the author's stated concerns is for the "actual" (as opposed to the legal) functions of governors. It is far from certain, however, that his review of the allocation of executive time, the occasional published reminiscences of former governors, or an apparently unsystematic interviewing of current chief executives and their staffs will reveal these "actual" functions. An additional problem is that, where systematic information was drawn upon from the work of others, it was available in categories different from those used by Ransone in his previous work and is therefore adaptable to his purposes only with some risk of distortion. Thus, the overall finding that the principal functions of the governorship remain the same, except for growing emphasis upon management, though unobjectionable, is built here on an infirm evidentiary base.

There are occasional insights in this volume, and Ransone's implicit view that the governorship has to be seen integrally, rather than as an amalgam of separate roles, itself has some value. The work, however, does little to summarize or advance our knowledge of the contemporary state chief executive.

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The Deindustrialization of America: Plant Closings, Community Abandonment, and the Dismantling of Basic Industry *by Barry Bluestone and Bennett Harrison. New York, Basic Books, 1982. 323 pp. $19.95.*

This recent entry in the industries policy sweepstakes addresses what the authors believe to be the "widespread, systematic disinvestment in the nation's productive capacity" as capital is diverted "from productive investment in our basic national industries into unproductive speculation, mergers and acquisitions, and foreign investment" (p. 6). The crux of the issue, they argue, is the "hypermobility" of capital that leads to closure of socially productive plants, community abandonment, and worker dislocation, and engenders as well a "fundamental struggle between capital and community." Their laudable quest is for policies that reconcile the often conflicting needs for "stable, humane, and equitable communities" and economic growth.

Through a somewhat curious process of reduction, Bluestone and Harrison conclude that the culprit in this struggle between capital and community is corporate management and its unswerving pursuit of profit. In three agonizingly brief pages, they reject what they appear to believe are the only three contending explanations of the "global economic crisis." Attributing the problem to the erosion of the work ethic, disincentives of government (the supply-side thesis), or the Japanese challenge, they argue, is scapegoating the American worker, the government, and the Japanese. Therefore, the problem is corporate management, driven by the need to restore or preserve historical profit levels, precipitously shifting capital among regions and nations, and using disinvestment, actual or threatened, to breach the social contract with labor and to coerce communities into concessions that create better "business climates." As a consequence, the fulcrum of bargaining power has shifted in favor of capital to an unprecedented degree (p. 18), and now "Washington has joined the corporate sector in declaring a class war on workers and their communities" (p. 19).

A basic requirement of this reductionist approach is that all contending explanations be eliminated. It is problematic, at best, to deny that worker attitudes, government taxes and regulations, social programs, and foreign competition in domestic and international markets have contributed in any way to the nation's economic problems and those of subnational regions and localities. Further, an alternative explanation exists that subsumes these four theses. We are in the midst of a technological revolution with ramifications no less significant than those of the Industrial Revolution. As a direct consequence, the United States and most other western industrialized nations are undergoing a fundamental industrial restructuring. While the social and human costs of these transformations are immediately apparent, their long-term consequences are poorly understood. When governments such as Great Britain have attempted to interdict and impede this process of industrial restructuring, the results have been disasterous and have resulted in costs to workers and their communities no less severe than those that impel Bluestone and Harrison.

The authors' immediate brief is for "reindustrialization with a human face" that extends the social "safety net" and legislates plant closing pre-notification requirements and compensation to communities and workers when plants are closed. Their vision of a

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"radical industrial policy" is more complex. Its foundation is a new economic democracy that significantly broadens community and worker participation in basic institutions of the economy and society. Among the means to this end are economic planning, community and worker participation in plant closure decisions, government minority ownership positions in "sunrise" industries, and worker ownership.

The problem of community disinvestment and the plight of dislocated workers is not new, but is assuming alarming proportions. Bluestone and Harrison provide the most extensive documentation of the dimensions of community disinvestment presently available. However, the ideology persistently imbedded in the dialectic of their analysis and the singular focus on manufacturing is unfortunate and distracting. Their carefully woven, but critically flawed, analysis, nonetheless, merits careful reading.

LARRY C. LEDEBUR
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Pure Politics and Impure Science: The Swine Flu Affair *by Arthur M. Silverstein. Baltimore, Md., Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981. 176 pp. $12.50.*

The 1976 swine influenza campaign has been generally referred to as a fiasco. In addition to the cost in life and personal injury due to the vaccine's side affects, and to the still unknown amount the government will pay to satisfy claims against it, the government directly spent over $100 million on the program. State and local agencies spent an additional $24 million. The Center for Disease Control (CDC) purchased over 156 million doses of swine flu vaccine, and had over 90 million useless doses of vaccine in storage when the program was finally terminated. What went wrong? How could the federal health bureaucracy, with its vast array of available technical and scientific expertise, contribute to the ill-fated decisions concerning the swine influenza program?

In order for the reader to appreciate what occurred in the program, the author provides a skillful blend of historical description of the events of 1976 with a variety of essential background scientific data about the public health behavior of influenza virus. The author, an experienced research immunologist by training, was on sabbatical leave during 1975–76 working on the staff of the Senate Health Subcommittee, chaired by Senator Edward M. Kennedy. He thus had the first hand opportunity to observe the swine flu issue unfold. His training as a biomedical researcher, more so than his political expertise, makes this account a fascinating case study of the political process as it involves an important public health issue.

Two years after the swine flu episode, the Carter administration commissioned a study of the entire swine flu program to review and reconstruct the entire sequence of events. The report presented a clear indictment of government health officials and of most of the outside scientific advisers involved in the program. The author, however, concludes that the report of the study was not erroneous in describing what had happened, but was "far off the mark in explaining *why* certain things had happened" (p. xiii).

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The author helps us to understand why the scientific advisers acted as they did in the spring of 1976. In February 1976 there was an outbreak of swine influenza among recruits at Fort Dix. There was already one death among twelve confirmed cases. The possibility of a pandemic with severe public health implications similar to the 1918–19 pandemic seemed possible. In addition, this was the first time in years that an early warning signal of an impending pandemic had been received in time to take effective public health action. Although history tells us that the predictions for a swine flu pandemic were wrong, the author contends that public health decisions were made on the best available data.

Similarly, the actions of government public health officials cannot be fully understood without knowing their statutory mission and the structure of the federal bureaucracy, which imposes a peculiar relationship between the full-time technically trained bureaucrat at the bottom and the transient politically trained bureaucrat at the top. In the case of swine flu, while the scientists talked about "some possibility" of a pandemic, the head of the CDC used the term "strong possibility" and subsequently the secretary of health, education, and welfare (HEW) changed possible epidemic into "there will be a pandemic." Similarly, although the scientists asserted they had no way of assessing the virulence or severity of the new virus, the HEW secretary projected one million deaths in 1976.

Finally, the actions of elected officials, whether in Congress or the executive branch, cannot be fully appreciated without knowing the contemporary politics of their respective institutions.

The lessons, according to this account of the swine flu episode, include the finding that the decision in March of 1976 to mount the National Immunization Program against the disease was correct. The initial decision to vaccinate the public rather than to stockpile vaccine was correct. The National Immunization Program was administered conscientiously, "if ineptly," by those in charge. Finally, there is no one to blame for the events of 1976. The scientists suffered from the lack of precision that accompanies any impure science. Governmental program managers suffered from their lack of expertise in ventures of this type and magnitude. All were at the mercy of unpredictable events. The culprit, if any, was the swine flu itself.

This is a readable, important account that presents a slightly different view of the swine flu program.

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Clipped Wings: The American SST Conflict *by Mel Horwitch. Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 1982. 473 pp. $25.00.*

On 19 May 1971, the United States Senate finally killed any hope of government support for development of a supersonic airliner (SST). Thus ended one of the most intensely

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debated technological ventures of postwar America, one that promised, according to its advocates, reliable, comfortable, and above all, rapid transportation over long-haul routes, as well as a bonanza for the major airlines and the SST builder. According to Horwitch, these advocates included a president and two secretaries of defense, a majority of concerned cabinet members, all the major aircraft manufacturers, most U.S. airlines, and a host of clients, constituents, and just plain people. The questions Horwitch poses are obvious: What happened? Why did this ballyhooed favorite of the aviation leaders of the world get shot down before it ever got off the ground?

The answer may be in the pages of this book somewhere, but frankly I could not find it and I suspect the author had no intention of providing it. What he gives us instead is a densely written, carefully footnoted case study consisting of deliberately bedeviling leaks, endlessly complex position-taking, and high-level interdepartmental maneuvering all arranged more or less chronologically. The author places the reader in the position of a student of management who is given the weekly case in the Monday morning assignment box. The student (and the reader of this book) must assume that textbook answers to the assigned question do not exist.

Was it the environmental lobby that killed the SST with its visions of sonic booms, ozone depletion, water vapor accretion in the stratosphere, and noise pollution around airports? One can certainly find evidence to support such a thesis in this book. Environmental activists seemed to spring up with the force and effectiveness of claymore mines as SST proponents pushed their design toward development. In fact, a cursory summary of Horwitch's book suggests that the main conflict occurred along lines drawn by the environmentalists. But there is more to the battle (and to the book) than this.

Did the airframe and engine manufacturers ultimately fail to produce on their promise of reliable, low-cost designs they needed to beat the Russian TU-124 and the Anglo-French Concorde? There is evidence for both sides here. Lockheed and General Electric had already produced the SR-71, a Mach 3, twin-engined aircraft designed for long-range, high-altitude reconnaissance that embodied technology unavailable to the Soviets and the Europeans. On the other hand, the British had produced the first commercial jet airliner, and together with the French, were widely recognized as strong contenders in development of the highly visible aircraft and engines used in the transoceanic passenger trade. Horwitch appears to argue that Boeing, selected as the prime contractor early in the government-sponsored design competition, generated undesirable backwash when it changed its highly touted swing-wing design to a more conventional fixed delta design. Perhaps some Congressional and airline uncertainties began to crystallize into doubts when such fundamental questions as the viability of the prime contractor's design came into question. But other facts must be accounted for.

Did the airlines sandbag Boeing by first appearing to back the dominant industry design and then pulling out of any real funding commitment at the last moment? While one can find evidence both for and against this argument in many sections of the book, the role of the airlines in focusing the government's study efforts and then forcing the funding issue into a channel favorable to them is one that the book does not explore completely. Of the major U.S. carriers only Braniff actually bought the Concorde, and then flew it briefly, losing money all the while. The other major U.S. carriers, so vocif-

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erously in favor of the SST at the outset, kept their corporate checkbooks conspicuously closed when the time came for funding a real airplane. This fact may have carried more congressional votes than all the environmental arguments ever mounted against the SST.

Was there a failure of managerial spirit and drive? The author provides more evidence on this point than on any other. Most of the book consists of a detailed accounting of the interactions that took place among corporate heads, senior government officials, assorted lobbyists, and legislators. But despite the bulk of data, there are no conclusions. About all we can conclude is that there was an abundance of managerial skill applied on all sides of the issue for over a decade. Not so surprisingly, even the losers did pretty well for themselves.

Where does the assignment end? If I were the luckless student in Professor Horwitch's class, I would construct a graph of the relationships involving aircraft size, speed, and cost per seat-mile. I would show that neither the carriers nor the government would have made any money by investing in the SST. Unfortunately, I would have to go elsewhere than the assignment in hand to find the data for this graph. But a diligent student must always bring more to a case study than the facts provided. So too does the reader of this detailed and well-researched, but ultimately inconclusive book.

VERN LANPHIER
Booz, Allen and Hamilton

The Politics of Defense Contracting: The Iron Triangle *by Gordon Adams. New Brunswick, N.J., Transaction Books, 1982. 465 pp. Cloth, $39.95; paper, $15.00.*

An "iron triangle" is "a political relationship that brings together three key participants in a clearly delineated area of policymaking: the Federal bureaucracy, the key committees and members of Congress, and the private interest" (p. 24). In this book, Gordon Adams draws together a truly impressive array of data on eight major aerospace firms to throw a harsh light on the iron triangle of defense. He concludes that "decisions on defense policy and weapons procurement rest almost entirely in the hands of insiders and policy experts walled off from outsiders and alternative perspectives" (p. 207).

Four of the book's chapters examine the complex web of personal connections that tie together the eight firms of this study to others in the industry, to the financial institutions that serve them, and to the bureaucracy that defines what they will build. The exchange of information, not to mention of personnel, between the defense bureaucracy and defense firms is substantial. Ideas for new weapons come from firms as well as from the government, but usually emerge from negotiations between the two.

Seven of the book's chapters document the political leg of the triangle, showing how defense firms seek to influence the Congress by contributing to political action committee (PACs), by lobbying from their Washington offices, and so forth. Pentagon bureaucrats also "lobby" the Congress, occasionally in close coordination with industry

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representatives. There is some suggestion of shady practice here, but much of this activity is legal, and some of it is as American as apple pie.

Adams's data expose these connections and activities quite well, and for this alone the book will remain a useful primer in the ways of defense politics. Yet these data hardly sustain the larger argument that the defense triangle plays "a paramount role in defining national security" (p. 25). This is, after all, a book about weapons acquisition—an important topic, but hardly the only or even the major component of national security policy. There is no basis for Adams's tendency to use "national security policy" and "weapons policy" interchangeably.

Within the domain of weapons policy, the book's strongest case involves the close connection between defense firms and the Defense Department. Yet even Adams admits that some sharing of expertise is required to match what the military services want with what technology might provide. While he laments the lack of "alternative perspectives," he never clarifies how they would be injected into this part of the acquisition process.

Presumably they might be injected from the Congressional side of the triangle. While Adams highlights the efforts of defense firms to prevent this from happening, he offers no data on the success of these efforts. Recent elections raised questions about the utility of PACs, for example; defense firms who contribute to PACs may be wasting their money. Defense firms lobby, but often several want the same pot of money; their efforts can be competitive as well as additive. Firms may enjoy strong support from the representative in their congressional district, but what does this mean in the context of a budget process that involves six committees and votes by both houses of Congress? That the defense budget went down in the early 1970s surely raises the possibility that defense firms are not alone in influencing U.S. defense policy.

Adams seems to have a conception of how American politics should work, yet he neither outlines that conception nor offers data to support conclusions based on it. Another book is in order, one that will put the defense triangle in broader context. Hopefully Adams will document that book as richly as he documented this one. But it may be hoped that the scope of his argument will match the scope of his detail.

THOMAS L. MCNAUGHER
The Brookings Institution

Marshall: Hero For Our Times *by Leonard Mosley. New York, Hearst Books, 1982. 570 pp. $18.50.*

Ask a group of college students to name American generals of World War II and they will probably mention Douglas MacArthur, George S. Patton, and Dwight D. Eisenhower. Only a few have heard of George C. Marshall, yet he is the man who Harry Truman said gave his country victory. No American, except FDR and Truman, made as much of a mark in the decade of 1941–51 as this man. His achievements as chief of staff (the senior Army officer) throughout the war and later as secretary of state and secretary of defense won him Winston Churchill's tribute: "He was the last great American."

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Hopefully this biography, written by a journalist of the World War II vintage for popular consumption, will revive interest in this great man. It is a pathetic comment on the last twenty years of American public life that the author saw fit to emphasize in his introduction that what made Marshall "both remarkable and special" was that "he never lied in either his own cause or his country's" (p. xiii). As a people, we used to set higher standards for our heroes and certainly there was more than mere honesty in Marshall's greatness.

He served his long apprenticeship of almost forty years in an Army that was not only small but was also generally considered a backwater. Although he attracted attention as an outstanding officer, promotion was still slow and it seemed more than likely that he would never reach the pinnacle of his profession. As it happened, he became chief of staff on September 1, 1939—the day Hitler began World War II. During the next six years, Marshall supervised the expansion of the Army from a strength of under 200,000 to one of more than 8 million and also was the man ultimately responsible for the feeding, clothing, equipping, arming, and training of that force, as well as its use in battle. It was an awesome task and the man who did it inspired awe. Because of his abilities and the high regard in which he was held, President Truman called on him to make peace in China and to take over the two highest cabinet posts when both the State and Defense Departments were in difficulty. He did not succeed in the perhaps impossible first chore, but was more successful in the other offices. In retirement, during which he stayed out of public view except for a rare event such as his acceptance of the Nobel Peace Prize, Marshall did not write an autobiography. Rather, he made his memory and his papers available to Forrest C. Pogue. Since the General's death in 1959, this noted scholar has published three volumes of what will be the definitive biography.

Leonard Mosley's effort is much less ambitious. He did use some of the General's interviews and papers and supplemented this research with some interviews of his own and a visit or two to other research institutions. He appears not to have leaned heavily on Pogue's books; indeed, his many factual errors indicate that he did not even read them carefully. Mosley does his best to tell a good story. In the process, he relies greatly on innuendo to stress Marshall's apparently unexciting sex life and spends pages on the Kay Summersby-Eisenhower relationship (which at any level is barely relevant to Marshall's career), while he ignores major wartime strategic conferences. Naturally, one would expect him to deal at length with Douglas MacArthur, whose career did touch Marshall's at various points. In an attempt to make the relationship more dramatic than it was, he has MacArthur competing with Marshall at the Army Service School and on the same boat with him in 1919. Neither was the case. Such errors, taken individually, are trivial. But when they are scattered in great number throughout the book (another example being that he has 54,000 Americans killed in the first months of the Korean War while, in fact, less than 28,000 died in the entire war) and compounded by the omission of crucial matters such as several of the important World War II conferences, a serious reader might well wonder about the value of this biography. If it stirs up some interest in Marshall and leads at least a few to Pogue's biography, it will serve a useful purpose.

EDWARD M. COFFMAN
U.S. Air Force Academy

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Abortion, Politics, and the Courts: *Roe v. Wade* and Its Aftermath *by Eva R. Rubin. Westport, Conn., Greenwood Press, 1982. 211 pp. $25.00.*

In a political system where policies change slowly (if at all), and then only incrementally, litigation is often a more effective group strategy than lobbying. Resort to the courts can neutralize losses in other arenas and expand limited legislative victories. According to Eva Rubin, abortion policy was particularly suited for a litigation campaign, from 1969 to 1973. State legislatures were becoming increasingly unwilling to address this controversial issue. Furthermore, women's groups then lacked an established lobby. In contrast, all a court case required was a good argument, a lawyer, and some money.

As conventionally understood, a litigation campaign is an "extended effort over a period of time to bring a series of cases as part of an overall strategy" (p. 3). Yet the campaign culminating in the legalization of abortion in *Roe* v. *Wade* (1973) was relatively short, intense, and marked by spontaneity and lack of coordination, rather than by organization and coherent strategy. Even after 1973, when supporters were forced to organize to protect their gains, litigation strategies were essentially reactive. The burden now fell on "pro-choice" groups to test new state abortion laws heavily influenced by the opposition movement rather than to seek to broaden abortion rights. Despite this lapse in definitional rigor, Rubin offers a fresh approach to a subject with a rapidly proliferating literature.

For the reader unacquainted with this scholarship, Rubin provides a clear and concise overview of topics covered in greater depth elsewhere: the history of abortion law in America; the reform efforts of the 1950s; and the legislative and litigation initiatives of the 1960s. Students of public policy will be particularly interested in her discussion of the interaction of public opinion and social setting with the medical and legal professions in placing abortion on the policy agenda in the 1960s. The book's major contribution, however, rests with its thoughtful consideration of the *Roe* decision and its aftermath in terms of political activity and policymaking.

This landmark decision and its implementation history lend support to the view that social change, once unleashed, is not easily bottled. Even though "pro-life" forces made good use of all access points to circumvent, narrow, or delay implementation, supporters of legalized abortion won most litigation and kept the most extreme legislative measures from being passed. In essence, the Supreme Court removed legal barriers to change here, thus freeing political forces to find a new equilibrium. This process has not been without difficulties, however. An issue has been politicized that may be ultimately insoluble through the political process of rational debate and compromise. Even so, Rubin notes that major policy changes growing out of landmark decisions often come fifteen to twenty years later, after the political turmoil has died and Congress and the executive branch have begun to take over the task of implementation.

This is a modest book theoretically, but it succeeds in its primary goal of describing how abortion law reformers used the political process, especially the courts, to promote legal changes. The book suffers from two minor but distracting features: court cases are sometimes cited with no explanation of their underlying principle; and several times the author digresses at some length into peripheral issues. There are also some puzzling bibli-

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ographic omissions in view of the date when the manuscript went into galleys (summer 1981). These shortcomings, however, are compensated for by a number of original insights on the potential and limitations of judicial activism, the Supreme Court as a political body, and the limits of conventional politics. Perhaps the most provocative idea advanced here is that *Roe* v. *Wade* may ultimately be viewed by an overpopulated world as endorsing a naive ideal: that individuals should be allowed to control their own reproduction free from governmental interference.

JANET K. BOLES
Marquette University

OSHA and the Politics of Health Regulation *by David P. McCaffrey. New York, Plenum Press, 1982. 192 pp. $24.50.*

The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) has been a center of controversy since its birth in 1970. This book, by a sociologist and organization theorist, examines the agency's work in regulating health. The author spent some time on the staff of the Bureau of Labor Statistics working closely with the OSHA staff, so he has an insider's perspective and an insider's access to documents and people. This is all to the good, and the book's strength is the new light it sheds both on controversies that produced federal court opinions and on those that were settled by negotiation or that never reached the rulemaking stage.

McCaffrey proposes to test three "theories" of agency behavior: pluralist, capitalist state, and organizational. The first stresses the role of private interest-group pressures in determining government actions. The second sees government as striving to assure the stability of capitalism. The third emphasizes the goals of agency heads and staffs and the organizational constraints they face. This theoretical overlay is weak. Not only are the theories not well articulated, but they are also not tested in a convincing way. The most that McCaffrey can claim is that the pluralist and organizational perspectives, taken together, are consistent with agency behavior. This claim reflects the plausible view that interest groups are influential but that their power is constrained by the organization of the bureaucracy and by the personalities within government who wish to be seen as running a "successful" program. The book would have been improved by less concentration on the author's three-fold construction and by a more serious attempt to develop a sophisticated model of the organizational perspective.

McCaffrey's critique is strongest when the scientific and economic issues are the simplest. For example, he discusses in Chapter 7 the failure of the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health to notify workers exposed to carcinogens. These few pages are an instructive case study of the way government officials, interest groups, and elected politicians will seek to avoid dealing with an issue with high political and bureaucratic costs, even if the benefits to society appear to be substantial.

McCaffrey's analysis, however, is seriously incomplete when he deals with difficult

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technical and economic problems. For example, in the area that I know the most about, economic advice, the author takes an overly simple view of the role played by economists in the Executive Office of the President. (I should, however, make clear that I am not an unbiased critic since I spent a year in the late sixties as a staff economist at the Council of Economic Advisors.) McCaffrey does seem to miss part of the point when he views Executive Office economists as pro-business because they are concerned with the social costs of regulation. Of course, business people and their political allies will be pleased with analyses that favor their positions, but this does not mean that the economists themselves do not believe that their analyses are justified on objective professional grounds.

McCaffrey's own position on the merits of health regulation is clear: he views Eula Bingham, the OSHA administrator under President Carter, as a stalwart fighter for the public good. Those concerned with costs are mainly trying to divert and delay the enforcement of the OSHA legislation. His strong pro-regulatory perspective, combined with his focus on political and organizational pressures, means that he never comes to terms with a central issue in health and safety regulation: How should agencies use the expertise of scientists, engineers, and economists in making decisions? What ought to be the relationship between the political pressures, which McCaffrey has documented, and the substance of health problems revealed by an analysis of benefits and costs?

The book is a good capsule history of OSHA's health regulation activities, but the reader is left ultimately dissatisfied with the author's basically one-dimensional analysis. Of course, scientists, engineers, and economists can be similarly narrow and can ignore political and bureaucratic constraints. We need more scholarly efforts which combine technocratic and political-organizational points of view.

SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN
Columbia University

The Politics of Aging: Power and Policy *by John B. Williamson, Linda Evans, and Lawrence A. Powell, in collaboration with Sharlene Hesse-Biber. Springfield, Ill., Charles C. Thomas, 1982. 331 pp. Cloth, $27.75; paper, $19.50.*

This book is a welcome addition to the emerging field of political gerontology. Questions concerning the relative power of the senior generation and its alleged participation in the political process as a consciously homogeneous bloc have been repeatedly probed in the last two decades. Williamson and his coauthors reexamine every salient argument without the benefit of new empirical data, but the results are better than a mere systematization of the "state of the art."

The book is divided in three parts. It initially examines the relative power of the aged from a historical and cross-cultural perspective. It subsequently deals with the formulation of special policies for the aged in the U.S., the aging as members of a social movement, and their participation in the political arena. The last section discusses the

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issue of power in the context of everyday living. The authors succeed in casting the issues in a broad theoretical framework and in transcending some of the simplistic dichotomies that characterize earlier contributions to this field.

An example of the latter is the penetrating critique of the modernization theory and its sweeping conclusion that modernity invariably produces a decline in the power of the elderly. When pointing to selective instances of an increment of such power, the authors suggest that modernization may not affect all societies alike and that the implications for the aged of the technological stage of modernization remain to be properly researched. On other occasions, the authors engage in a less commendable exercise of sophomoric over-zealousness. This is the case when they apply A. Mauss's model to the formation of the senior movement. Because Mauss identified the last stage in the natural history of social movements as "fragmentation and decline," the authors selectively look for some incipient evidence of such a deteriorating process. They hasten to assert without benefit of adequate empirical support that the more successful the aged prove to be in obtaining a portion of societal resources, the lesser the willingness of other generational cohorts to foot the bill. Their subsequent conclusion that "this in turn will tend to reduce the relative power of the elderly" (p. 101) is similarly unfounded.

The authors use a nonrestrictive definition of power that enables them to examine the dynamics of influence, authority, and control and compliance as a continuum ranging from family or dyadic relations to complex organizational and political systems. It is regrettable that their overemphasis on the concept of control leads them to join the nihilistic conspiracy thesis recently unleashed on the field of aging. This thesis holds that all policies and programs for the aged, not excluding the research and teaching of professional gerontologists, are instruments of political oppression imposed as straightjackets on the aged. The authors thus suggest that social security made possible the economic independence of millions of aged Americans at the demeaning price of subservience to a governmental bureaucracy. They seem to overlook that all public policies are implemented in the context of set administrative parameters. This is valid for all population groups, not only the aged. Statutory requirements, however, can be opposed and negotiated. Are we to infer from the book that the aged and their allies are so paralyzed with fear or impotence that they cannot act as a valid potential social action movement and defend themselves? In any event, why this partiality to an alleged specter of oppression without doing justice to or even mentioning the impressive benefits brought about by public entitlements for the aged during the 1970s and 1980s?

Despite such instances of one-sidedness, the authors remind us for the most part that reality is far more fluid and inconclusive than the expedient polar positions policy analysts are prone to adopt. If one discards their tendency to premature forecasting, the authors have brought a substantial measure of integration to the field of political gerontology. It also signals that the field is rapidly developing and deserves more attention than it actually receives.

ABRAHAM MONK
Columbia University

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An Ounce of Prevention: Child Health Politics Under Medicaid *by Ann-Marie Foltz. Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 1982. 254 pp. $27.50.*

Foltz's book is a recent addition to the MIT series on Health and Public Policy edited by Jeffrey E. Harris. It is another of the growing "implementation studies" literature, a literature of cautionary tales concerning the gap between intentions and results for government programs. Foltz's book is the story of the rather casual addition by Congress of an ambitious child health program to the Medicaid program. This was the Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnosis, and Treatment Program (EPSDT). EPSDT was adopted by Congress during the late 1960s but not actually implemented by the states until the mid-1970s, and then in a rather uneven and desultory fashion. The story is one of perhaps dozens of examples of the way in which government, pursuing laudable goals but with questionable means, was mindlessly expanded during the 1960s and 1970s. The question Foltz enamines is: Why did this particular program achieve so little?

Foltz offers several reasons why EPSDT remains a disappointment. First, the program was lodged in a federal welfare agency that had almost no experience with child health programs. The second major obstacle was federalism. The bureaucrats tried without success to establish incentives and penalties that would motivate better cooperation by the states. Third, there were formidable technical obstacles to implementation of this program; there was no firm consensus on the value of periodic screening for the future health of children. Finally, and most importantly, there was lack of consensus and support for the screening program among private health care physicians and hospitals.

My major objection to Foltz's book lies at the level of theory. The "theory" that is found in most implementation studies is a curious blend of political feasibility, the theory of bureaucratic decision-making, and nostrums from the politics of bureaucracy literature. In this literature, viable programs must be clear in their purposes and based on a strong social and technological consensus. EPSDT and the rest of Great Society programs "failed" because of ambiguity of purpose and because a strong, well-organized constituency did not stand to benefit from their adoption. But it seems to me this literature rests on a fundamental confusion. Most government policies address problems that are systemic in nature and that require for their solution collective goods—goods that are jointly consumed by large segments of the population and that require authoritative coordination and the assignment of costs.

This is certainly the case for EPSDT. An ambitious program like EPSDT can only succeed when health providers—physicians and hospitals, to name the most important two—are brought into an organized and coordinated effort to realize the goal of screening millions of poor children each year. But EPSDT relied principally on the "commercial market strategy" of the Medicaid program, a strategy that leaves the hospital and physician sectors to operate with very limited supervision by government. This fundamental issue—the collective goods problem—was not even contemplated by the architects of EPSDT because a central premise of American health policy to date has been the promise not to interfere directly in medicine. All the clarity in the world will not save a policy that ignores the most formidable obstacle to success—the failure to recognize

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that policy success requires structural modification of the priorities of major health care institutions.

DAN E. BEAUCHAMP
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

The Politics of Welfare: The New York City Experience *by Blanche Bernstein. Cambridge, Mass., Abt Books, 1982. 220 pp. $22.00.*

Blanche Bernstein wrote this book following her resignation as head of New York City's welfare bureaucracy during the beginning years of Mayor Edward Koch's first term. She previously had been New York State's deputy commissioner for income maintenance in Governor Hugh Carey's administration. Bernstein came to both positions strongly identified with views that were inimical to what she calls the "organized social welfare community," including welfare officials, associations of social service agencies, black and Hispanic leaders, and "liberals" (roughly defined). Based on her previous research, she believed that ineligibility rates among welfare recipients were much higher than officials were admitting; that the package of public assistance cash and in-kind benefits was far more valuable than people realized and constituted a disincentive to work; and that the benefit system had an adverse impact on family stability, the "intact family" being the "most important single factor in preventing dependency" (p. 2). Her efforts to change welfare policymaking and administration accordingly met with sustained opposition and, ultimately, a request for her resignation.

Bernstein's critical analysis of welfare policies raises issues that, for the most part, have been raised by other students of public assistance. However, the account of her own administrative and political experiences is of great value and yields some important lessons for those who believe that the welfare system can be effectively reformed.

One such lesson is that administrative policies can importantly affect the level of "waste and fraud" in the system. Three of her examples seem quite persuasive on this point. The rate of Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) recipient ineligibility in New York City had risen to 18 percent (contrary to the previous official estimate of 3 percent), and the rate of overpayment was somewhat more than one third. Three strategies were used to reduce these expensive errors. A "mail-out" sent one-page questionnaires to all welfare cases to update information on family composition and income. Non-response resulted in a notice of closing the case and, if this notice was ignored, payments ceased. A second technique was a "face-to-face recertification" procedure, which required a personal appearance by the recipient. Again, failure to respond to the notice of interview and the notice of closing resulted in removal from the welfare rolls. A third approach was the computerized matching of welfare payment files with the files of other benefit programs and, later on, with the New York State wage reporting system. This procedure corrected ineligibility and overpayment errors and saved an estimated

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$5 million per year. Other administrative changes in the food stamp and Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA) programs also produced savings for the system.

Another lesson from Bernstein's experience is that bureaucratic and constituency politics may substantially inhibit efforts to change public assistance in ways that conflict with the priorities of the "welfare community." In one instance, an attempt was made to expand the uses of "two-party rent checks," which assured payment to landlords from welfare recipients who had been in arrears. Another procedure sought to garner additional financial support from absentee fathers. Both reforms fell victim to the opposition of those who thought them punitive.

In her introduction, Bernstein expresses the hope that her study will contribute to a balanced discussion of welfare policy issues and will serve as "a marker toward that middle road" (p. 15). Some will undoubtedly argue that this book is a brief for only one side of the policy debate. However, it is difficult to sustain this view. Berstein characterizes the bulk of the current administration's welfare cuts as harsh. She proposes to fill gaps in private sector job opportunities with public sector jobs. She also supports the availability of birth control information and devices, as well as abortions. Regardless of the merit of these positions, they can hardly be described as conservative.

BRUCE JACOBS
University of Rochester

Red Harvest: The Communist Party and American Farmers *by Lowell K. Dyson. Lincoln, University of Nebraska Press, 1982. 259 pp. $18.95.*

The story of the Communist Party of the United States of America (CPUSA) and the American farmer abounds in paradox. Lenin himself, Dyson points out, wrote more about American agriculture than about any other aspect of American society. Communism has had its greatest successes in agrarian nations—Russia, China, Vietnam. Yet "the Communist party failed in its efforts among American farmers, just as it failed among workers, teachers, blacks, and other groups" (p. 199).

The American Communist movement, urban in origin and preoccupation, allotted only intermittent attention to the American countryside. The Communist remedy of collectivized farms was, ideologically and practically, a total non-starter in the individualistic American environment. The Communist effort to impose a class analysis on American agriculture—one organization for sharecroppers, another for farm laborers—made little sense in a situation where sharecroppers regularly crossed the line back and forth between tenant and wage-worker. The programs that gained the CPUSA whatever meager support it had from farmers were short-run reforms designed, contrary to the Communist vision, to strengthen, not to revolutionize, the American agricultural system. And, of course, in agricultural work as in every other line of CPUSA endeavor, the American interest was ruthlessly sacrificed to accommodate every new requirement of Soviet foreign policy.

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Dyson defines these issues with lucidity. He carries the story from the abortive party efforts of the 1920s through the confusions of the Great Depression to the final expulsion of Communists and fellow-travelers from the National Farmers Union in the 1950s. Imbedded in the text are useful sketches of Hal Ware and Lem Harris, the two leading party theoreticiams, as well as of influential radical farm leaders like Milo Reno and James G. Patton. Dyson's approach throughout is cool, judicious, and resolutely nonpolemical.

The focus of the book, however, is rather narrow. Dyson writes mostly about organizations. He pays general tributes to the "dedication" (p. 202) of some of the CPUSA farm activists, but they appear from the text to be dedicated chiefly to inventing, infiltrating, or destroying farm organizations. The farmers themselves, their fields, and their lives remain in the dim background.

The national government is also ignored, except as the source of legislation. One might think that a book on the CPUSA and the American farmer would devote some attention to the Communist penetration of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration (AAA). Was AAA, for example, simply a target of opportunity, or a deliberate party objective? But Dyson briskly rules this topic out on the ground that members of the Ware cell in the Department of Agriculture "seem to have had no connection with the Communist farm movement" (p. 228).

The emphasis on organization leads to some structural confusion in the narrative. Chapter 5, for example, follows the story of the Cannery and Agricultural Workers Industrial Union and the Sharecroppers Union through 1937. Chapter 6 abruptly transports us back to the winter of 1932–33, with Franklin Roosevelt not yet in the White House.

Still, within its limits, this is a solid and careful book. Dyson has supplemented exhaustive research in farm periodicals and manuscript collections with useful interviews of survivors. *Red Harvest* will take at once a secure place in the literature of agrarian radicalism in the 1930s.

ARTHUR SCHLESINGER, JR.
City University of New York

Disability and Work: The Economics of American Policy *by Richard V. Burkhauser and Robert H. Haveman. Baltimore, Md., Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982. 131 pp. $14.00.*

This book provides an overview of the economic issues related to current programs for the working-age disabled population. The importance of the topic is suggested by the finding that 16.8 percent of working-age people view themselves as having work-related disabilities. While there are some health- and income-based measures of disability, the working definition rests on a social judgment that has been changing over time.

Those who meet the current definition are not randomly distributed across the

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population. This suggests an element of worker choice in deciding whether they are impaired. Thus, it is not surprising that, relative to the total working-age population, the disabled have characteristics that imply low earnings. Women, Blacks, the relatively low educated, and the aged all have both lower expected earnings and frequencies of work impairment than the average of the population. This observation is critical to Burkhauser's and Haveman's argument that disability claims are related to both health and economic factors.

In this book, programs that provide assistance to the disabled are viewed as emanating from economic theories on spillover effects, insurance, the adverse impact of labor market constraints, and collective compassion. This seems to be more of an exercise to provide an economic rationale for the program mix in the United States than an actual explanation of how these programs originated. As such, "collective compassion" is left as the justification for activities that do not meet the other economic criteria.

In the middle chapters there is an astounding amount of information about the individual programs without the repetitive detail found in most books of this type. Cumulatively, these programs are estimated to have provided $97.9 billion of public expenditures in 1977. The authors point out that the diversity of programs makes it difficult to evaluate the efficiency and equity effects of this system. In the current political and economic environment, more space should have been given to consideration of the system as a whole, analyzing the strengths and weaknesses of the delivery system and offering some judgments about needed changes. As it is, Burkhauser and Haveman settle for the easy conclusion that the costs of multiple coverage are difficult to justify.

The strongest part of the book is the discussion of labor market effects of disability programs. They show that disability payments have been increasing more rapidly than average annual wages and argue conclusively that this provides work disincentives, particularly for low-wage workers. Drawing on an extensive literature, they dwell on the finding that disability-related income transfers induce impaired workers to drop out of the labor force. This clearly should be seen as one of the costs of a program that eliminates the need for disabled workers to find employment.

The survey of work-related programs for handicapped workers, including vocational rehabilitation, sheltered workshops, and special Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA) programs, shows rather high returns to the public investment. This suggests that such programs should be a much more important component of our policy and would seem to offer an opening for a full discussion of the reasons for their historic lack of support. Once again, the challenge is not picked up. Burkhauser and Haveman simply note that direct labor-market intervention has always been a controversial policy.

Perhaps the most novel aspect of this book is the attention given to policies for providing equal access to facilities. An important policy question is raised about the economic feasibility of equating the equal opportunity goals of the civil rights movement with equal access goals for the handicapped and physically impaired, since the costs of these two objectives are of a different magnitude and type. The authors suggest that cost-benefit studies of these changes are in order so that society will have a better notion of the costs of "collective compassion." Unlike the rest of the book, the discussion of equal access programs is nearly devoid of data and literature references. One case study is

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provided, but the implied conclusion that we may be spending too much in this area is not backed up by solid research.

This useful and informative little book should appear on the reading list of all who are interested in disability programs. However, it falls short as an analysis of policy, chiefly because it does not make a serious effort to consider the complete array of programs as a single system.

V. LANE RAWLINS
Washington State University

Lead Me On: Frank Goad Clement and Tennesssee Politics *by Lee Seifert Greene. Knoxville, University of Tennessee Press, 1982. 555 pp. $19.95.*

Frank Clement's political career spanned two decades of great change in Tennessee politics. In his first bid for elective office, he was elected to a two-year term as governor in 1952 at the age of 32, after which he was reelected to a four-year term made possible by constitutional change. Ineligible to succeed himself at that term's end, he waited out his successor and won a third gubernatorial term in 1962. The death of Senator Estes Kefauver led Governor Clement in 1964 into a losing campaign against Ross Bass for the Democratic nomination to fill the unexpired Senate term. Two years later, as his governorship was ending, Clement deprived Bass of his Senate seat by winning the Democratic nomination, but lost the general election to Republican Howard Baker, Jr. The possibility that Clement might seek a fourth term as governor was tragically ended in 1969 when he was killed in an automobile accident.

Given his record, and given the great changes that took place in Tennessee and most other Southern states in these two decades, a full-scale political biography is fully warranted. There is a great deal to commend in this book by Lee Greene, for many years professor of political science at the University of Tennessee and a well-established authority on volunteer politics and administration. He has amassed a great wealth of information (the notes and bibliography run to 150 pages), though the collections of papers examined seem not to have yielded much of substance. He is impressively fair in his assessments both of Clement and of his opponents, and his familiarity with the state enables him to apply what appears to be an accurate discount rate to a great many claims and charges. He is not afraid to offer judgments when appropriate. Greene gives us a good feel for the state's administrative system and the changes that took place in it, though his discussion of electoral and legislative politics seems to me less insightful. And he shows skill and sensitivity in recapitulating such headline-producers as the desegregation battles at Clinton and the charges of corrupt Teamsters Union influence. In writing a biography of this sort, a great many missteps are possible, and to his credit Lee Greene avoids many of them.

But not all. So many names are introduced that even knowledgeable Tennesseans may be impeded. We do not learn much about the inner Frank Clement that is helpful in understanding the outer one, and personal difficulties that may have affected his later

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career (such as a drinking problem and his wife's suit for divorce, pending at his death) are barely mentioned. Little is said about the political role of religious groups and their leaders, though they are surely important. It is hard to get a good overview because the book's style and organization cause major and minor developments to run together.

It seems fair, however, to blame the inherent difficulty of the task rather than the author for the failure to portray satisfactorily Clement's greatest resource—his oratorical ability. Those of us who heard his keynote address at the 1956 Democratic National Convention can understand that in his time and place it was a formidable talent.

The book is attractively designed and nicely printed and bound, with only rare copy-editing lapses (such as "straighened" for "straitened" (p. 31); "degredation" on p. 294; "defenstration" on p. 330).

CLIFTON MCCLESKEY
University of Virginia

Change and Continuity in the 1980 Elections *by Paul R. Abramson, John H. Aldrich, and David W. Rohde. Washington, D.C., Congressional Quarterly Press, 1982. 257 pp. $8.95.*

This study is divided into three parts. Part I discusses the 1980 presidential election: the nomination contests in both the Democratic and Republican parties; the general election campaign; and the election results. Part II analyzes voting behavior in the 1980 presidential election: who voted; the social factors that influenced the vote; and the roles that party identification, issues, and presidential performance played in determining the outcome of the election. Part III looks at the 1980 congressional elections, both at who won and at what factors influenced the election results.

While at first glance it may seem that the book tries to address three different topics, in fact the format of the book allows the authors to discuss the 1980 election within the context of a more general discussion of voting behavior in the United States. In their description and analysis of the 1980 presidental election, the authors raise two themes: was the election a referendum on Carter's performance or a mandate for Reagan's policies; and did the election signify a realignment or a dealignment of partisan predispositions? The authors state that "the Republican victory in 1980 was more a rejection of Carter's performance as president than a mandate for Republican policies," (p. 5) while admitting that the question of partisan realignment or dealignment is "far more difficult to answer" (p. 5). By raising these questions within their description of the 1980 electoral contest, the authors provide a link to the discussion of voting behavior that follows.

One of the greatest strengths of this book is the authors' efforts to place the 1980 election in historical perspective. These efforts are especially noteworthy in Part II. In both the analysis of voter turnout in 1980 and the analysis of how social groups voted in 1980, the authors discuss trends in turnout and voting behavior from the New Deal

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to the present. The study does an excellent job of demonstrating the breakdown of the New Deal coalition and the electoral problems the Democratic party will face in the future.

Chapters 6 and 7 present a discussion of prospective and retrospective voting, continuing the mandate-referendum theme raised in Part I. The authors do a good job of examining the notion of issue-voting in 1980, and conclude that while issues were important in the election, there was little empirical evidence to support Reagan's claim of a mandate. Moreover, they find substantial evidence to support the notion of retrospective voting, and once again put the 1980 election in perspective by comparing prospective and retrospective voting in the 1972, 1976, and 1980 elections.

In Part III of the book the authors examine the outcomes of the 1980 House and Senate elections, the effect of those elections on policymaking in the Ninety-seventh Congress, and the factors that affect voting in congressional elections. The two chapters dealing with Congress are the least satisfying in the book, though only in comparison to the detail and perspective that characterizes the discussion of voting in the presidential election.

This book is an important work for those who want an understanding of the 1980 elections and for those who are interested in voting behavior generally. The authors go beyond mere description to provide insightful analysis of the election results and their significance. They provide a thorough discussion of the factors that have influenced voting in past presidential elections as well as the 1980 election. A tremendous amount of factual information is presented in tables and charts, though the reader does not feel overburdened with unexplained information. Finally, the book remains topical, despite the events of the ensuing two years.

CANDICE J. NELSON
Georgetown University

Strategic Studies and Public Policy: The American Experience *by Colin S. Gray. Lexington, University Press of Kentucky, 1982. 230 pp. $19.50.*

This slim volume can be approached on two levels. It can be viewed as a historical review of the American strategic literature from the immediate postwar period to the present. As such, it provides a thorough description, organized by time period, of the most important policy debates that have taken place. This should prove useful to students and scholars alike. It is among other things revealing of the fact that the same few questions, finite deterrence versus war-fighting, the feasibility of extended deterrence, and the political utility of strategic forces, have continually dominated the literature with much the same arguments being made in somewhat different technological contexts.

The historical review of the literature also gives Gray the opportunity to offer his own opinion on most important strategic questions. His judgments are sometimes perceptive, sometimes bizarre, and always verging on arrogance. He deserves praise for harping on

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the cultural determinants of strategy, something that has traditionally been given short shrift by American analysts, whose conceptions more often derive from abstract theoretical notions about conflict. This has made it difficult, even impossible, for most American strategists to make sense of Soviet doctrine and force structure. Americans have tended to project their own notions of deterrence and strategic sufficiency on the Soviet Union and to interpret Soviet developments accordingly. At first this led to a consensus that the Soviets were strategically "backward" but could be educated about the need for accepting mutual assured destruction (MAD) through the arms control process. Now that the Soviets continue to reject MAD even after achieving parity, it has become fashionable to read the most ominous ambitions into their assertions that nuclear war is winnable. Gray is not the first to point out that both conceptions are ludicrous and reveal more about the analysts who advance them than they do about Soviet strategy.

On the negative side, Gray launches emotional attacks on the opposition to the Vietnam War; he believes that the war probably could have been won by taking it north on the ground. Such a strategy, even if it would have held out the prospect of success, seems yet one more reason why the United States should never have become involved in Vietnam in the first place. Gray also heaps abuse on arms controllers, as do-gooders blinded by their own conceptions of security who permitted the Soviet Union to catch up and even overtake the U.S. in some categories in strategic capability. These charges are valid to the extent that one subscribes to the at least as narrow, rigid, and ideologically determined conceptions of this critic.

RICHARD NED LEBOW
Cornell University

Social Science and Institutional Change *by Robert R. Mayer. New Brunswick, N.J., Transaction Books, 1982. 202 pp. $16.95.*

Reflective political and other social scientists must at some point question themselves about the applicability of their theories to what is often referred to, somewhat embarrassingly, as the "real world." In this book, Robert Mayer has asked this question aloud, focusing his efforts in part on what social scientists can offer to practitioners concerned with institutional change. I say only in part because Mayer's concern with this very important question represents only a portion, albeit the best portion, of this work of otherwise questionable value to political scientists.

Two purposes motivated Mayer to write the book: to add to our understanding of the process and to examine the role of social science in institutional change. To pursue these goals, Mayer's "methods" included reviewing the literature (or rather the *abstracts* of the literature) on institutional change and studying a handful of cases of change through review of documents, site visits, and interviews. Institutional change, by the way, is characterized, according to Mayer, by "any planned or intended alteration in the goals,

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program, or structure of an organization which is operating in the public interest" (p. 2).

Mayer's review leads him to posit that three factors are important in institutional change—ideology, organizational structure, and individual psychological and interpersonal characteristics. The discussion of each of these factors is very dissatisfying. All three discussions are largely taxonomic rather than analytic. The discussion of ideology is superficial, as one might expect in a discussion of ideology in the United States that lasts one page; its functions in organizations are barely noted. More problematic is that the discussion is limited to explicit ideology in public decision-making. Such a conceptualization misses the roots of institutional stagnation, which is tied to an *implicit* ideology of system maintenance. Mayer's "analysis" of structural approaches to institutional change is really just a set of hypotheses about the conditions under which change is likely to be fostered or resisted. The notion of incentive systems in the discussion of the role of individuals in change assumes that economic rationality and cash incentives may be used to motivate bureaucratic and social service workers, whereas much evidence points to other factors as motivating street-level service providers.

Moreover, save for a brief discussion in the conclusion, which is buried in the end of the book rather than at the beginning to give some theoretical meat to the otherwise skeletal volume, there is no attempt to synthesize the three factors. Mayer is dependent on the thinking of others and offers no new insights. What may pass for innovative scholarship in social work—and I am certainly not qualified to judge quality scholarship in a discipline with which I am unfamiliar—simply does not pass muster in political science. The dynamics of organizational behavior are not addressed. Many of the important works in organizational and policy analysis are unnoticed by the author; citations to those who were read stop in 1977, leaving the book hopelessly outdated before it was even printed.

Three chapters are devoted to case studies of institutional change in corrections and in education. Those on correctional reform are hardly in-depth case studies that can serve as laboratories to test the taxonomy (called a model by Mayer). Instead, they are outdated summaries of programs in progress—one reference on p. 102, for example, refers to a program that is supported by the Carter administration—in a book published in 1982—with no real evidence to evaluate the success or failure. Nonetheless, Mayer tries to fit the cases into his existing taxonomic framework. The programs described are hardly the results of social science being applied. They are simply ideas of one particular thinker, not the results of systematic scientific inquiry or rigorous theorizing. The case studies of educational reforms (voucher systems and school decentralization) are better documented but are problematic for other reasons. The problems Mayer finds in his cases refer more to the difficulties of program implementation, not to a failure of social science.

Perhaps inadvertently, the most interesting chapter is one addressing the utilization of social science in public policy. Though disjointed, the chapter offers a history of social science use in several programs and outlines a number of factors affecting the use of social science research findings. In his call for the fusion of theory and applied research, however, Mayer calls for a social science that is compatible with dominant ideologies and politics. Though he mentions the possible problems that emerge from an uncritical social

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research, somehow one is left with the feeling that Mayer thinks social scientists should toe the line and serve political elites rather than maintain some distance to criticize them.

ROBERT G. MEADOW
University of California, San Diego

Inflation and Politics: Fiscal, Monetary, and Wage-Price Discipline *by William A. Lovett. Lexington, Mass., Lexington Books, 1982. 268 pp. $28.94.*

Maybe inflation is one of the prices we pay for our cherished freedom to act in what appears to be our own self-interest, but while hurting others. (Other examples are pollution, unemployment, dangerous products, overpopulation, and the like.) Inflation becomes a national problem when its rate becomes so high that prominent people say "something should be done about it."

The roots of inflation, thus conceived, are usually political, meaning that people with power to influence events have used that power with selfish interest. Sometimes this selfishness may be masked by custom (like passing along cost increases with a little added), by failing to do something preventive (like not raising taxes for fear of reprisals by campaign contributors or by a segment of voters different from those for whose benefit spending is being legislated), or by the misjudgment of well-intentioned people (like central bankers who don't make good predictions and then rationalize their monetary policy mistakes).

The title of this volume indicates the viewpoint of a professor of law and economics with experience in regulatory agencies. People are said to lack "discipline," meaning sufficient restraint in the fields of public finance, banking, and price-setting. Also, the book argues that enough "discipline" in those areas could stop inflation. (Note the unconscious circular reasoning in the use of adjectives like "sufficient" and "enough" that could logically vitiate counter-arguments.)

More precisely, Lovett sees possible causes of inflation as including at least eight factors: excessive government deficits; excess money supplies; "increase in wages or prices without enough discipline from competition"; expectational momentum; "scarce resources, products, or specialized manpower"; special wartime or postwar pressures; external price shocks in major commodities like oil or grain; and inflation in major trading partners abroad (see, for example, pp. 95, 104, 165).

The author would generally excuse nations for the last five but certainly not the first three. He presents much evidence that countries like Japan, West Germany, and Switzerland have shown much better "discipline" in the first three than the United States, Britain, France, and therefore have had less inflation.

ROBERT B. PETTENGILL
State University of New York at Albany

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Britain and Soviet Communism: The Impact of Revolution *by F.S. Northedge and Audrey Wells. London, Macmillan Press, 1982. 280 pp. Cloth, £15; paper, £6.95.*

This is a survey of "the British experience of the Soviet phenomenon" (p. vii) that hopes to contribute "to the formation of more rational judgements [as to] . . . how Britain is best to deal with the Soviet Union" (p. viii). Its general premise is that the West must learn to coexist with the Russians since otherwise we will all perish together. The author argues first that British attitudes towards the Soviets have been based on misconceptions, and second that British policy towards the Soviets since 1917, and especially during the 1930s, was often short-sighted and mistaken, while Soviet policy towards Britain, though hardly blameless, often was both sensible and pragmatic.

The book is divided into two sections. The second, which is less interesting and effective than the first, deals with the cultural and economic aspects of Anglo-Soviet relations since 1917. In it, the authors trace the evolution of the main outlines of general public opinion in Britain towards Soviet Russia since the Revolution, concentrating in turn on Russophobes, Russophiles, intellectuals, and the Left. There is little that is new here: a brief description of the climate of opinion in Britain concentrating mainly on the 1930s and 1940s, when in certain circles it was practically adulatory, and the 1950s when, typically, former celebrants of Soviet communism put together a volume of essays entitled *The God That Failed*; a conventional though abbreviated account of communist strength both in the Labour Party and in the trade union movement; a short summary of British Communist Party history that emphasizes the failures. Many works provide more thorough and more analytical treatment of these subjects. The authors' survey of economic relations between Britain and the Soviet Union is equally cursory, essentially a listing of the main trade agreements and an argument that there have not been enough of them. Had there been more, they contend, Stalinist Russia would have felt less isolated and embattled, and therefore would have been less totalitarian.

Perhaps because the authors have attempted to compress so complex a history into this second section of their book, they occasionally become careless. J.R. Clynes was not a leader of the anti-war faction of the Labour Party during 1914–18 (p. 183). Rather, as minister of food in 1918 he served David Lloyd George's government and opposed Labour's decision to leave the coalition after the war was won. Nor did Harold Wilson help Richard Crossman and Ian Mikardo to form the "Keep Left" organization after World War II (p. 191). Michael Foot was the third member of that formidable triumvirate.

Yet if the touch of Northedge and Wells is somewhat uncertain in dealing with the home front, as it were, of Britain's relationship with the Soviets, their treatment of the diplomatic side is concise and sure. It owes much to the revisionist interpretation of diplomatic history elaborated during the 1960s. As the authors put it: "In many international questions in the twentieth century (we have no wish to say the same of matters arising in the internal administration of states), the Russians have had a better case . . . than that of the Western states they have dealt with" (p. 118). It would seem that Anglo-Russian relations, in particular, have been characterized on the British side by misunderstanding, shortsightedness, and outright malevolence.

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In 1917, Lloyd George hoped to treat with the Bolsheviks and "civilise" them; he was overruled and eventually replaced by Conservatives in his cabinet who instead tried to strangle the Revolution in its cradle. The Labour governments of 1924 and 1929 took a less activist, though only marginally less hostile, attitude. Wiser than Stanley Baldwin, Winston Churchill, and the others, Ramsay MacDonald and Arthur Henderson followed the Lloyd George line. For a variety of reasons, however, not excluding domestic political ones, they always sought to make clear the chasm that separated revolutionary communism from democratic socialism, and to keep Anglo-Soviet relations within strict bounds. As a result, such contact between the two countries as was permitted failed to promote better understanding. After 1931, when the Conservatives returned to power, Russia sought security from fascism through alliances with Britain and France, but met with continual rebuffs. In Northedge's and Wells's view, the Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939 was Stalin's logical if chilling riposte to six years of foolish and mistaken British diplomacy. Even after the war, the authors argue, Russian moves in Eastern Europe and elsewhere were essentially defensive and designed to afford protection from a revived and militaristic Germany. But Britain, from a variety of motives, put a different and much less generous construction on them.

There will be diplomatic historians to quarrel with this. If many have rejected the former orthodoxy that attributed all international tensions to Russian expansionism, the original revisionist view that conversely located the source of those tensions mainly in the West has likewise been modified. Moreover, recent work on British diplomacy in the 1930s tends to rehabilitate the long term-judgment of the appeasers Lord Halifax and Neville Chamberlain.

Few, however, would reject the general sentiments that animate the authors of this volume. Their call for "patient inquiry" into Anglo-Soviet relations so that we may discover alternatives to mutual annihilation is obviously timely. As a modest contribution to that process, this volume fulfills its authors' purpose.

JONATHAN SCHNEER
Yale University

Reviving the Industrial City: The Politics of Urban Renewal in Lyon and Birmingham *by Jerry A. Webman. New Brunswick, N.J., Rutgers University Press, 1982. 197 pp. $25.00.*

Jerry Webman has written a very good little book comparing French and British decision-making. He begins by observing the similar goals and strategies of planners in Lyon and Birmingham and queries the different outcomes of their urban renewal projects. Working his way systematically through the celebrated analyses of Andrew Shonfield and Jack Hayward, in particular, he debunks the prevailing view that the French are better planners and have more central control, and that the private sector dominates British planning in comparison to French state authority.

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Webman proves in this study that structured, focused case comparisons can devastate theories generated through grander hypothesizing about more general data. He argues that the presumably narrow pursuit of urban renewal poses the same planning challenge to the state apparatus as policies for economic growth, and he deploys detailed data culled from thorough interviewing of responsible officials in Lyon and Birmingham to turn Shonfield's and Hayward's arguments upside down. Reversing what might have been expected from conventional wisdom on France and Britain, he concludes that "if Birmingham provided a model of bureaucratic uniformity, insulation, and singularity of purpose, Lyon exemplified administrative complexity and overlap" (pp. 134–35). A more startling but still plausible conclusion follows: "Though more centralized, the French urban planning apparatus is more fragmented than its British counterpart" (p. 139).

Although Webman's research methods are to be applauded and his analytical conclusions make an important contribution to our general thinking about Britain and France, there are features of this book that are disappointing. Some weaknesses are inherent in the methodology but reflect more on the discipline than on the author. For example, there is the inevitable difficulty of generalizing from only two cases (and indeed only one in each country); Webman might have tested at least one other urban pairing. However, other political scientists by now might have provided additional systematic comparative cases that would contribute to more reliable generalizations. Students of Western Europe have depended far too long on grand policy pronouncements rather than on careful decision analysis to generalize about political cultures and institutions. Webman's study is a useful corrective.

Other weaknesses are more serious. Webman reaches out to an American audience by framing analytical questions around the rudimentary theories of American political scientists. The primary audience for this book, however, will comprise comparativists and Europeanists, and the excursions into the American literature are at the expense of a more serious treatment of the relevant European literature. Furthermore, the predictions based on American experience are generally unreliable because, as Webman successfully demonstrates himself, different policy outcomes are attributable to different institutionalized decision-making processes.

The theoretical framework of the first chapter does not turn out to be the most useful one possible. Webman evokes the "synoptic ideal" of comprehensive planning and inquires about the "political arbiter" who might achieve it. Yet Webman's main theoretical contribution concerns coordination problems among central agencies and between central and local authorities. The "political arbiter" is a straw man, and this book would be stronger if Webman had included a more direct and detailed assessment of coordinating mechanisms, measurements of policy success and failure, and the significance of mix in public and private enterprise for the achievement of central policy goals. All these issues are discussed, but they take a regrettable back seat to less enlightening theoretical propositions.

Webman's concluding chapter is disappointing because he raises important questions but does not try seriously to answer them, and because he might have been more straightforward in assessing the puzzle of contrasting policy outcomes. Hence, the book contributes some exciting empirical findings, but it lacks the ambition that, on its own,

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might have made a greater dent in the tarnished armor of conventional wisdom. This study is valuable (and I myself have already assigned it to students), but we must look forward to more cases drawn as carefully, and to more ambitious analysis.

ELLIOT J. FELDMAN
Harvard University

Workers and Communists in France: From Popular Front to Eurocommunism *by George Ross. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1982. 357 pp. $30.00.*

While a major reason for the strength of the French and Italian communist parties is their domination of the labor movements of the two nations, no scholarly research until now has focused on the relationship between the communist party "vanguard" and the trade union mass following in either country. As George Ross conclusively demonstrates in this outstanding study of the French Communist Party (PCF) and the Confédération Générale du Travail (CGT)—the largest French trade union—the usual description of the CGT as a transmission belt for PCF policy obscures more than it clarifies. First, the "transmission belt theory" neglects the fact that, if the CGT was narrowly subordinate to the PCF during the cold war, it had greater latitude during much of the 1960s and early 1970s. Borrowing from Nicos Poulantzas's analysis of the capitalist state, Ross suggests that the CGT developed relative autonomy from the PCF at this time. Just as, in Poulantzas's approach, the state requires autonomy from capital the better to serve the latter's interests, so Ross asserts that the CGT required relative autonomy from the PCF in order better to defend PCF interests. By neglecting labor market militancy in favor of political activity on behalf of the PCF in the 1950s, the CGT alienated its own mass following and thereby jeopardized the PCF's position as well. In the 1960s and 1970s, by contrast, the CGT concentrated on defending workers' material interests, while stressing that fundamental change depended on PCF success.

Second, the transmission belt approach fails to illuminate the dynamics of how PCF influence is exerted within the CGT. A useful parallel might be drawn in this respect with the concept of totalitarianism (indeed, the two concepts are often used in tandem). Both imply fully centralized absolute control that does not agree with reality.

Third, while PCF leaders might have preferred the CGT to act as a transmission belt, this was precluded if the PCF was to project the image of a Eurocommunist party attractive to younger, educated workers and to members of the intermediate strata. Ross described how the PCF was forced to grant the CGT greater autonomy in order to demonstrate consistency between the PCF's Eurocommunist professions and party practice.

By the same token, however, CGT autonomy depended on the depth of the PCF's commitment to liberalization. When this faltered in the late 1970s, after the PCF failed to gain widespread middle strata support and began to return to a workerist (*ouvrièriste*)

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stance, the CGT was again forced into subjection to the PCF. However, this did not occur before the CGT achieved what Ross considers its high point of audacity and imagination—the brief period around 1978 of "proposition force unionism." Under the leadership of Eurocommunist liberalizers in the CGT (most of whom have since been dismissed from leadership positions), the CGT sought to develop and implement its own counter-industrial planning as a progressive alternative to then Prime Minister Raymond Barre's neo-liberal austerity policies.

With the Socialist victory of 1981 and the PCF's decline, all this might be considered, to quote Jimmy Carter, "ancient history," except that Ross's analysis provides indispensable historical background for understanding the internal shift within the French left and the present PCF and CGT disarray. However, I still maintain three reservations. First, the book's title is misleading. The CGT represents a tiny proportion of French workers and only about half of French trade unionists; it should not be equated with all workers. While there is some analysis of the CGT's relations with other unions, the book's purview (although substantial) is quite limited. Second, Ross studies the PCF and CGT from the top down: the book is an account of "summit relations," not workers and communists in specific industries, regions, or factories. Third, the book is based nearly exclusively on the official record. It comes to life when Ross draws on interviews and other personal sources—but one wishes for more of this fascinating information. Fortunately, Ross will partially redress these problems in a forthcoming book (with Jane Jenson), in which he will report participant observations of a PCF cell.

MARK KESSELMAN
Columbia University

Red Navy at Sea: Soviet Naval Operations on the High Seas, 1956–1980 *by Bruce W. Watson. Boulder, Colo., Westview Press, 1982. 245 pp. $27.50.*

Commander Watson's concise book examines the activities of the Soviet navy in the context of Soviet long-term political objectives. Drawing on mainly English language sources, as well as some interesting interviews with senior American naval officers, the study provides a useful overview of Soviet naval operations on the world's oceans from 1956 to 1980.

The book's organization is quite straightforward. In the opening chapter, the author states his belief that the Soviet fleet was constructed to support the achievement of four long-range goals: defending the Soviet Union; enhancing the Soviet Union's international stature; aiding Soviet power projection capabilities; and helping "change the international political system to suit Soviet purposes" (p. 1).

After some discussion of general types of Soviet naval activity, such as port visits, surveillance, and crisis intervention, each subsequent chapter provides a largely chronological accounting of Soviet fleet operations in the various regions of the world. Almost one third of the book is devoted to Soviet naval activities in the Mediterranean Sea, while

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shorter segments examine similar operations in the Atlantic, Pacific, and Indian Oceans, the Caribbean Sea, and West Africa. The discussion of these matters benefits from Commander Watson's extensive research in press archives.

Some fifty pages are devoted to tables in the appendix that detail such activities as port visits, out-of-area ship days, and the shifting strength of the various Soviet fleets. The tables, though a veritable mine of information, would have benefited from more effective visual aids, such as graphs or pie charts. Further, no references are given in the appendix.

The major weakness of the book is one of tone. Commander Watson is still serving in the United States Navy and at times his naval bias intrudes to the point of irritation. For example, in his summary the author states: "Although Soviet naval power has been employed effectively on many occasions, none has led to socialist systems conforming to the Soviet model. That fact does not spell failure for the Soviets. . . . Rather, it reflects the influence of U.S. naval power in international affairs" (p. 175). Other observers might conclude that Soviet setbacks also reflect a host of other influences. Similarly, the author makes clear his dissatisfaction with the apparent timidity of the American response to Soviet naval expansion. Having raised the issue, however, Commander Watson offers no policy recommendations beyond a general strengthening of the U.S. fleet.

Still, such commentary, combined with the interviews of senior American naval officers, provides some idea of current U.S. naval attitudes toward the Soviet fleet. The primary value of the book is its wide scope. Commander Watson has compressed a great deal of information into a rather small space, and the study provides a useful account of the dramatic expansion of the Soviet navy.

CHRISTOPHER J. BOWIE
The Rand Corporation

The *Real* Terror Network: Terrorism in Fact and Propaganda *by Edward S. Herman. Boston, Mass., South End Press, 1982. 252 pp. Cloth, $20.00; paper, $7.50.*

By its refusal to support the creation of an international development agency administered by the Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development (SUNFED) immediately following World War II—when the United States had a practical monopoly on the strategic decisions that were to structure the postwar system of international relations—American made inevitable the use of the Third World as the arena in which the protagonists of the cold war would fight most of their battles. In effect, Herman's book provides a devastating analysis of the consequences of this failure of our moral and political imagination. It is also a thoroughgoing indictment of the defense of Third World authoritarianism, flogged by all other postwar administrations, but vigorously pressed by the Reagan administration through the persona affected by the United States ambassador to the United Nations, Jeane Kirkpatrick.

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Indeed, one of the attractive aspects of Herman's book is its successful assault on the ambassador's vulgar thesis regarding dictatorship: that traditional autocrats (unlike their "totalitarian" counterparts in Communist countries), such as those in Latin America (the source of the majority of the book's examples), observe "traditional taboos" in their treatment of their populations. One would be hard pressed to discover the traditional taboos observed by Alfredo Stroessner's geek "Snowflake." Or, likewise, to discover the limits of the venality and bestiality of Anastasio Somoza Debayle.

Perhaps the most attractive and important aspect of the book is its treatment of the failure of American media adequately to report the egregious human rights violations taking place in what Herman calls the National Security States (NSS)—the states whose regimes Kirkpatrick is bent upon defending. He convincingly argues his hypothesis "that a friendly NSS which allows easy penetration by western economic interests can engage in virtually unlimited abuse of its own citiziens without attracting substantial attention or expressions of concern, let alone denunciations, by the U.S. mass media" (p. 156). In particular, he takes to task the reporting of Juan de Onis and the editorializing of Flora Lewis regarding these states. He also dissects Claire Sterling's *The Terror Network*, demonstrating that "whenever Sterling tries to show the subservience to (or control by) Moscow of specific retail terrorist groups of the left, the closer one looks the less the plausibility" (pp. 55–56).

Chapter Three of this five-chapter work rehearses the more obvious details of the state terrorism that Kirkpatrick would justify, and that U.S. media fail to report. Chapter Five suggests remedies for this terrorism. In my view, the crucial weaknesses of Herman's book appear in these chapters. For, although the matter is mentioned in Chapter Three, Herman nowhere provides adequate coverage of the role that the authoritarian structures of the NSS and their relations with their international sponsors play in imposing hunger and even starvation on huge segments of Third World populations. As it stands, this book provides a wealth of information which could be used to confirm aspects of such formal *dependencia* hypotheses as are provided by Raymond Duvall et al. But an analysis of the consequences of the agribusiness-sponsored "Green Revolution" would make a more subtle point about the most pervasive and more destructive aspect of the structural violence addressed.

Remarkably, in Chapter Five, Herman fails to argue the obvious; that, in the long-run, U.S. support for authoritarian regimes is counter-productive. No less qualified a cold warrior than Robert J. Alexander pointed out twenty years ago that by supporting virtually every military tyrant who came on the scene in Latin America between 1945 and 1960, the United States set the stage for its own and Latin America's current problems. We seem bound to learn the same lesson again.

W. R. CAMPBELL
Miami University, Ohio

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Media and the Russian Public *by Ellen Propper Mickiewicz. New York, Praeger, 1981. 156 pp. $21.95.*

Not a social scientist myself, I have for years meekly accepted as inevitable the sad fact that the likes of me cannot read serious studies in political science. There was a time, I would recall with nostalgia, when even non-specialists could read many such works that were, in language and style, indistinguishable from historical writing. Nowadays, I was sternly told by colleagues, that is out of the question. Precision and complexity of thought, the argument went, require highly technical language—and also lengthy exposition.

I shall no longer be thus intimidated. Ellen Propper Mickiewicz has demonstrated what I have suspected all along. Her study attests that a large and involved subject can be intelligently discussed in a brief book. It also demonstrates that ample documentation, including statistics, need not stand in the way of clear exposition in pleasantly literate (and occasionally elegant) English prose.

Frequent comparisons and contrasts between Soviet and Western practices that are found throughout the book impart a helpful sense of perspective. Thus, she writes: "Many kinds of stories covered by the Western press are considered inappropriate for the Soviet press. News of disasters and accidents is reported in the tersest fashion. Crime and sensationalism generally go unreported. Celebrity and socialite doings are not covered, nor is the host of entertainment features such as astrology, fashion, living, horoscope, travel tips, and advice to the lovelorn. Advertising is absent. There are human interest stories in the Soviet press, but they are designed to spur examination of social mores and the problems of choosing a correct path in life" (p. 53).

To a non-Soviet specialist, the book's most interesting sections are those dealing with television, public lectures, and the economically and culturally deprived urban dwellers, who are for the most part recent migrants from the countryside. The advent of television is a relatively recent phenomenon: "In 1960 there were only 4.8 million sets in the Soviet Union, but by 1975 that number had climbed to over 55 million and over 6.5 million sets were produced annually" (p. 18). The distribution, however, is uneven. While 67 percent of all Soviet families owned a set, only 44.2 per cent of rural households did, mostly because they could not afford one. As if to compensate, farmers watch television more than city dwellers. Indeed, "rural children between the ages of five and 16 now watch 85 percent of everything that is broadcast and spend as much time in front of the set as at school" (p. 23). People over 61 watch television more than any other group, except only for children 11 to 15. Men average 10 to 12 hours of viewing per week, while women watch only six to seven. But then, women are also less likely to read newspapers regularly than men (61 per cent and 85 per cent, respectively). One reason for the disparity is that women with young children "spend some 30 hours a week on housekeeping chores and another 10 hours caring for children" (pp. 143–44). Adding to this the full-time job that most Soviet mothers hold, we obtain an average of *eleven working hours a day, seven days a week.*

Of the forms of Soviet mass media, one has no American counterpart at all. These are public lectures sponsored by the Znanie (Knowledge) Society: "In 1966 the audience

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for these lectures was equal to over five times the entire adult population of the country" (p. 125)—a staggering figure indeed. In 1976, in Moscow alone, 818,000 lectures were given, more than two thousand every day of that year. The subjects emphasize Party history, economics and foreign affairs, but include a very wide spectrum, ranging from geology to the fine arts. The most avid consumers of Soviet books, periodicals, broadcasting, and the like, are professional Party functionaries. Those least likely to be reached by the Soviet media are recent rural migrants to the city, of whom nearly 3.5 million lived in barrack-style dormitories in 1970 (p. 105).

Except for Communist Party members who turn to news of the party, Soviet newspaper readers "turn first to international news, then to sports, science and culture, and the economic news—in that order" (p. 121). The intense curiosity about life abroad—coupled with skepticism about the objectivity of Soviet sources—moves many to listen to foreign radio, such as the BBC, Voice of America, and Radio Liberty, all of them currently jammed. Even more pervasive, however, is thirst for entertainment. By and large deprived of entertainment by the Soviet mass media, Soviet men and women flock not only to good Western films, but even to artistically inferior Third World productions. It is unfortunate that political limitations imposed in the USSR on public opinion surveys exclude deeper probing of similar questions.

MAURICE FRIEDBERG
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Siberian Development and East Asia: Threat or Promise? *by Allen S. Whiting. Stanford, Calif., Stanford University Press, 1981. 276 pp. $22.50.*

That the Soviet Union has always been an East Asian as well as a European power is a fundamental but often unacknowledged reality of world politics. However, the East Asian dimension of Soviet power has suffered from the fact that the century-long promise of Siberian development has not yet been fully redeemed. Accelerated development of the vast and resource-rich lands of Siberia is now underway, and it is this process and its implications for the other actors in East Asia—China, Japan, and the United States—that form the subject of Allen Whiting's superb and innovative study. Commencing with an analysis of what he terms East Asian Siberia (those Siberian territories oriented towards East Asia), Whiting examines the internal and international factors that affect such development, the strategic implications for East Asia as a whole, and the particular interests of Japan, China, and the U.S. His general conclusion is that foreign participation in the development of East Asian Siberia should be encouraged, since development does not ominously threaten the interests of any power and may contribute to the stock of global resources and the economic well-being of China and Japan, as well as that of the Soviet Union itself. Without foreign participation, the development of East Asian Siberia is likely to be considerably retarded.

Climatic factors including severe winter weather, ice fog, and permafrost complicate

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the development of East Asian Siberia. Whiting explores these factors along with questions of resource endowments, demographic constraints, and Soviet public policy to reach a realistic judgment of the region's potential. A particularly valuable feature of his book is its balanced assessment of Soviet military deployments in East Asia. Rejecting the alarmist views often encountered on this subject, Whiting suggests that Moscow's military orientation may be defensively conceived, notwithstanding the buildup of recent years. He further suggests that the completion of the Baikal-Amur Mainline (BAM)—the East-West rail line being constructed to the north of the Trans-Siberian—will not likely alter the existing military balance in the region.

Whiting's chapters on the international political aspects of Siberian development are a kind of short course on East Asian international relations and as such can profitably be read even by those with minimal interest in Siberia. He correctly focuses on Soviet-Japanese relations as the central bilateral relationship given the historical alternation between Russian and Japanese hegemony in Northeast Asia. Japan tends to perceive the USSR basically in economic terms, and from such a perspective Tokyo and Moscow share an interest in Siberian development. A strengthening of economic links, Whiting suggests, may be a means toward the resolution of political and security issues over the longer term. Although Chinese interests are less directly involved in Siberian development, there too positive, if limited, payoffs for the PRC may be envisioned and perhaps for this reason Peking has posed no serious political obstacles to foreign participation in Siberian development.

As a student of Chinese foreign policy, Allen Whiting has long since proven himself to be without peer. In this book, which displays the same rich conceptual imagination and rigorous scholarship that are his trademark, he breaks new ground by bringing East Asian Siberia into the field of vision of East Asian specialists. This is a singular service. So too are his policy recommendations, which suggest the need to rise above the short-term parochial interests of a single country to a regional perspective from which the value of economic cooperation to all parties concerned can be more easily discovered.

STEVEN I. LEVINE
American University

Policy and Politics in Contemporary Poland: Reform, Failure and Crisis *edited by Jean Woodall. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1982. 200 pp. $25.00.*

It is a tribute to the contributors to this volume that although they completed their work a few short months before the imposition of martial law in Poland, the book's worth and usefulness has not been diminished by that desperate step. If anything, the situation in Poland since December 1981 is made more comprehensible by this volume's analyses of the multiple and interesting crises of the 1970s. The editor defines the aim of book as providing a "logical explanation" of the turbulence in Poland since 1980, and in this the authors succeed. While there is no conceptual organizing principle, there is a common

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theme that runs through all the essays: attempts to reform the Polish system in the 1970s were not well thought out, were often contradictory, and were stymied by both pre-existing vested interests and new ones created by the reforms themselves. Thus, for example, Paul Lewis shows that decentralization of economic decision-making allowed enterprise managers to enrich themselves at public expense and to the detriment of their enterprises. Again, "the reduction in the size and status of provincial party organizations, far from bringing effective political leadership closer to the local community, simply reduced the party's capacity to supervise and control economic activity at the local level and necessitated cumbersome approaches being made through the central government apparatus" (p. 87).

The nine essays cover ideological developments, the evolution of the Polish United Worker's Party at both the mass and elite levels, administrative reforms under Edward Gierek and their consequences, the organization of labor, and "the degeneration of central planning." There are two more narrowly focused chapters, on educational policy and health policy, which serve as case studies of the overall malaise described by the other authors. George Schöpflin's contribution is an analysis of the impact on Eastern Europe of Polish developments in which he concludes that no other country is likely to copy the specifics of the Polish model of 1980–81, but that it is "more likely to be a source of encouragement . . . for other East European societies seeking a wider role than that allowed by democratic centralism" (p. 32). Unfortunately, in light of martial law and its consequences, reformist tendencies in Eastern Europe are likely to be suppressed, at least in the short run.

In contrast to many "instant analyses" of the Polish crisis, this one is based on extensive research in Polish sources. The authors are all young British scholars, and they indicate a bright future for social scientific studies of Poland in Britain. One might have expected a separate chapter on the development of the Solidarity trade union movement, though that has been dealt with extensively elsewhere. In light of events immediately after the book was completed, one wishes that there had been a chapter on developments within the Polish military and police in the 1970s. While these are difficult subjects to research, the diligence of the authors in developing their essays leads one to believe that such a chapter could have been written. But even without such a chapter, this book must stand as one of the most serious and valuable analyses of Poland to appear in recent years.

ZVI GITELMAN
University of Michigan

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East European Military Establishments: The Warsaw Pact Northern Tier *by A. Ross Johnson, Robert W. Dean, and Alexander Alexiev. New York, Crane Russak and Co., 1982. 182 pp. $19.50.*

The military balance in Europe and the development of Soviet military power in the region are subjects that have always attracted a great deal of attention. However, relatively little study has been performed in the non-classified literature on a topic of related importance, the reliability and effectiveness of the non-Soviet military establishments of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO). Non-Soviet forces may play a significant part in offensive operations against the Western Alliance, and Soviet lines of supply and communication to the central front in Europe will run through East European territory. Thus, some assessment must be made of the performance of non-Soviet as well as Soviet components of the WTO command structure.

This book, originally produced as a Rand Corporation study, provides a timely and well-constructed account of three of the most important WTO military establishments, those of East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. Rather than focusing on the "hard" aspects of military capability, such as numbers of men and equipment and weapon systems performance, the authors concentrate on the non-quantifiable, but no less important, factors of political reliability, organizational cohesiveness and morale, and doctrinal concepts.

The WTO is a coalition—however hegemonically influenced by the USSR—of states with diverse national experiences and military traditions. The authors correctly see these elements as having an impact on their domestic political roles and future wartime missions. The study therefore employs a comparative method to present a picture of national and institutional diversity.

Some of the observations presented are to be expected. For example, the military strategies of each of the WTO states reflect the Soviet preference for rapid, preemptive offensive operations. The Soviets have utilized a network of bilateral and multilateral ties to develop an intimate relationship with the officer corps of the WTO, and have attempted, rather successfully in the cases of Poland and the German Democratic Republic, to mold military cadres into a Soviet image. Therefore, the Soviets have managed to foster a respectable amount of doctrinal and organizational uniformity within their alliance system.

Other conclusions are important, however, in revealing the potentially mixed performance of WTO forces in war. Although the Polish people may harbor nationalist and anti-Soviet feelings, the Polish military still appears to take its military obligations to the Soviet Union quite seriously, and would probably provide an effective adjunct to Soviet forces in military operations against Western Europe. By contrast, the Czechoslovakian officer corps was on the cutting edge of the movement to gain greater political autonomy from the USSR in 1968, and suffered from massive purges and voluntary resignations in the aftermath of the Soviet invasion. To this day, the officer corps has still not recovered in morale and there is a constant shortfall in the number of trained command personnel. Therefore, the fighting ability of Czech forces is highly doubtful.

It should be stressed that the book is primarily a study of military elites and conse-

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quently examines only one part—albeit a major one—of potential East European military performance. Information about the enlisted component of the armed forces, its training, morale, political reliability, and relationship with officers and non-commissioned officers are factors that must complete any assessment of the overall effectiveness of Warsaw Pact forces. If this study has a flaw, it lies in its intentionally narrow framework.

Despite its brevity, the book provides a valuable source of information on the WTO. It is well researched, pertinent in its conclusions, and will be useful to anyone involved in the examination of Warsaw Pact military power, or in civilian-military relations in communist states.

ANDREW C. GOLDBERG
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

An Economic History of the Middle East and North Africa *by Charles Issawi. New York, Columbia University Press, 1982. 304 pp. $25.00.*

This latest book in Charles Issawi's long and impressive list of published works on the economic histories of Middle Eastern states is probably the most directly relevant to introductory students of the subject. In organization, content, and writing style Issawi has undergraduate and first-year graduate students in mind, and for many of us who teach the politics and economics of the Middle East, this is possibly a work's ultimate compliment.

The book covers nearly two centuries (1800–1980), both of exogenously induced and indigenously created economic growth and development in the whole of the Middle East and North Africa region. The study begins with a concisely written economic overview of the impact and reaction of the Middle East to European colonial rule and economic imperialism. The details of the impact are then spelled out in separate chapters titled "Expansion of Foreign Trade," "Development of Transport," "The Influx of Foreign Capital," and "Migration and Minorities." The book's third major part identifies the region's specific responses to these influences by looking at "Population, Level of Living, and Social Development," "Agricultural Expansion," "Deindustrialization and Reindustrialization," "Institutions and Policy, Money and Prices, Savings and Investment," and "Petroleum." The latter section succinctly summarizes the peculiar characteristics of the petroleum industry and its impact on the economy of the Middle East and North Africa. The discussion on the framework in which the industry developed is particularly insightful and, in the Issawi tradition, consistently fair. An additional advantage of the entire analysis is the full inclusion of North Africa as an integral part of the "Middle East" region. For too long the exclusion of this critical component has distorted the understanding of the economic dynamics of the Middle East.

Specialists of the Middle East and North Africa or those searching for rigorous, theoretically-inspired economic analysis will be somewhat disappointed with this volume

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—yet these are not Issawi's primary audience. What the author has intended and admirably achieved is a work of broad synthesis, more descriptive than analytical in nature, within which the historical, imperial, and nativistic forces intersect to create a society that is at once economically dynamic and socially progressive, yet that remains, in many of its essential features, retarded and underdeveloped. As contradictory impulses buffet this turbulent region, the peoples of the Middle East and North Africa continue to seek simultaneously the unachievable: "economic growth, higher levels of living, national power, equality, a greater sense of community and cultural identity, and political liberty" (p. 227). Both the origins of these impulses and the manner in which they are reconciled are eloquently presented in this volume which, along with Roger Owen's *The Middle East in the World Economy, 1800–1914* (1981), constitutes an ideal introductory text on the subject. Its availability for such purposes, however, is ultimately dependent upon its appearance in a paperback edition.

JOHN P. ENTELIS
Fordham University

The New Arab Social Order: A Study of the Social Impact of Oil Wealth *by Saad Eddin Ibrahim. Boulder, Colo., Westview Press, 1982. 208 pp. $18.00.*

This study results from Ibrahim's involvement in a larger research project devoted to relations among rich and poor Arab states. This project has already yielded an edited volume by its coordinators, Malcolm Kerr and Sayed Yassin, and presumably will stimulate further single-author studies as well. The appearance of Ibrahim's book is noteworthy, as the author is one of a relatively limited number of sociologists actively working on the Middle East. Furthermore, the book represents an important trend toward looking at the Middle East, in this case the Arab world, in more generalized, comparative terms rather than on a discrete, country-by-country basis. The author successfully achieves this complex goal by focusing on manageable themes that he explores thoroughly, articulately, and with great understanding of those special factors that can make the Arab world a single and researchable sociopolitical entity.

The basic theme of the study is Ibrahim's contention "that the Arab world is more closely linked socioeconomically at present than at any time in its modern history. The linkage . . . is dramatically manifested in the flow of manpower and money (in opposite directions) across Arab state borders at levels and magnitudes never precedented in the last few centuries" (p. 156). On some levels this assertion appears quite sound, but on others it raises important questions. For example, in light of these undeniably close socioeconomic linkages, we must query the absence of a corresponding degree of Arab unity. For example, with Libya and Syria supporting Iran in a protracted and futile war with Iraq, or with the questionable Arab commitment to providing efficacious support for Palestinian nationalism, Arab unity remains, as always, a utopian ideal. Yet linkages

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and unity are obviously not synonomous. Ibrahim astutely recognizes this, implicitly reminding us of the notion put forth by Stanley Hoffmann of how states practice international relations by playing simultaneously on a number of "different chessboards." This is no less the case regionally, since domestically, political elites find themselves in equally exacting and, at times, contradictory interactions with various opposition and support groups.

Ibrahim masterfully picks his way through this conceptual and empirical thicket, proceeding through several chapters devoted to macro-sociological themes such as inter- and intra-Arab social stratification, the consequences of labor exportation for Egypt and importation for Saudi Arabia, and the more generalized implications of "oil-related social changes" that affect both oil producers and non-producers in the Arab world. A central theme of the study is the manner in which "oil has turned the stratification of the Arab world nearly upside down" (p. 154). Using indicators such as gross national product, rates of literacy, labor participation, and so on, Ibrahim ranks states in four strata ranging from the rich, to the well-to-do, down to the struggling middle, and, finally, to the poor. Ironically, the rich states have little to offer but their great wealth, while the less fortunate states, those with little or no oil, boast more manpower, both skilled and unskilled. This has led to increased interdependence, recognized by political elites throughout the Arab world, as well as to a concomitant potential either to stabilize or to destabilize the region. According to the author, this interdependence has become and will continue to be a primary dynamic affecting regional and domestic social, cultural, and political life.

The new Arab social order, when looked at in the context of Arab dependence on the outside world, and Arab crises of legitimacy, prevalent in the Middle East as a whole, have led to a host of alternative and destabilizing forms of political expression "among Arab masses [where] cynicism, apathy, and social discontent have become rampant" (p. 173). This has become a dominant problem, for "the economic growth of the Arab world has made possible expansion of the ranks of the lower middle class and the lumpen urban proletariat" (p. 174). The political future of the Arab Middle East may well lie in the hands of these politically restive and combustible class groupings.

JERROLD D. GREEN
University of Michigan

Roots of Confrontation in South Asia: Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, and the Superpowers *by Stanley Wolpert. New York, Oxford University Press, 1982. 222 pp. $14.95.*

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 constituted a challenge of explanation and interpretation to the community of scholars. Wolpert, an eminent student of South Asian history, makes his contribution in this brief but effective analysis of the cultural and political background to the Soviet action. In three successive chapters he ex-

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amines the Indian and Islamic backdrop to Afghanistan's emergence as a more or less modern nation-state. Several other chapters elaborate the peculiar strategic position of Afghanistan. While it contains very little in the way of essential minerals or other resources, it happens to lie at the boundaries of three major imperial-cultural forces—the Russian-Soviet presence to the north, the British-Indian in the southeast, and the Persian-Iranian in the southwest. Indeed, there is a fingertip of contact between Afghanistan and China—strategically insignificant, but enough to give the Russians the pretext for evacuating the Wakhan corridor. Two chapters examine the evolution of American policy towards the region and the current situation in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Finally, Wolpert draws some cautious conclusions and offers his own view on what a "more rational South Asian policy" for the United States would and should look like.

The great strength of this volume is, as one might expect, the author's firm command over the region's history. There is just enough detail for the expert to understand Wolpert's assumptions and approach, but not so much as to overwhelm the lay reader. Perhaps more than any single book now in print, this puts the Afghan crisis in its proper historical context. It is, therefore, strongly recommended as an introductory or supplementary text and as a basic reference book for any library worth its name.

There are two points on which Wolpert might be faulted. The first is his emphasis on the South Asian quality of the Afghanistan conflict. Much of Afghanistan's culture, language, and strategic importance derives from its proximity to Iran, oil, and the Persian Gulf, not because it abuts South Asia. While most discussions of the Afghan crisis ignore the South Asian linkage, this book stresses it too much. Second, his suggestions for U.S. policy seem excessively breezy and hasty, and are already outdated. He states that with "a hefty assist from Moscow," American policy towards South Asia once again spun itself full circle, and "once again Pakistan was to become our martial surrogate, while India's armed forces and military systems would be driven to dependence upon and into closer conformity with the Red Army" (p. 192). This simply is not and was not true. The Indians are wary of increasing their dependence on the Soviets and the American commitment to Pakistan has thus far been quite limited. The Reagan administration, like the Carter administration, has made it quite clear that it does not view limited support for Pakistan as incompatible with the proposition that India is the major military and political power in the subcontinent.

STEPHEN PHILIP COHEN
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Communist Powers and Sub-Saharan Africa *edited by Thomas H. Henriksen. Stanford, Calif., Hoover Institution Press, 1982. 137 pp. $9.95.*

This book is explicitly modeled after, and attempts to augment, the 1963 book *Africa and the Communist World*, edited by Zbigniew Brzezinski, also under the auspices of the Hoover Institution. Thus the book has chapters on each of the major Communist actors

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in Africa: the USSR, the East European states, Cuba, and the People's Republic of China (PRC). These chapters are good descriptions of the activities of the various Communist actors in independent Black Africa. Richard E. Bissell provides a sound historical presentation of Soviet policy, with an excellent section on party-to-party relations. Roger E. Kanet's chapter on Eastern Europe is invaluable because it addresses a topic so rarely covered in English and because of the many excellent statistical tables and analyses, especially of trade patterns. George Volsky's discussion of Cuba is fast-paced, well written, and provides an intriguing combination of Havanology and gossip. William E. Ratcliff has written a thorough discussion of the various phases of Chinese policy.

However, the book runs into difficulty in its attempt to follow the format of the earlier Brzezinski book because the world was a much simpler place when Brzezinski was writing than it was almost twenty years later. Thus, whereas a fairly comprehensive book could be written back then with only one chapter and one point of view per Communist actor, the complexities of recent years have produced or elicited an incredible divergence of views on motives and objectives, on the context for analysis (global or regional), and on comparisons between American and Soviet behavior. If Henriksen had wanted to repeat the comprehensiveness of the earlier Brzezinski volume, he would have had to include more than one chapter on each country or choose authors prepared to deal explicitly with the various schools of thought on post-1974 Soviet behavior in Africa.

The editor does acknowledge the changes that have occurred in the past twenty years. He notes that the role of Cuba and the East European countries is much more significant, that the Soviet dispute with the PRC has intensified, that Soviet military adventures have been considerable, and that the early expectations for African peace and democracy have proven too sanguine. However, it is when he notes on the very first page of the Preface that Western "resolve" in Africa has been lower that we are put on notice that the editor has a particular perspective—a globalist one. If professors alert their students to this bias, and explain the regionalist-globalist controversy in some detail, the book would have not inconsiderable value.

The professor assigning this to a course—and the book is well suited to upper-division undergraduates or beginning graduate students—would also do well to alert his or her students to another aspect of the book, the implicit assumption that Soviet and American policies in Africa are basically dissimilar. There is not explicit or implicit acknowledgment that there is room for a regionalist-globalist debate about U.S. policy in Africa, that the very valuable distinction that Bissell makes in his chapter between the Russian and Communist aspects of Soviet African policy has some counterpart in the tension in U.S. policy between spreading democracy and promoting American national interests, or that the covert Communist activities alluded to in several of the chapters sometimes have their analogue in U.S. behavior.

But overall, this book is a sound analysis of the operations of several Communist actors in tropical Africa and would be a helpful addition to a college syllabus.

HELEN DESFOSSES
State University of New York at Albany

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The Australian-American Security Relationship: A Regional and International Perspective *by Henry S. Albinski. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1982. 257 pp. $32.50.*

Henry Albinski is the most prolific American political scientist among the few who write knowledgeably about Australia. In his area of concern he has made himself immensely well informed and well connected. He reads and interviews voraciously. His most recent books have been very large; this one, if his publisher could have afforded a decent size print, would approach 500 pages—on just six years of a mostly noncontroversial bilateral alliance. Albinski's attention to detail is often awesome—and sometimes numbing. Included here is almost everything one might want to know about the interplay of Australian and American military and diplomatic activities in almost every part of the vast area that comprises the South Pacific, Eurasia south of the Soviet Union, and Southern and Northeastern Africa—through the era of Presidents Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter, or the first two terms of the Malcolm Fraser government in Australia.

What seems lacking is a clear principle of selectivity. Micronesia and Melanesia get about as much attention as Japan (and much more than India). To be sure, there are some virtues in this; readers can apply their own criteria of selectivity—and I for one was glad to be led to poke around in minutiae, once in a while discerning a real nugget, such as evidence that Fraser stalled the Soviet-American talks on naval limitation in the Indian Ocean until the talks were doomed.

But Albinski himself provides few cues to relative importance of items within the vast comprehensiveness of this book. Indeed, his sections on East and Southeast Asia are so discreetly circumspect and prolix in diplomatic circumlocations that one sometimes feels subjected to a splicing of taped official briefings. Fortunately, however, the breeze quickens refreshingly when we move out to sea for the second half of the book—westward across the Indian Ocean and eastward far into the South Pacific. Those are the areas of Australian and American security interest about which Albinski has a great deal to say and that is bracing and very hard to locate in any other study.

There are some gaps—notably that Albinski has deliberately not employed his undoubted erudition about Australian internal politics to give readers of this book much, if any, sense of the party-political or bureaucratic-political decision-making process in either Australia or America that produced the interacting policies he describes—even though a number of them were in fact quite controversial. With standard metaphors about such studies, one observes that Albinski treats the two countries as essentially "black-boxed"; they bounce like billiard balls on the international pool table. Thus an uninformed reader would remain in the dark about the tensions and final break-up in the relationship between the very hawkish Prime Minister Fraser and his considerably more dovish Foreign Minister Andrew Peacock; and there is not even any attention to the open continuous policy conflicts among, for example, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Cyrus Vance, Andrew Young, and Patricia Derian in the highly pluralistic Carter administration. Some of the other detail in this book might well have been sacrificed in order to fill such gaps. As political scientists, we have learned by now from Richard Neustadt, I.M. Destler, and others that alliance politics are not just two-dimensional but three-

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dimensional, and reach down into the participants' respective polities. And when dealing with democracies the evidence is available to show how this occurs, as Albinski could ably have done.

An approach that revealed more controversy might also suggest to some readers grounds for less complacency about Australian-American relations. Albinski unobtrusively conveys an uncritically favorable impression of Fraser's endless maneuvers to block American disengagement from Fraser's regions of concern. Both for Australia and for the U.S., Fraser's clinging to unequal interdependence is depicted as vindicated today by the new cold war. Not everyone contentedly agrees.

H. BRADFORD WESTERFIELD
Yale University

The House and Foreign Policy: The Irony of Congressional Reform *by Charles W. Whalen, Jr. Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1982. 207 pp. Cloth, $18.95; paper, $9.95.*

Charles W. Whalen, Jr., a former Republican member of the House of Representatives from Ohio, has written an interesting and thoughtful analysis of the impact of the reforms of the 1970s on foreign policy decision-making in the Congress. In so doing he has drawn very effectively both on his experience as a senior and highly influential member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee and on his ability to understand and articulate the political factors that permeate the highly pragmatic contexts in which members act both inside and outside the House.

Whalen's basic argument is one that has begun to gain increased currency as the performance limitations of a democratized and decentralized House have become increasingly apparent. He contends that recorded teller votes, increased subcommittee power, new procedures for choosing who would chair committees, growth in a variety of forms of congressional staff, etc., have had sizeable dysfunctional consequences for the quality or effectiveness of House decision-making. He buttresses his abstract argument with a detailed examination of a number of concrete floor votes on foreign policy issues in post-Watergate Congresses, and he seeks to demonstrate that decision-making has become far more parochial and shortsighted.

That deliberate change in legislatures typically has unanticipated dysfunctional consequences is something students of the House's history have long known. The reforms of 1910 provide a classic example: rule by "Committee barons" in the 1940s and 1950s was not at all what the critics of "Czar rule" intended. Nonetheless, Whalen's analysis has merit and interest beyond merely providing a more timely and relevant re-demonstration of a familiar hypothesis. In making his argument about dysfunctional effects, Whalen focuses on a basic problem that political scientists who study the Congress have largely ignored—the conflict or tension between democracy and effectiveness.

The root of Whalen's analysis thus inheres in his treatment of the manner in which

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House reforms in the 1970s have undercut sound or wise policymaking. He finds a two-fold, reinforcing effect. On the one hand, recent reforms have strengthened the independence and technical capacity of individual members and have thereby lessened the ability of House leaders and executive officers to divert them from pursuing or indulging highly self-serving concerns. On the other hand, recent reforms, by increasing accountability to constitutents, have weakened the inclination of members to take stands that are difficult to explain and have strengthened their inclination to pander to special interests and firmly entrenched ideological shibboleths.

Whalen, however, is no advocate of any wholesale return to past practice. As someone who served in the House in the 1960s, he recognizes the beneficial or functional consequences of increased member power, knowledge, and accountability, as well as the dysfunctional effects of these changes. Moreover, he is too intelligent to believe that history can be reversed; he senses that the reforms themselves and their effects are tied to broader electoral, institutional, and technological forces. He does overestimate the benefits of his own reform proposals, which are procedural and aimed at reducing opportunities for amendments and recorded votes. Still, he can be forgiven for his optimism, since his proposals are in the right direction and are based on coherent and insightful analysis.

It is arguable that Whalen has exaggerated the tension that exists between democracy and effectiveness – that the voting results in his case studies reflect a highly idiosyncratic period or that he casts views he opposed in too harsh a light. However, Whalen makes a persuasive case for his position in documenting his case examples. More important, to deny or ignore the existence of some form of significant linkage among democratization, politicalization, and substantive ineffectiveness is simply wrong. That the relationship between democracy and effectivenessis not linear was well recognized by the framers of the Constitution and it is also familiar as a general proposition to political scientists. Among other virtues, Whalen's study brings this proposition to bear on the Congress. He thus reminds us of the relevance and importance of macro-level analysis and he alerts us to the rich possibilities that exist for integrating motivational and organizational factors in explaining institutional performance.

JOSEPH COOPER
Rice University

Decentralizing Urban Policy: Case Studies in Community Development *by Paul R. Dommel and associates. Washington, D.C., Brookings Institution, 1982. 271 pp. Cloth, $24.95; paper, $9.95.*

It is refreshing to see an effort at unified case studies serving as a telling reminder that all that is officially reported may not be so. The book incorporates case studies of Chicago, Phoenix, Houston, Allegheny County (Pennsylvania), and Carbondale, Illinois. This provides a mid-level approach, hopefully curing the curse of the individual case study. By integrating a number of case studies, the authors reduce the parochial anecdotal na-

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ture of such studies that are usually limited to a moment in time, to a particular cast of characters in a unique setting.

The five case studies take up 175 of the 265 pages in the work. They are prefaced by chapters on methodology and the Block Grant concept. The latter provides a useful recap of the flow of philosophy and events that produced the Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) effort. The conclusions are presented in a terse, appetizing (but not appetite-fulfilling) span of less than 40 pages.

The initial elation, shortly followed by dismay, of mayors who no longer could use the federal government as the "bad guy" in allocating resources and the conflict with community action groups are ably sketched in the conclusions—but are scarcely conceptualized to any depth. Similarly, the maturing of the directional web, after the initial euphoria of the first year of CDBG, deserves much more amplification. Was this an inexorable bureaucratic creep, a complement of the harsh reality that the sponsor sooner or later must define the art form? Or was it simply a reflection of new personalities in authority in Washington?

We must look to subsequent works—and, it may be hoped, to the same authors—to provide more definitive responses. In the meantime, the several case studies give room both for melancholy and hopes for the future. The only way to use local government as the key decision-maker is to "invent City Hall" by giving it responsibility. The common theme that runs through the vignettes suggests a long and far from certain process. The price of developing responsible local government may involve, at least initially, accepting its inadequacies. This is a harsh reality that may fly in the face of immediate needs and public attention.

In 1950s, federal grants represented 10.4 percent of state and local expenditures; by 1980, the proportion had risen to an estimated 26.3 percent, the bulk of the increase coming at the end of this period. Local fund-raising capacities of communities are increasingly threatened by the fluidity with which industry—and residents as well—seek out alternate locations. Just as the utilization of the property tax by central cities fell afoul of suburban low-tax havens, so generalizations based on metropolitan area incongruities have been swept away by the regional differentiation that has come to the fore. Even this may lag the fundamentals of the worldwide homogenization of labor force and managerial expertise that is increasingly evident.

Within this context, the issues may not be local versus national funding or direction, but rather issues of national strategy placed and formed within the context of global competition. The withering away of concern on local redistribution, and its replacement by the mid-life crisis of middle-America, raises severe issues and constraints. The potential of the federal government to serve as a relatively passive fundraising entity, with equivalently passive allocation of the garnered resources to localities to use as they will, is now questioned. CDBGs increasingly are measured not in the adequacy of provisions for equity or local democratic procedures—but rather in terms of national economic priorities and competence.

GEORGE STERNLIEB
Rutgers University

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Why Nations Realign: Foreign Policy Restructuring in the Postwar World *by K. J. Holsti, et al. Winchester, Mass., Allen and Unwin, 1982. 225 pp. $28.50.*

With this volume, K. J. Holsti completes a trilogy of essays about some of the conventional wisdom in international relations and foreign policy theory that is excessively influenced by a Western perspective. Obviously he and his five collaborators focus on an important question of international politics, a particular kind of foreign policy change that he labels foreign policy "restructuring." By this is meant "the dramatic, wholesale alteration of a nation's pattern of external relations" (p. ix), which is distinguished from "normal foreign policy change," usually slow and incremental. Systematic comparative study of "restructuring" has previously not gone very far, most existing works being confined to descriptive commentary on single country episodes. By introducing a rigorous framework for describing and explaining foreign policy in a series of eight case studies, the authors set out to show how and why restructuring took place in those instances. In a final chapter, Holsti evaluates the study, the foremost contribution of the book.

Most of the cases involve Third World countries that have been concerned with dependency and some sort of external penetration—political, military, economic, cultural. The study is not limited to a particular geographical region or class of states. Even with only six cases, the sample includes developed and developing countries, major powers and small states, democracies and authoritarian regimes. Utilizing a foreign policy typology labeled *isolation, self-reliance, dependence*, and *nonalignment-diversification*, the case studies of restructuring are classified as follows: from isolation to dependence (Bhutan, 1958–62) by Holsti; from isolation to diversification (China, 1970–73) by Thomas W. Robinson; from self-reliance to isolation (China, 1966–69) by Robinson; from dependence to self-reliance (China, 1959–66) by Robinson; from dependence to diversification (Tanzania, 1967–77) by Timothy Shaw and Ibrahim Msabaha; from dependence to diversification (Canada, 1972–78) by Holsti; from diversification to isolation (Burma, 1963–67) by Holsti; an abortive attempt to change foreign policy (Chile, 1970–73) by Jacques Zylberg and Miguel Monterichard.

The cases selected all involve major attempts to repattern external relations. Each case is concerned with describing "(a) significant changes in the patterns of externally directed diplomatic, cultural, commercial and military relations, and (b) the identification of new policies with regard to foreign 'agents' within the country" (p. 12). The distinction is made between the intent to change policies (foreign policy reorientation) and actual restructuring. An attempt is made to discover why policymakers chose a particular type of new orientation as opposed to some other.

Not surprisingly, the descriptive part of the study provides a clearer picture than the explanatory. As Holsti correctly concludes, "by including eight cases we do increase the capacity for generalization, but certainly not to argue that foreign policy realignment is *regularly* caused by x, y, z, or some combination of them. . . . From the point of view of foreign policy theory, we regrettably cannot explain why some states restructure their foreign policies while others, facing similar domestic and external problems, do not

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. . . . We lack a control group of states which, facing similar domestic and external conditions, did *not* change their policy patterns." (p. 198) What is shown is that "certain conditions, particularly dependence, vulnerability, perception of weakness and massive external penetration, *predispose* some governments to restructure their foreign policies . . . . Comparisons and generalizations derived inductively from our case studies must be understood in a probablistic sense" (p. 199). This disclaimer comes as no surprise to laborers in the vineyard of comparative foreign policy analysis. However, the value of the Holsti study is such that it should be required reading for serious students of contemporary foreign policy and international politics, both in Western and Third World countries, and both by critics of and by believers in the case study method. It represents a kind of honest and careful scholarship in an age of global interdependence and dependence, where complexity and misperception and frequent change challenge the best social scientists can offer. One is struck by the disciplined approach guiding the study and Holsti team of country specialists, as well as the specific substantive finding concerning governmental choice.

S. SHEPARD JONES
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

Polls Apart *by John P. Robinson and Robert Meadow. Cabin John, Md., Seven Locks Press, 1982. 183 pp. $14.95.*

The warning of the title strikes twice in this thoughtful report from the Kettering Foundation on how to improve surveys of public opinion on foreign-policy issues and make them more useful for foreign-policy decision-making. The first observation of the double entendre is the suggestion that polls operate apart from the deliberations of the policy process. Policymakers, it is argued, often proceed in obvious contradiction to the expressed wishes of the people as documented in opinion surveys. The second observation is the fact that polls are too frequently apart in their findings—that is, when several polling organizations conducting surveys at the same time produce conflicting expressions of public opinion on the same issue.

Robinson and Meadow base their analysis of how poll data are used (or ignored) in the policy process on interviews with policymakers in the Ford and Carter administrations and with staff members of the House and Senate foreign policy committees. Their analysis of conflicting poll findings on foreign policy issues by major survey firms is followed by a unique experiment that shows that poll results will converge if the questionnaire is properly designed.

Part I of the book examines the connection between decision-making and the role of public opinion surveys in the policy formulation process. The evidence assembled suggests that polls are seldom used, occasionally misused, but most often ignored by national leaders in the development of foreign policy. The authors' insightful conclusions about why issue polls are not better utilized provide a welcome addition to the dearth

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of literature on this subject. Yet the chapter that reports on interviews with policymakers is disappointing. More detailed, concrete examples would have helped and the additional perspective of political advisors (such as Patrick Caddell or Richard Wirthlin) would have rounded out the analysis.

The second section of the book contrasts a critical examination of foreign policy surveys with the authors' own research on public attitudes in a "Ten City Study." Although Robinson and Meadow correctly attribute much of what they call a "litany of divergences in poll data" (p. 63) to differences in question wording, more attention could have been given to the many other potential sources of sampling and non-sampling error in survey data.

The "Ten City Study" was a series of surveys conducted in coordination with "town meetings" held between officials of the State Department and elite and non-elite citizens of the ten cities in 1976–77. The results of the poll data converge into rather consistent patterns due largely to the fact that the authors follow their own advice on questionnaire construction. The substantive analysis of the foreign policy issues is of interest in its own right and in secondary analysis by students of foreign policy.

Finally, Robinson and Meadow provide a "cook book" summary of how to frame questions properly for issues polls. Though this section is clearly written and fairly complete, a much fuller treatment of this topic is the subject of entire books, many of which are cited in the text.

The recommendations that are made to the survey research industry (pp. 134–36) are on target and will be familiar canons to the well trained survey researcher. Why then are they still just recommendations more than thirty years after Stanley Payne first documented "The Art of Asking Questions"? The answer has to do with the nature of the survey research industry as a social institution. An introspective study of that industry would shed light on this perplexing problem.

This book will have broad appeal and should be on the shelves of journalists, policymakers, pollsters, and poll followers. It is a useful reference book for teaching survey methods.

DONALD R. DELUCA
Yale University

REFERENCE BOOKS AND SOURCE MATERIALS RECEIVED

Congressional Publications: A Research Guide to Legislation, Budgets, and Treaties *prepared by Jerrold Zwirn. Littleton, Colo., Libraries Unlimited, 1983. 195 pp. $22.50.*

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



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

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

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